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Introduction and Overview
Employees whose jobs offer pensions leave their positions much 
less frequently than do employees whose jobs lack pensions. This 
observation has been confirmed by numerous researchers, working 
with diverse data sets covering different time periods. For instance, 
Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1993) found that over the seven-year 
period from 1975 to 1982, over 60 percent of workers not covered by 
pensions changed jobs. In the same time frame, less than 40 percent of 
workers who had pension coverage moved on to new jobs. Our own 
research (Gustman and Steinmeier 1993b) showed that over a one-year 
period between 1984 and 1985, the rate of job change among male 
workers without pension coverage was almost 20 percent. Meanwhile, 
only 6 percent of pension-covered workers switched employers.
Moreover, it does not appear that other factors, such as education or 
the type of job, are capable of explaining these differences in mobility 
rates. Even after allowing for the effects of various individual and job 
characteristics that might be expected to influence mobility, Mitchell 
(1982) found that pension-covered workers were 20 percentage points 
less likely to change jobs over a four-year period. This result is fairly 
typical. Indeed, the observation that workers with pensions move less 
from their jobs has come to be one of the most firmly rooted "stylized 
facts" in the literature dealing with pensions.
The research presented in this book challenges a widely held view 
as to why worker mobility is lower from jobs that offer pensions than 
from jobs that do not. According to that explanation, the lower mobility 
rate from pension-covered jobs occurs primarily because of financial 
disincentives created by pensions. Many pension plans use a formula 
to determine the amount of benefits, and the formula often increases 
benefits very rapidly in the final years before the specified retirement 
age. 1 Such plans are said to be "backloaded."2 If workers leave the firm 
before qualifying for retirement, they suffer a pension "capital loss" by 
giving up the opportunity for substantial increases in pension benefits. 3 
Thus, the prevailing view links the lower mobility of workers from 
pension-covered jobs and the backloading of defined benefit plans in a
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causal way, asserting that the capital loss from mobility discourages 
covered workers from leaving firms before qualifying for early retire 
ment.
Indeed, there is a literature that takes the linkage between reduced 
mobility from pension-covered jobs and backloaded pensions as evi 
dence of purposeful behavior by firms with regard to the design of pen 
sion plans. One branch of this literature argues that pensions are part of 
a human resource policy created to reduce the mobility of workers. 
Another branch argues that backloaded pensions are an integral part of 
compensation schemes that enhance work incentives. A further motiva 
tion attributed to the adoption of pensions is to encourage retirement at 
optimal ages.4 With regard to this literature, a finding of a relationship 
between pensions and mobility, and especially of a negative relation 
ship between backloaded pensions and mobility, is taken as support of 
a model or set of models of human resource policies in which pensions 
are an important tool for regulating mobility and worker productivity.
Background for Research
There are three types of evidence that have led to the belief that 
financial penalties from pensions reduce turnover. First, there is evi 
dence that workers who are covered by pensions have lower rates of 
turnover from their jobs and longer tenure than do workers without 
pensions (Bartel and Borjas 1977; Mitchell 1982, 1983; and McCor- 
mick and Hughes 1984, among others). Second, as required by the the 
ory, there are financial penalties to early mobility. Examinations of 
pension plans at a number of firms have revealed that the benefit for 
mula of defined benefit plans causes the value of the pension to accrue 
disproportionately in the later years of employment (Bulow 1981, 
1982; Kotlikoff and Wise 1985, 1987a). In addition, special benefits 
often accrue to those who remain with the firm until qualifying for 
early retirement. This research establishes the magnitude of the back- 
loading and pension capital losses in defined benefit plans and has sug 
gested to analysts that the resulting disincentives are sizable enough to 
discourage mobility. Third, there has been some recent work that has 
attempted to relate a measure of the disincentive to mobility in pen-
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sions directly to observed turnover behavior. That work (Alien, Clark, 
and McDermed 1993) has concluded that a substantial fraction of the 
difference in turnover associated with pension coverage is due to the 
loss in pension value with turnover. 5
Our analysis confirms that turnover is lower from pension-covered 
jobs and that pensions are indeed structured in such a way as to result 
in financial penalties to early mobility. However, we do not find pen 
sion backloading to be large enough to have a strong effect on turnover, 
nor do we find the available evidence of the relationship between pen 
sion backloading and turnover to be persuasive as to causality. We 
believe that our study raises questions about the conventional view that 
pension backloading is responsible for the lower mobility rates of pen 
sion-covered workers.
If backloading is not the cause of lower mobility, what is? One pos 
sibility is that workers who are in pension-covered jobs are different in 
a way that makes them inherently more likely to remain in their jobs. 
These differences may or may not be observable to the investigator, but 
could not have been included in studies finding lower mobility from 
pension-covered jobs. Another possibility is that there is some aspect 
of pension-covered employment, other than backloading, that is 
responsible for reduced mobility. The explanation we favor is that 
workers are reluctant to leave pension-covered jobs because they 
receive higher compensation on those jobs than they can receive else 
where (in the next best opportunity). This extra compensation on a 
pension-covered job may be called a "compensation premium."
Research Approach
Previous empirical studies have disregarded the possibility of a 
compensation premium, largely because the next best opportunity is 
not observed if the worker does not switch jobs. As a result, those stud 
ies have attributed whatever effect the compensation premium has on 
mobility to other variables, most notably to pensions or to pension 
backloading. However, we have developed a procedure that overcomes 
this difficulty, and we believe that the compensation premium explana-
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tion for the lower mobility rate among pension-covered workers is sup 
ported by the balance of the evidence.
The approach adopted here is more comprehensive than in the usual 
model, but it still does not encompass all relevant possibilities. The 
methodology does analyze the effects of both the degree of pension 
backloading and of any compensation premium on mobility. However, 
the model does not incorporate the possibility that backloaded pen 
sions are used to select workers on the basis of unobservable character 
istics associated with low turnover and that it is this unmeasured 
propensity to stay that accounts for the lower mobility of workers on 
pension-covered jobs. In this regard, we face the same problem as 
other researchers: where there are a number of potential explanations 
for behavior, it is often not possible to include all relevant possibilities 
in a single model, due to limited empirical information. The typical 
empirical model of mobility incorporates one or at best two of these 
explanations. The same is true for empirical studies explaining pension 
coverage, plan attributes, and pension accrual profiles and their charac 
teristics. In all of these studies, it is hoped that the behavioral variables 
omitted from the analysis will be orthogonal in their impact to the 
included variables so that, in the absence of a relationship between 
included and omitted variables, coefficient estimates for included vari 
ables are unbiased. Fortunately, for the model we estimate, evidence 
from Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1993) suggests that selection, to 
the extent it exists, is based on observable, rather than unobservable, 
characteristics, which can be included in our analysis.
The model also does not address the source of a wage premium. In a 
spot labor market, where only the current period matters, and in which 
all agents are competitive, we can anticipate that the wage equals pro 
ductivity in each period and that workers shift to jobs providing the 
highest benefits net of moving costs. In such a world, we would not 
expect to find compensation premiums. Once more realistic assump 
tions are adopted, however, compensation premiums may arise; these 
assumptions include such factors as long-term attachment of workers 
to firms, compensation arrangements that may span a period of time, 
training costs, matching workers to jobs, pockets of imperfect competi 
tion and a resulting array of rents and quasi rents, monitoring costs, 
imperfect and asymmetric information, and unions motivated by a vari 
ety of considerations (Krueger and Summers 1988).
Introduction and Overview 5
The origin and even the existence of compensation premiums are 
intensely debated topics in the field of labor economics. Arguments 
abound over whether certain jobs are "good" jobs, meaning that they 
pay a given worker more than can be secured in other employment, or 
whether industry wage differentials mainly reflect compensating dif 
ferentials for unmeasured factors or unmeasured ability. While there is 
general agreement on the existence of wage premiums on union jobs, 
there is, for example, disagreement on the reasons for the well-docu 
mented compensation premium that accrues to those who work at large 
firms (Brown and Medoff 1989). Some argue that such wage differen 
tials are equalizing, so that those on less pleasant jobs are paid more, 
while others find the evidence inconsistent with an equalizing wage 
differentials argument. The literature also includes competing views of 
how wages are determined, even when there is long-term job attach 
ment. Some argue that wage experience and wage-tenure profiles are 
more likely to reflect efforts by the firm to economize on the costs of 
specific training or on the costs of generating a good match. Others 
argue that the profiles reflect selection in mobility over the course of 
the life cycle, so that those with higher productivity are more likely to 
stay with the job, or even pure returns to seniority.
Research Findings
Our work does not resolve the preceding issues of wage determina 
tion or indicate a choice among the competing explanations for com 
pensation and employment differentials. Our findings do suggest that 
the backloading is smaller than one would expect from a major deter 
minant of productivity and turnover and that some aspects of the usual 
explanation for the effects of pensions on turnover are not consistent 
with observed behavior. Our results also indicate that the wage pre 
mium on pension-covered jobs has a suspiciously strong, negative rela 
tionship with the turnover observed for pension-covered workers. 
More specifically, the evidence that we and others have gathered sug 
gests the following:
  The penalty to mobility from backloaded pensions is relatively 
small. For the average, covered male worker in his thirties or forties,
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the loss would be a little more than half a year©s pay. If an alternative 
job were to pay just a few percentage points more, it would be to the 
worker©s advantage to take the pension loss to get the higher wage. As 
an example, a raise of just 3 percent, multiplied by 20 years until retire 
ment, more than offsets a pension loss of half a year©s pay, especially 
since the increase in wages begins immediately, while the loss in pen 
sion value comes after 20 years. In general, a once-and-for-all loss of 
the equivalent of a few months© pay, which would be realized 20 to 30 
years in the future, is not large enough to tie workers in their thirties or 
forties to the firm. The loss from pension backloading due to early sep 
aration is a stock rather than a flow over time, and that loss remains 
small relative to the wage differential from moving until the worker 
approaches within a decade or so of retirement age.
  It has been suggested that firms use pensions to reduce turnover in 
order to lower hiring and training costs. However, the penalty to mobil 
ity from defined benefit plans is especially small for young workers. 
The incentives against quitting are insubstantial precisely during the 
time when the firm has the largest share of unrealized returns on its 
training investment. Until the individual reaches within about 10 years 
of retirement age, benefit formulas do not create a substantial penalty 
to leaving the firm. Thus, the evidence developed here suggests that 
firms would use pensions as a tool to economize on training costs only 
if these costs occurred throughout the period of attachment to the firm. 
The pension would not be helpful in economizing on the substantial 
fraction of training costs incurred in the initial year of hire. 6 The pen 
sion, of course, would also not be useful in economizing on hiring 
costs.
  Turnover is not lower for workers who hold jobs offering back- 
loaded pensions (mainly defined benefit pensions) than it is for work 
ers who hold jobs offering pensions in which benefits are not 
backloaded (defined contribution plans). We show that, in reduced 
form mobility equations in which defined benefit plans are distin 
guished from defined contribution plans, both types of pensions are 
found to have an equal, negative association with the probability of 
turnover. Generic defined contribution plans are not backloaded, and, 
even with the addition of provisions that foster backloading on some 
defined contribution plans, such as special bonuses for those who qual 
ify for early retirement, a nationally representative sample of defined
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contribution plans does not exhibit much backloading. Thus, it is a 
mystery as to why defined contribution plans, which are not back- 
loaded, should be associated with lower turnover. 7 This finding sug 
gests that it is not the financial backloading aspect of pensions that 
causes lower turnover rates, but some omitted factor that is correlated 
both with pension coverage and with turnover. 8
  In current empirical models relating mobility to pensions (or to 
pension backloading), to wages, and to other variables, the relative 
sizes of the pension and wage coefficients are difficult to interpret. 
Typically, the pension coefficient is quite large, and the wage coeffi 
cient is relatively small. Taken at face value, this would imply that the 
effect on mobility of having a pension is the same as that of having a 
very substantial wage increase. For instance, Mitchell (1982) estimates 
that having a pension has more effect on mobility than a tripling of the 
wage! 9 These findings suggest to us that the current models are mis- 
specified if they are to be interpreted as a causal relationship. The prob 
lem is that they lack a measure of the compensation premium. If there 
are compensation premiums, and if those premiums are more closely 
correlated with pensions than with wages, then the explanatory power 
that should be attributed to the premiums in a mobility equation would 
instead be attributed to pensions. This problem would account for the 
pension coefficient being so large relative to the wage coefficient. In 
the material that follows, we develop evidence that supports this view.
  Some studies find that pensions are associated with reduced turn 
over mainly because they are associated with lower layoffs, rather than 
lower quits (Mitchell, 1982; Alien, Clark, and McDermed 1993). 10 This 
finding raises questions about the motivation for adopting backloaded 
pensions and, in particular, about whether firms adopt backloaded pen 
sions as a device to reduce turnover. If turnover were lower on pension- 
covered jobs due to a reduction in layoffs, backloaded pensions would 
be unnecessary as a device for lowering mobility: firms can control 
layoffs directly without resorting to backloaded pensions. This sug 
gests that firms have adopted a backloaded benefit structure for other 
reasons, perhaps having to do with efforts to provide tax-deferred sav 
ings, to provide various types of insurance that the worker values and 
that are not available in the market, and/or to regulate retirement 
behavior (Gustman, Mitchell, and Steinmeier 1994)."
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A finding that compensation premiums, and not pension backload- 
ing, account for reduced mobility from pension-covered jobs calls into 
question a number of theoretical models of the motivation for pen 
sions. The role of backloading is central to models claiming that the 
defined benefit pension is a natural outgrowth of implicit contracts 
designed to increase worker productivity and to economize on training, 
supervision, and related costs. Thus, in addition to its relevance for 
models of worker mobility, this study is relevant to the literature on 
pension economics. To the degree that it uncovers additional system 
atic wage differentials, the study also provides evidence pertinent to 
models of wage determination and to the analysis of industry and com 
pensating wage differentials.
Along with the theoretical implications, there are a number of policy 
implications from the finding that pension backloading per se is not 
likely to be responsible for much of the difference in mobility between 
workers on pension-covered and nonpension jobs. A mistaken view of 
causality may lead to inappropriate policies. For example, there has 
been some concern at the U.S. Department of Labor that pensions 
adversely affect productivity because they discourage mobility. This 
motivates a search for potential legislative cures. Some policy analysts 
also fear that, because of backloaded pensions, workers may stay too 
long with declining firms, thus worsening the positions of these firms; 
similarly, these analysts are concerned that workers might be reluctant 
to move to expanding sectors, thereby raising the labor costs of prom 
ising enterprises and inhibiting growth. 12 Legislation has required 
either cliff vesting where an employee becomes fully vested after a 
specified number of years, with no vesting prior to that within five 
years or graded vesting where an employee is partially vested after a 
certain number of years and then is increasingly vested according to a 
schedule until attaining 100 percent vesting within seven years (the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986) and has lowered the minimum age for credit 
ing a pension to 21 (the Pension Equity Act of 1984). The Congres 
sional Budget Office (CBO) has explored the possibility of using a 
projection of the wage at retirement rather than the wage at termination 
in calculating the pension benefit (CBO 1987). These initiatives, and 
other, more sweeping, recommendations, such as those of the Presi 
dent©s Commission on Pension Policy (1981), were partly motivated by
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a concern about the effects of turnover and backloading on pension 
benefits received at retirement.
Data Sources and Organization of Study
The empirical work in this book uses three major data sources: ret 
rospective data for a five-year period from the 1983 Survey of Con 
sumer Finances (SCF), the 1984-85 Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP), and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), 
covering the period 1984 through 1989. All three surveys provide use 
ful information for analyzing the pension-mobility relationship, but the 
data do have some limitations. The reason for job change is routinely 
collected only in the PSID, which is the smallest of the samples we 
have available. In the other surveys, either the reason for job change is 
not reported or it is available only for a limited, and, as it turns out, 
highly unrepresentative sample. As a result, much of our empirical 
work pools layoffs and quits, rather than allowing us to examine lay 
offs and quits separately. 13 On the other hand, employer-provided 
information detailing the pension characteristics and formulas is only 
available for the SCF. 14 Consequently, calculating the extent of back- 
loading using the SIPP and the PSID data requires imputation, by 
matching pensions to individuals on the basis of personal and job char 
acteristics.
We should note that, throughout the book, all empirical work per 
tains to men who are initially in their thirties and forties. Prime-aged 
workers are selected to avoid contaminating the results with retire 
ment-related behavior and to eliminate any mobility associated with 
school-work choices or with the initial period of job shopping. Analyz 
ing job mobility for women is considerably more complicated than it is 
for men, since it is much more reasonable to assume in the case of men 
that participation is constant and that work hours are full time. Our 
empirical model is not adequate to analyze jointly labor force partici 
pation, labor force hours, and mobility decisions, and, as such, would 
be inappropriate to use in analyzing the mobility decisions of women.
The book is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the basic arith 
metic of pension backloading. The literature exploring the relationship
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of pensions to mobility is discussed in chapter 3. Chapter 4 reviews the 
relevant descriptive statistics and basic multivariate relationships from 
the three surveys used in this study: the SCF, the PSID, and the SIPP. 
An econometric model of mobility decisions is developed in chapter 5. 
Using data from each of the three surveys, an empirical version of the 
model is estimated in chapter 6. In this model, mobility is a function of 
the compensation differential between the current and the next best job. 
The results of these estimations are then used to simulate the effects of 
pension backloading and of compensation differentials. Chapter 7 pro 
vides a reestimation of the model with panel data from the SIPP and 
the PSID, allowing pension backloading and the remaining compensa 
tion premium to have separate and possibly different effects on mobil 
ity. 15 The findings in this chapter represent a specification check. 
Chapter 8 presents the potential policy issues that arise from this work, 
and our conclusions are discussed in chapter 9.
NOTES
1. These plans, which are called defined benefit plans, base pension eligibility and the yearly 
pension entitlement on years of service and history of pay on the job. The other major plan type, 
defined contribution, bases benefits at retirement on the amount accumulated in an account held in 
the name of the covered worker, with accumulation based on contributions made by the worker 
and the employer, and on the returns to the investments held by the plan. Defined benefit plans are 
declining in importance, but they still are the predominant type of primary plan. Often, defined 
benefit plans are supplemented by defined contribution plans. In recent years, they have been sup 
plemented by a particular type of defined contribution plan, the 401(k) plan. For recent figures on 
plan coverage by type, see Beller and Lawrence (1992). For discussions of the reasons for these 
trends, see Clark and McDermed (1990), Gustman and Steinmeier (1992a), Ippolito (forthcoming 
a), and Kruse (forthcoming a and b).
2. It is possible to design defined contribution plans so that they are backloaded. Examples of 
such plans abound (Turner 1993). Backloading is attained in higher education, for example, by 
combining defined contribution plans with special early retirement incentives (Gustman and 
Steinmeier 1991 and 1992b). However, as evidence from a representative cross section of the 
population will show, the degree of backloading in defined contribution plans is very mild because 
early retirement incentives and other backloading devices are not nearly as common in defined 
contribution plans as they are in defined benefit plans. Moreover, even when such provisions are 
present, the size of the incentives they create, and thus their effects on retirement, are modest.
3. The concept of pension capital loss is discussed by Ippolito (1986), by Alien, Clark, and 
McDermed (1993), and by other students of the pension-mobility relationship. We will return to 
the question of measuring the pension loss from mobility.
4. More generally, pensions are said to have been promoted by efforts to save at tax-favored 
rates of return and to meet other goals of covered workers and their employers. For a review of the 
pension literature, see Gustman, Mitchell, and Steinmeier (1994).
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5. The 1993 Alien, Clark, and McDermed article is an important contribution to the literature 
on pensions and mobility. This study is based on a series of working papers, including Alien, 
Clark, and McDermed (1991). Certain calculations are only available in the working papers. 
When appropriate, the working papers will be referenced directly instead of the article.
6. A basic lesson learned from human capital models early on is that human capital investment 
expenditures should be undertaken as soon as possible (Ben Porath 1967). Although we are aware 
that much of training costs and all hiring costs occur up front, specific training is distributed 
throughout the period of worker attachment on the job. For recent data separately reporting train 
ing activity at the time of hire and training activity during the course of employment, see U.S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1992). For a preliminary effort to relate these 
data to pension coverage, see Dorsey, Cornwell, and Macpherson (1994).
7. This finding has been confirmed in work by Even and Macpherson (1992). They suggest 
that failure to vest the employers© contribution in the first few years of employment may discour 
age mobility of those covered by a defined contribution plan until vesting is attained. This point is 
of relevance only for a relatively short span of time and cannot account for defined benefit and 
defined contribution plans having similar, negative effects on turnover for workers throughout 
their prime working age.
8. Consistent with a view that pensions are used to reduce turnover is a finding that the nega 
tive pension-mobility relationship is observed in large firms, which commonly offer defined bene 
fit plans, but not in small firms, which more often offer defined contribution plans (Even and 
Macpherson 1992). There remains the possibility, however, that other unmeasured characteristics 
of large and small firm employment may account for this result.
9. The coefficient of pensions in her probit equation for mobility was 0.700, while the coeffi 
cient of log wages was 0.608. Both coefficients are highly significant.
10. One might argue that on jobs where a worker©s compensation is higher than in the next 
best opportunity, turnover should be greater because the firm will be encouraged to lay off 
employees. The evidence is not consistent with this view. We find that where the compensation 
premium is higher, turntiver is lower. Moreover, pension-covered jobs are associated with pay 
ment of a compensation premium, yet Mitchell (1982) and Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1993), 
find that layoffs are lower on pension-covered jobs.
11. Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1993) explain the effect of pensions on mobility through 
layoffs as a reflection of the firm©s commitment to an implicit contract. In such a contract, com 
pensation is deferred. It is argued that laying off workers who have backloaded pensions would 
violate the implicit contract. We are sympathetic to the idea of an implicit pension contract. There 
is no other way to explain the ad hoc postretirement pension increases that have been granted to 
most recipients of defined benefit pension plans. Evidence supporting the existence of such 
increases is contained in Alien, Clark, and Sumner (1986), and in Alien, Clark, and McDermed
(1992). Indeed, examination of data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) suggests 
that cost-of-living adjustments may offset almost half of the adverse effect of inflation on the real 
value of pensions for those retired on a fixed nominal pension (Gustman and Steinmeier 1993a). 
Nevertheless, if pension backloading decreases mobility by reducing layoffs, as Alien, Clark, and 
McDermed find, the question arises as to why firms concerned about mobility would bother to 
adopt backloaded pensions, since they can control layoffs directly.
12. There is a separate set of concerns about equity. It is argued that, because of pension back- 
loading, those in the population with the least stable job histories, including women and minori 
ties, will have inadequate retirement incomes. For relevant discussions and evidence, see Turner
(1993).
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13. In the PSID, which is the one survey where quits and layoffs can be readily distinguished, 
the qualitative results are the same whether the analysis uses quits only or quits and layoffs com 
bined.
14. We use retrospective data from the SCF because, for reasons we discuss, attrition from the 
1983-86 SCF panel is systematic and renders the data highly suspect for use in a mobility study. 
The 1983-89 SCF panel was unavailable at the time this work was done.
15. Censoring of the retrospective data in the SCF prevents estimation of the expanded model 
with those data.
2
The Basic Arithmetic 
of Pension Backloading
Does pension backloading discourage individuals from leaving 
jobs? This chapter explores the mechanics of pension backloading and 
evaluates the argument that it provides a severe disincentive to those 
who would leave pension-covered jobs, especially in the early years of 
employment.
How large is the effect of backloading on the pension received by an 
early leaver compared to a worker who remains until qualifying for 
retirement benefits? Assume, for example, that the worker joins the 
firm this year at age 30. Further suppose that each year of work results 
in an increase in the yearly pension that is 1 percent of the salary in the 
last year of employment. If the worker stays with the firm until qualify 
ing for normal retirement benefits, which in this example occurs at age 
62, then the total yearly pension will be equal to 32 percent of final 
pay. Alternatively, if the worker joins this year at age 30 and leaves at 
age 40, the pension is calculated as 1 percent of the average salary at 
age 40 times 10 years of service. However, the pension payments do 
not begin until the worker reaches retirement age. Accordingly, in this 
example workers who leave after 10 years of service must wait 22 
years before they can receive a pension. Yet the salary used in the com 
putation is fixed in nominal terms, at the level paid 22 years earlier. At 
5 percent annual wage growth, the final salary at age 62 is roughly 
three times the salary at age 40. This early leaver not only receives a 
lower pension because of having accumulated just one-third of the 
years of service of the normal retiree, but each year of service is multi 
plied by a salary level that is roughly one-third of the salary the worker 
would have received had that individual stayed to retirement age. 
Accordingly, in this example, an early leaver with the same starting 
salary and one-third the time at work for a normal retiree would receive 
a pension of about one-ninth the value of the pension received by the 
normal retiree. This example indicates the potential effect of backload 
ing on the value of the pension to early versus normal leavers from 
pension-covered jobs.
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Moreover, defined benefit pensions typically provide an additional 
reward to anyone who remains with the firm until qualifying for early 
retirement benefits. The additional reward may result from a variety of 
plan provisions. For example, in the years until they qualify for actual 
payments from social security, early retirees who are not yet age 62 or 
65 may have their pension plan benefits increased by an amount equal 
to what their future social security benefits will be. Alternatively, the 
firm may use a reduction in yearly benefits that is smaller than actuari- 
ally fair for those who stay until qualifying for early retirement but use 
an actuarially fair reduction for those vested workers who leave earlier. 
For example, if the departing employee has not yet qualified for early 
retirement benefits, the firm may reduce benefits by 6 percent for each 
year the individual leaves before normal retirement age. For those who 
have qualified for early retirement, the reduction in the yearly benefit 
may be 3 percent for each year of retirement before normal retirement 
age. Under a third mechanism, the generosity of the plan is increased 
after the employee has been on the job for a specified number of years. 
For example, the benefit may be equal to 1 percent of the final salary 
for each of the first 20 years of work, and 2 percent of the final salary 
for each year of work after that. This type of explicit backloading of 
the pension formula is limited to some extent by specific provisions of 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
Pensions might also reduce turnover via their vesting provisions, 
which deter workers from leaving firms until they have worked long 
enough to be guaranteed an eventual retirement benefit (Schiller and 
Weiss 1979). However, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 specifies that vest 
ing must now occur within a few years of hire, five years if there is cliff 
vesting and seven years if vesting is graded. This has severely limited 
the ability of firms to use vesting to reduce turnover of middle-aged 
workers.
The next section explores the fundamental arithmetic of pension 
accrual and pension backloading and applies the basic concepts in a 
series of examples. Then, a measure of pension backloading is devel 
oped for use in our later statistical analysis. This measure indicates that 
backloading can have only a very small effect on the mobility deci 
sions of young workers. The third section presents statistics from a 
nationally representative sample with matched employer-provided pen 
sion plan descriptions. These data indicate the size and variation of
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pension backloading both from the basic formulas that have been 
adopted by firms and from the special early retirement benefits offered. 
The penalty associated with mobility and the increase in compensation 
for a new job required to offset the pension loss from moving are cal 
culated. Pension accrual is found to be very small within the first 
decade of employment, and the penalty to mobility created by back- 
loaded pensions is found to be very low for workers who are more than 
a decade from retiring. In the appendix to this chapter, alternative mea 
sures of the potential costs of early mobility are described, analyzed, 
and compared to the measure that we developed in the chapter. We find 
our measure equivalent to ones used by Ippolito (1987) and by Lazear 
and Moore (1988).
Pension Accrual From Defined Benefit Plans
We begin by discussing the arithmetic of pension accrual under 
defined benefit plans. 1 For purposes of discussion, the simplest type of 
defined benefit formula, where the yearly benefit in retirement, Bdb, is 
given by the product of the generosity parameter a, typically 1 to 2 per 
centage points, times a measure of the final wage 1^, times the number 
of years of tenure (service) at retirement T:
(2.1) Bdb = aWfT.
Assume that wages grow from WQ in period 0 at a rate of g. 
Years of service are measured as the difference between the date of 
separation k and the date of hire j. Under these circumstances, ten 
ure can be expressed as T = k - j, and the final wage can be 
expressed as Wf= WQ ekg , where again W0 is the wage in period 0.
The total retirement benefit due to work, from hire in year j through 
any time k, evaluated at time k, is then the present value of the benefit 
to be paid throughout the retirement years, from date of retirement R to 
date of death D, taken back to the date k. The further k is from the date 
of retirement R, the greater the effect of discounting, and the lower the 
present value of the accruing pension, Pdb (k). This relationship is given 
in equation (2.2).2
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(2.2) Pdh (k) =
The term a is the generosity parameter. The next term is the benefit 
amount from equation (2.1). The final terms are the result of discount 
ing the benefits received throughout the retirement period at an interest 
rate r to bring them back to date R, and then further discounting the 
benefits from the date of retirement to date k. Equation (2.2) holds for k 
< R, that is, for an individual who is working but has not yet qualified 
for retirement benefits.
To give perspective on the orders of magnitude, we will develop and 
follow a single example throughout the discussion. We will begin with 
the relationship between the yearly pension benefit and the present 
value of the payments made throughout the retirement period. Assum 
ing for purposes of this example that retirement is at age 62 and death 
is at age 80, the yearly benefits would be received for 18 years. At an 
interest rate of 8 percent, the present value of the 18 years of benefits 
on the first day of retirement is about 9.5 times the yearly benefit. (For 
comparison, at a 6 percent interest rate, the present value of the benefit 
is worth about 1 1 times the yearly benefit, whereas if the interest rate is 
10 percent, the present value is worth about 8.3 times the yearly bene 
fit.)
Consider now the earnings from work between periods k and k+1. 
They include the wage plus the increase in the value of the pension, 
less that part of the increase which is due to accruing interest. This 
amount is the wage plus Pdb(k+\) - (\+r)Pdb(k). Following Bulow 
(1982), the value of the increment in the present value of the pension 
from remaining employed can be obtained by differentiating equation 
(2.2) with respect to k and subtracting out rPdb(k). Thus equation (2.3) 
indicates, for any time k preceding the year of eligibility for normal 
retirement, the path of the marginal increment to pension wealth with 
additional service:
(23)
With positive wage growth and interest rate, the slope of the curve 
relating the present value of the pension to the date k is positive. Pen-
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sion accrual from the growth in the wage and from increasing service 
are reflected in g and \l(k -j) respectively.
Pension backloading is reflected in the fact that before the individual 
qualifies for retirement, the present value of the pension increases non- 
linearly with service, with greater proportionate increases for addi 
tional service the longer the individual remains on the job. Thus the 
slope of the function relating the present value of the pension to the 
date of separation, called the pension accrual rate, is increasing with fc. 3 
It can also be shown that the pension accrual rate declines sharply after 
the age of normal retirement.4
To illustrate these relationships, we insert assumed values in equa 
tions (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3). In particular, we assume the following val 
ues for the parameters: a = 0.01, W25 = $20,000, g = 0.05, r = 0.08,7 = 
25, k = 26, 27,..., 62, R = 62,D = 80. Thus, the example pertains to an 
individual with an initial wage of $20,000 when he or she is hired at 
age 25, who faces a normal retirement age of 62, and dies with cer 
tainty at 80.
Table 2.1 presents the earnings and pension values that result from 
this example. It illustrates the magnitudes of measures that will be of 
central concern to us in attempting to determine the way in which pen 
sions affect the incentives for mobility.
Column 2 of table 2.1 reports representative annual earnings during 
the 37 years of employment, beginning at the individual©s 25th birth 
day, and lasting until retirement at age 62. Column 3 reports the yearly 
pension benefit starting at age 62, based on the assumption that 
employment is terminated in the indicated year. Thus, if the individual 
stays for 37 years, the pension is $47,063 for each year of retirement.
The presence of backloading can be seen in column 4, with a ratio 
showing the annual benefit if employment were terminated in the indi 
cated year, divided by the benefit if employment were terminated only 
upon qualifying for normal retirement. Thus, if one stays five years, 
thereby working 13.5 percent of a full career (5/37), the yearly benefit 
would be only 2.7 percent of that received had the individual stayed 
until normal retirement. At the other end of the life cycle, the last two 
years of work before normal retirement, representing 5 percent of the 
full period of attachment (2/37), results in an increase of over 14 per 
cent in the yearly pension.
Table 2.1 Pensions and the Reward to Work: An Example
(1)
Age at 
separation 
M
26
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
62
(2) 
Earnings 
at age k
[W\
$ 21,025
25,681
32,974
42,340
54,366
69,807
89,634
115,092
127,196
(3) 
Nominal yearly 
benefits at 
age 62[B*]
$ 210
1,284
3,297
6,351
10,873
17,452
26,890
40,282
47,063
(4) 
Ratio of yearly 
benefits to 
potential 
benefits
[B IB ]
k 62
0.004
0.027
0.070
0.135
0.231
0.371
0.571
0.856
1.000
(5) 
Total 
pension[V*)]
$ 113
947
3,627
10,422
26,619
63,737
146,508
327,418
448,903
(6) 
Pension benefit 
accrual rate
[dP(k)ldk} do
$ 127
312
834
2,050
4,791
10,835
23,930
51,919
70,490
(7) 
Ratio of accrual to 
compensation 
(excluding interest 
rate effect)
0.006
0.009
0.016
0.028
0.047
0.076
0.120
0.183
0.214
NOTE: This example is based on equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) and assumes a = 0.01, 
62, and D = 80.
W25 = $20,000, g = 0.05, r = 0.08,7 = 25, k = 26, 27, ..., 62, R =
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Because of pension backloading, the worker who stays until retire 
ment age will enjoy a rapidly accruing pension. Column 6 shows the 
pension accrual including the interest. Column 7 computes the ratio of 
the accrual to total compensation (wages plus accrual, which is column 
2 plus column 6). However, in calculating the pension accrual, the 
interest term is omitted as in equation (2.3); this isolates the effects of 
working another year on the wage and service used in computing bene 
fits and eliminates the change in the present value of the pension 
brought about when the base period advances one year. The figures in 
column 7 show that the value of the pension accrual rises rapidly. After 
20 years of attachment, it will reach 5 percent of compensation.
Column 7 shows that, although the pension accrual represents only 
about half of one percent of compensation in the first year of employ 
ment, it is almost a fifth of compensation as the individual comes 
within two years of qualifying for normal retirement. Even a basic 
defined benefit plan, with a generosity coefficient of only 1 percent, 
provides the worker with the opportunity to increase compensation by 
amounts that appear to be substantial.
Special early retirement benefits create additional incentives for the 
worker to stay with the firm. Further, many defined benefit pension 
plans base benefits on two or three formulas. One formula may pertain 
to benefits for those who leave the firm before qualifying for early 
retirement (i.e., for terminated-vested employees), and another to those 
who qualify for normal retirement, with various treatments for work 
past normal retirement date. There may also be another formula, or 
perhaps an adjustment factor applied to the formula for normal retire 
ment benefits, to determine benefits for those who qualify for early 
retirement. Special temporary benefits at early retirement, such as the 
adjustment until social security eligibility and the granting of addi 
tional years to credited service, would create a "spike" in the pension 
accrual profile at the early retirement age.
In addition to the discontinuous benefit accrual at early retirement, 
pension wealth may change dramatically at other dates. For instance, 
some plans specify generous benefits for workers until they reach a 
prespecified level of service, while drastically reducing accruals for 
work after that point. In general, defined benefit plans are not actuari- 
ally neutral with regard to retirement ages, paying wealth values that 
differ substantially, depending on when the worker leaves.
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A Measure of Pension Loss From Mobility
Our literature review in chapter 3 shows that a number of authors 
have attributed an important part of the negative relationship between 
pension coverage and mobility to the effects of backloading of defined 
benefit pension plans. Consequently, the mobility equations we esti 
mate will be used to isolate the effect of pension backloading. It fol 
lows that we should develop a measure of pension backloading and 
explore its importance in compensation.
The measure of pension backloading we will employ compares pen 
sion accrual in the defined benefit plan with pension accrual in a com 
parable defined contribution plan, i.e, having the same value at 
retirement. Backloading is simply the difference between the present 
value of the defined contribution plan and the defined benefit plan. 
Although it might at first appear that the definition of pension capital 
loss that we use is rather specialized, the appendix to this chapter will 
show that it is equivalent to the measures that are commonly used in 
the literature.
Consider first the change in value of a defined contribution pension 
with additional service. For the case in which the rate of growth of 
wages, g, is unequal to the interest rate, r, the value of a defined contri 
bution plan with contribution rate c, as of year k, or Prfc(k), for an indi 
vidual hired in year j, is5
If g is equal to r, the value of the defined contribution plan is equal to6 
Pdc (k}= cWQ e rk (k-j).
In the case where the wage growth rate and interest rate are equal, 
the balance in the pension plan is simply the amount deposited in year 
k, which is fraction c of the wage, times the number of years of service. 
Deposits made in earlier years will grow at the rate r due to compound 
ing and will just keep up with the increase in the value of the contribu 
tion to the pension, which is rising due to wage growth.
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The slope of the profile is given by
c(2 - 5) - 
for g not equal to r. For g equal to r, the slope is 
dP, (k)^ ©
dk
= P
Notice that when g = r, the proportionate change in the value of the 
pension with increasing service is equal to the proportionate change in 
service (!/(& -y)). In addition, the pension value grows with r. This 
simply reflects the fact that the nominal value of the deposit is adjusted 
in accordance with the interest rate for different base periods. 7
To compare the loss from mobility under a defined benefit and a 
comparable defined contribution plan, it is necessary to discuss what 
we mean by comparability. A defined contribution and defined benefit 
plan are said to be comparable if they generate the same present value 
at the retirement age specified by the defined benefit plan. Equating the 
right-hand sides of equations (2.2) and (2.4) and setting k - R, equa 
tion (2.6) solves for the generosity coefficient of the comparable 
defined contribution plan, c*, which is
n(R- i\ M _^~r ^~^l /r
(2.6) c* =
1
g~r 
if r is different from g, or
* M -r(D-/f), /
c*= a [1 -e ]/r
ifr = g.
As noted, a convenient measure of the disincentive to mobility at 
year k created by a pension is the present value of the comparable 
defined contribution plan evaluated at time k minus the present value of 
the defined benefit plan at time k.
(2.7) Backloading = pdc (k) - Pdb (k) .
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To illustrate the orders of magnitude involved, and the path over 
time of the disincentive to mobility created by pension backloading, 
table 2.2 continues the example developed in table 2.1. This example 
indicates the effect of backloading under the assumption that the plan 
is a simple defined benefit plan with no special benefits at early retire 
ment and does not use different formulas for those who qualify for 
early or normal retirement. Comparable measures of backloading for a 
nationally representative sample, with plans that most often do include 
these features, are presented in the following discussion. Table 2.2 
allows us to focus on the size of the effects of backloading that is a 
result of the basic defined benefit formula. Generosity coefficients that 
exceed 1 percent would lead to upward adjustments in the figures in the 
table, while the presence of social security or other offsets would 
require downward adjustments.
Column 2 calculates the increase in the present value (discounted to 
year k) of the defined benefit plan between age k and age 62, the retire 
ment age in the plan. This amount is the value of the pension if the 
individual stays until the retirement age, discounted back to year k, less 
the value if the individual were to quit working at the firm after year k. 
Column 3 makes the corresponding calculation for the defined contri 
bution plan.
Backloading, or pension capital loss, is the difference between these 
two columns, as illustrated in column 4. Since the contribution percent 
age for the defined contribution plan is chosen so that the two plans 
have equal value at retirement, P^R) = P^c(/?), the backloading 
amount simplifies to P^c(^) - Pdb(k}- Notice that pension capital loss 
takes on an inverse U shape when it is related to tenure. According to 
related examples in Petersen (1992), these patterns are also typical of 
other plan formulas beside the basic, final-average-salary defined bene 
fit plan.
The importance of backloading relative to the value of the future 
pension accruals and relative to future compensation is indicated in 
columns 5 and 6, respectively. The numbers in column 6 may be inter 
preted as the wage increase that would be required to just offset the 
pension capital loss that would occur if a worker changed jobs (assum 
ing that both jobs had the same kind of pension).
These numbers show that backloading can have only a very small 
effect on the mobility decisions of young workers. For those in their
Table 2.2 Pension Backloading: An Example
(2) 
Future increase in 
present value of db
(1)
Separation 
age 
[k]
26
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
62
plan
1 P (R) 6
db
-P (k)] db
$ 25,086
33,756
48,143
66,809
88,597
108,145
109,909
55,112
0
(3) 
Future increase in 
present value of dc
plan
\M \**-) £
dc
-P (k)} dc
$24,088
27,492
31,756
35,488
37,679
36,612
29,454
11,627
0
(4) 
Backloading
[Pdc (k)-Pdb (k)}
$ 998
6,263
16,386
31,321
50,918
71,533
80,455
43,485
0
(5) 
Ratio of
backloading to
future increase in 
present value ofdb 
plan
.040
.186
.340
.469
.575
.661
.732
.789
-
(6) 
Ratio of
backloading to
present value of 
future 
compensation
.008
.011
.025
.042
.063
.088
.119
.156
-
NOTE: This example is based on equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) and assumes a - 0.01, W0 = $20,000, g = 0.05, r = 0.08,;© = 25, k = 26, 27,..., 62, R = 
62, and D = 80.
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first decade of employment, pension capital loss is minor and is easily 
overcome by a modest raise on the new job. Even for an individual who 
is 45 years old and has 20 years of experience, the required raise is 
only 6.3 percent. Of course, as the retirement age is reduced, or as the 
worker ages, the disincentive for mobility increases. Plans that are 
more generous relative to the wage will have stronger effects. How 
ever, these figures strongly suggest that pension backloading will con 
stitute a noticeable fraction of compensation only for those within a 
decade or so of qualifying for early or normal retirement benefits.
The foregoing examples set the stage for an examination of disin 
centives to mobility in actual pension data. Such data will take into 
account the wide variation in the features of pension benefit formulas, 
the differences in requirements for early and normal retirement, and 
the various special changes that often take place in pension plans at the 
time that individuals qualify for early or normal retirement. These fac 
tors raise the penalty for leaving a firm once an individual is covered 
by a defined benefit pension plan. Accordingly, we now turn to mea 
sures of pension backloading based on the pensions held by a represen 
tative sample of the population.
Pension Accrual and Disincentives to Mobility
To this point, we have considered a numerical example of the disin 
centive effects for mobility created by the backloading of defined bene 
fit plans. The disincentive effects result from the use of the standard 
final average salary formula. As previously noted, pension plans also 
discourage mobility by providing additional special benefits only to 
those who stay until qualifying for early or normal retirement.
In actual data on pension plans, there is wide variation in the formu 
las, in the ages of eligibility for early and normal benefits, and in the 
special benefits. It is therefore useful to examine the pension accrual 
profiles and related mobility incentives for a representative sample of 
the population.
At the date of writing, there was only one population survey the 
1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) that provided detailed, 
employer-supplied, descriptions of pension benefit formulas and earn-
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ings histories. All of the statistical analysis of the pension-mobility 
relationship in this book will make use of the pension provider infor 
mation from the 1983 SCF. Specifically, the SCF information will be 
used to determine the incentives for mobility that are facing workers in 
pension-covered jobs.
Table 2.3 summarizes the pension accrual profiles that would be 
experienced by the population of male pension-covered workers in the 
1983 SCF. To understand the variability in the plans, the figures in the 
table suppose that all workers were hired at age 25. The table illustrates 
the average incentives and the variability of incentives at different ages. 
The patterns in the table would be similar for workers hired at other 
ages, although the exact figures would vary.
To obtain the results presented in the table, we considered a sample 
of pension-covered individuals. We used the individual©s reported cur 
rent wage and projected this wage forward and backward over time on 
the basis of the experience and tenure coefficients from a standard 
wage equation. This wage stream was then matched to pensions in the 
1983 SCF on the basis of industry, occupation, firm size, union status, 
and wage level. 8 The wage stream is applied to these pension plans to 
calculate the path of accumulation of pension rights. 9 In these calcula 
tions it is assumed that any nominal amounts in the plans are adjusted 
upward with the general level of wages. Post-retirement benefits are 
increased by 38 percent of the inflation rate, conforming to results 
found in Alien, Clark, and Sumner (1986). 10 The results are weighted 
and aggregated to form the results reported in the table.
The first block of results in the table indicates the ratio of the value 
of discounted accumulated pension benefits (pension wealth) to the 
value of discounted cumulative wages (wage wealth) for individuals 
(all presumed hired at age 25) who have reached various ages. The 
middle column of data indicates the median ratios, and the first and 
third columns provide the first and third quartiles as measures of vari 
ability. As expected, all ratios grow at an increasing rate up to about 
age 55, after which the growth rate declines and they flatten out or 
decline slightly. It is interesting to consider the variability of the ratios. 
At age 55 the value for the third quartile (13.5 percent) is over two and 
a half times the value for the first quartile (5.2 percent). At age 65, by 
which time everyone in the sample should be eligible to collect full 
normal retirement benefits, the third quartile value is almost twice the 
first quartile value.
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Table 2.3 Pension Accruals and Wealth 
the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances
for Defined Benefit Plans from 
(Assuming Age of Hire is 25)
First Third 
quartile Median quartile
By age: 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65
By age: 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65
Relative to plan retirement ages: 
Pre-retirement
For those with early retirement 
Spike at early retirement age 
Early retirement to normal retirement 
Spike at normal retirement age 
For those without early retirement
Spike at normal retirement age 
Post-retirement
Early retirement age 
Normal retirement age
Pension wealth / wage wealth
1.1% 1.7% 3.1%
1.6 2.5 4.2
2.1 3.4 5.7
3.1 5.1 8.7
5.2 9.1 13.5
6.2 9.5 12.7
5.4 8.7 10.5 
Pension accrual / annual wage
1.6% 2.6% 5.8%
2.5 4.3 7.0
3.9 6.7 10.6
6.2 10.3 16.8
-1.0 5.9 15.3
-9.8 .7 9.7
-36.8 -20.6 -10.5
6.4
13.3
3.3
-2.1
11.1
26.8
10.5
8.0
17.5
114.9
18.2
20.6
106.5 190.9 229.2
-22.0 -10.3 -5.3
Plan retirement ages
55 55 55
60 62 65
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The second block of results in table 2.3 measures the pension 
accrual rate, or the ratio of the annual change in pension wealth to the 
annual change in wage wealth. The numerator of these ratios is simply 
the increase in the expected value of the pension due to working 
another year, excluding that part of the increase attributable to interest 
and to having survived the year. Future values are multiplied by sur 
vival probabilities, which increase at a given future age as the individ 
ual lives longer. The denominator is the wage that is received from 
working that year. Negative entries reflect the situation in which the 
value of the pension is actually lowered by working another year, prin 
cipally because the worker is already eligible for benefits and will give 
up a year©s benefits if he or she keeps working. In the table, the median 
plan reaches a peak at age 50, when pension accruals reach 10.3 per 
cent of wages. At age 55, accruals in the median plan drop to 5.9 per 
cent of wages that year. Age 55 is when a worker hired at age 25 will 
have achieved 30 years of experience at the firm, and many plans offer 
either full normal retirement benefits or early retirement benefits for 
workers who reach age 55 or who have 30 years of service.
In all quartiles, the marginal pension incentives to remain at a firm 
rise very rapidly up to age 50, which is before most individuals are eli 
gible for early retirement benefits. After individuals become eligible 
for early retirement benefits, the marginal incentives drop up to age 65 
almost as rapidly as they previously rose. At age 65 and thereafter, 
when all individuals are eligible for full normal retirement benefits, the 
marginal incentives drop precipitously. Again, the plans exhibit a great 
deal of variation in their incentives. At age 45 and earlier, the third 
quartile value is almost three times the first quartile value, and after 
that the variability is even more striking. By age 60 the bottom quarter 
of the plans are significantly penalizing employees for further work, 
while the top quarter are rewarding employees almost as much as ever.
The third block of results in table 2.3 highlights evidence of discrete 
jumps in pension values at the ages of early and/or normal retirement, 
similar to findings reported by Kotlikoff and Wise (1987a). The 
"spikes" in the table refer to the increase in pension value, relative to 
wages, that occurs in the year the individual first reaches eligibility for 
early or normal retirement benefits. Preretirement refers to the three 
years immediately prior to the early retirement spike year (or normal 
retirement spike year, if the plan does not provide for early retirement).
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The row labeled "early retirement to normal retirement" refers to the 
years immediately before the normal retirement spike year but after eli 
gibility for early retirement; postretirement refers to the three years 
immediately following the normal retirement spike year.©© For exam 
ple, in the year of work that results in eligibility for early retirement, 
the value of the median pension jumps by an amount equal to 26.8 per 
cent of the wage earned in that year.
The table shows that the majority of plans yield a substantial incre 
ment in pension value upon eligibility for early retirement, with the 
median equal to 26.8 percent of the annual wage. In many cases these 
gains are enormous. For a quarter of all plans, the increase in pension 
value exceeds the value of the wage in the year of early retirement eli 
gibility. Moreover, among plans that do not provide for early retire 
ment, the spikes at normal retirement are very large and highly 
variable. The first quartile shows an increase in pension value that is a 
little bit larger than the wage in the year of normal retirement; for the 
third quartile, the increase in pension value is more than double the 
value of the wage.
The final two rows of the table report the early and normal retire 
ment ages found in these plans. For a majority of the plans, including 
the first and third quartiles, eligibility for early retirement benefits 
begins at age 55 for an individual hired at age 25. There is somewhat 
more variation in the age of eligibility for normal retirement benefits, 
with the median at 62 and the first and third quartiles at 60 and 65, 
respectively.
Table 2.4 gives pension values for defined contribution plans in the 
1983 SCF. 12 There is little evidence that defined contribution plans are 
sufficiently backloaded to create major disincentives to mobility. While 
defined contribution plans can theoretically be backloaded (Turner 
1993), in practice backloading of defined contribution plans does not 
appear to be severe.
The calculations underlying table 2.3 clearly indicate that defined 
benefit pension plans may provide substantial rewards to continued 
work in the years just before the early retirement age. Moreover, even 
standardizing completely for the date of hire, the incentives vary con 
siderably among the plans. This is especially true of the spikes, which 
provide particularly strong and variable incentives for retirement not 
captured in any currently available household-based data set except the
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SCF. 13 In addition to affecting retirement decisions, the large accruals 
in the years just before early retirement may also affect mobility at pre 
vious ages; an individual who leaves the firm early for any reason gives 
up the opportunity to earn these accruals. The question is whether the 
magnitude of this incentive is enough to deter mid-career and younger 
workers from moving.
Table 2.4 Pension Accruals and Wealth for Defined Contribution Plans 
for the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (Assuming Age of Hire is 25)
By age:
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
By age:
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
First 
quartile Median
Third 
quartile
Pension wealth / wage wealth
7.8%
8.7
8.7
8.7
8.7
8.7
8.7
Pension
12.4%
8.7
8.7
8.7
8.7
8.7
8.7
8.8%
9.7
10.5
10.5
10.6
10.6
10.6
14.5%
15.0
15.1
15.2
15.5
15.4
15.6
accrual / annual wage
13.1%
13.1
10.9
10.9
10.9
10.9
10.6
17.6%
17.0
15.4
15.3
15.3
15.3
15.3
To answer this question, we calculated the size of the disincentives 
to mobility created by pension backloading for the sample of 31- to 50- 
year-olds in the SCF in 1978. This is the base period we will use for 
mobility analysis using the SCF data. The examples analyzed in the 
second section of this chapter suggested that there is a very small disin-
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centive to mobility for individuals in this age range created by the 
backloading of the basic pension formula. The following discussion 
shows that this result is also reflected in the actual data from a repre 
sentative population sample, even when special early retirement bene 
fits are included.
Table 2.5 attempts to decompose the 1978 average job compensa 
tion into primary components due to the wage, to the pension benefit 
under an equivalent defined contribution plan, and pension backload 
ing. 14 This table examines pension capital loss, including the effects of 
special benefits for those who stay until qualifying for early retirement, 
calculated from the employer Pension Provider Survey of the SCF, 
which is a nationally representative survey of prime-aged pension-cov 
ered workers.
Table 2.5 Decomposition of Average Hourly Compensation Until 
Retirement for Those with Defined Benefit Plans
Amount due to:
Wage
Pension without backloading
Backloading
Total
Compensation 
level
$12.58
1.49
.38
14.45
Percent of 
compensation
87.1
10.3
2.6
100.0
SOURCE: Authors© calculations of 1978 base period earnings using the 1983 Survey of 
Consumer Finances.
Compensation is calculated as the average per hour amount of (dis 
counted) wages plus increases in (discounted) pension values between 
1978 and either the individual©s expected date of retirement from full- 
time work or the normal retirement age specified in the individual©s 
pension plan, whichever is earlier. If the individual did not provide an 
expected retirement age, the terminal date for the compensation calcu 
lations is taken to be the normal retirement age in the pension plan. 
Real wages are imputed on the basis of a wage profile similar to the 
one used for table 2.3. The rationale for calculating the average com 
pensation between the current date and retirement is as follows. To 
avoid the pension capital loss and reap the high accruals just before 
retirement, the worker must remain at the current firm until retirement.
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However, the financial incentives to remain with the current firm are 
not just the pension accruals but also the wages that will be earned over 
the period.
The first column of data in table 2.5 divides the total hourly com 
pensation until retirement for pension-covered workers into three com 
ponents: the wage, the value of the pension from working until 
retirement under an equivalent defined contribution plan, and the value 
of backloading. The first figure in the column sums up the discounted 
wages until retirement and divides by the number of hours until retire 
ment. The second figure in the column asks the question: What would 
the portion of compensation until retirement that is due to the pension 
have been if the pension amount over the lifetime of the job had been 
held the same, but the pension value had accumulated in the fashion of 
a defined contribution plan? Again, the resulting number is divided by 
the number of hours until retirement. The third figure, pension back- 
loading, is the pension loss that occurs because actual pension plans 
accumulate value disproportionately at the end of the job rather than 
smoothly over the life of the job. The backloading total is also divided 
by the number of hours until retirement. The figures in the table are 
averages over the samples of pension-covered individuals in the SCF.
The loss amount due to pension backloading, amortized over the 
time until retirement, is less than 3 percent of compensation. Because 
the individuals in this sample have over 22 years until retirement, how 
ever, the lump-sum value of the loss is still substantial. The typical 
worker in a pension-covered job would suffer approximately a $17,000 
pension loss if the individual were to leave that job. On the other hand, 
there are over 22 years in which to make up this loss in the new job. At 
2,000 hours per year, the new job would have to pay about 38 cents 
more per hour, or a relatively small raise of about 2.6 percent of com 
pensation, in order to make up for the pension loss. This amortization 
appears to be the appropriate procedure to use in determining what a 
new job must pay in order to equal the earnings if the individual were 
to continue in the present job. The dollar value of the pension loss may 
look sizable, but it is only a relatively small component of the value of 
the job. More sizable is the value of the pension itself. Over the life of 
the job, the nonbackloaded portion of the pension contributes about 
10.3 percent of compensation.
32 The Basic Arithmetic of Pension Backloading
The loss amounts do not appear to be very sensitive to the interest 
rates used to evaluate the losses. To illustrate, consider the worker 
whose pension is shown in table 2.2. This worker joins the firm at age 
25 and plans to retire at 62, which is typical of pension-covered work 
ers in this sample. Recall that the pension pays benefits equal to 1 per 
cent of the final salary times years of service. Assuming an interest rate 
of 8 percent and a nominal wage growth of 5 percent, the pension capi 
tal loss for the worker is equal to 65.6 percent of the annual wage at 
age 45. Raising both the interest rate and the wage growth rate by 4 
percentage points to an interest rate of 12 percent and a nominal wage 
growth of 9 percent, the capital loss is 69.4 percent of the annual wage 
at age 45. Evidently the increase in capital loss due to the greater 
spread between current and retirement wages in the second case is 
essentially offset by the increased erosion of postretirement benefits 
due to the nominal nature of those benefits. In both of these examples, 
the loss would be only about 4 percent of compensation until retire 
ment.
In sum, the data from the Pension Provider Survey attached to the 
SCF confirm the finding that the spikes in the pension accrual profile 
are large and variable at the early retirement age. The data also strongly 
confirm the implications from analyzing pension benefit formulas in 
the abstract: defined benefit plans do not create large disincentives to 
mobility from the option value of the pension. For the sample of pen 
sions covering prime-aged workers in the SCF, the cost of mobility to 
pension-covered workers from the backloading of pension plans 
amounts to less than 3 percent of compensation. Only a modest raise 
on the new job is needed to offset the disincentive to mobility created 
by backloaded pension plans, taking account of the disincentives 
derived from the backloading of the basic defined benefit formula and 
from the special benefits offered at early retirement.
Appendix to Chapter 2 
Methodology for Calculating Pension Backloading
This appendix compares the measure of backloading developed in chapter 
2 with the measures used in leading studies by Ippolito (1986) and Lazear and 
Moore (1988). It shows that the measure of pension loss from mobility de 
scribed here is a generalization of "capital loss" measures used in the other 
studies.
To review, our backloading calculation begins by determining the contribu 
tion rate that would be required for a defined contribution plan to achieve the 
same value as the actual plan at the projected retirement date. Next, the current 
value of this hypothetical defined contribution plan is calculated, by measuring 
how much value the actual plan would have accrued were it not backloaded. 
The difference between this value and the current value of the actual plan is a 
measure of the backloading loss.
This measure of backloading is equal to Ippolito ©s calculation of capital loss 
for the standard defined benefit plan he examines. For the more complicated 
plans occasionally encountered in the SCF, our generalized measure of capital 
loss is more appropriate than Ippolito© s.
Consider a simple defined benefit plan that calculates benefits by multiply 
ing a generosity factor times years of service times final salary. For such a pen 
sion, Ippolito defines capital loss L as the loss in value of the pension if the 
current wage is used in the formula rather than the wage at retirement, holding 
years of service at its current value. Using the notation developed earlier in the 
chapter:
D
(2.8) L = ^a(WR -Wk)Tk e~r(t © k) dt
R
where a is the generosity factor of the plan, Tk and Wk are tenure and the wage, 
respectively, at age k, and R is the retirement age. 15
If wages grow at the same rate as the interest rate, this expression can be ma 
nipulated as follows:
D D
(2.9) L =
j R
where j is the age at hire. The first term in the last of the equalities in equation 
(2.9) is the current value of a defined contribution plan with a contribution rate
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c*, and the second term is the present value of the defined benefit pension. Note 
that c* satisfies the relationship
o R
-r(t-R) ,, f * , -r(t-R)(2.10) \aWR TRe~ (t - R) dt = $ c  W f (t ~ R) dt
R
which is to say that the values of the defined benefit and defined contribution 
plans are equal at age R. This can be algebraically manipulated to yield
\aWR TRe r
J 
= c*W D TR
-r(t-k) -r(k-R)
*
r - (t- )©jaWR Tke dt = c*WRe
= fc*Wkdt
The last line of this condition enables us to move from the first line in equa 
tion (2.9) to the bottom line. Since the top line of equation (2.9) is Ippolito©s 
definition of capital loss, and the bottom line is the measure of capital loss used 
in this study, the two definitions are equal for the type of plan considered by 
Ippolito.
This approach of comparing the current values of a defined benefit plan with 
that of a comparably valued (at retirement) defined contribution plan can be ex 
tended to more complicated pensions as well. For example, a pension may cal 
culate benefits as equal to 1 percent of final salary times years of service of up 
to 20 years plus 1.5 percent of final salary times years of service past 20 years. 
In this kind of pension, simply plugging the wage at retirement into the formula
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yields an understatement of the extent of backloading. Alternatively, many 
pensions make a more favorable formula available to individuals who work 
with the firm until retirement. Again, simply plugging the retirement wage into 
the currently applicable formula understates backloading for individuals below 
the retirement age. In both of these cases, comparing the current value of the 
pension with that of a defined contribution pension reaching the same value at 
retirement will yield a better measure of the backloading.
The pension values (inclusive of backloading losses) used in this study are 
also related to the pension "option values" used by Lazear and Moore (1988). 
Lazear and Moore effectively define the option value of a pension at time k as
.R*-k(1+r)
where P(f) is the present value of future benefits should the worker leave at 
year t, k is the current age, R* is the retirement age that maximizes the preced 
ing expression, and r is the discount rate. The option value is simply the differ 
ence between the pension value at the optimal retirement age, discounted back 
to the current age, and its current value. It is important because the value of 
many pensions jumps a sizable amount when eligibility for early retirement is 
reached and because part of the value of current employment is the opportunity 
to continue working and to realize this increment in pension value. Calculated 
at the same age of retirement, the option value is the equivalent to the pension 
part of future compensation used in this study.
One difference between our measure of the pension portion of future com 
pensation and the option value may be noted. The measure used here computes 
the pension as of the age at which the individual intends to retire. The option is 
often calculated at the age at which P(t) is maximized in value. The advantage 
of using the intended age of retirement in calculating the worth of the pension 
is that the option has value only to the extent that the individual intends to ex 
ercise it.
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NOTES
1. The following discussion incorporates material from Gustman and Steinmeier (1989a). A 
number of the basic relationships discussed here have been analyzed by Barnow and Ehrenberg 
(1979), Bulow (1981, 1982) and Kotlikoff and Wise (1985, 1987a).
2. To be more specific about the derivation of equation (2.2),
D
i/ r -r(t-k) .
= f
D 
aWQe (k-j)e dt
u/ kS f , -\ -r(R-k) -r(D-R)
= aWQe (k-j)e [1 - e ]/r
-r(t-k) -r(t-R) -r(R-k) 
Note e is the product or e and e
In the empirical results in the third section and in the remaining chapters, the benefits are mul 
tiplied by the probability of living to collect them. However, since none of the theoretical points in 
this chapter is affected by the existence of uncertainty about the length of life, the formulations 
use a certain lifespan in order to avoid undue complexity.
3. More specifically, the second derivative of the pension accrual rate with respect to k is posi 
tive because wage growth and service growth are interacting. See also Kotlikoff and Wise (1985, 
1987a).
4. For k > R, benefits commence upon retirement, and the lower limit of the integral in equa 
tion (2.2) becomes k instead of /?. As a result, the present value of the pension as of year k is
Pdb(k) = a W0ek8 (k -j) [1 - e-«D ~ *>]/r.
For the case where the individual works past normal retirement age, and credit is given for such 
work, the pension accrual rate is given by
dPdh(k)ldk-rPdh(k) = Pdb(k) {g + \l(k-j)-rl[\ -e^-*>]}.
In this expression, the last term in the brackets reflects the fact that once the individual quali 
fies for retirement benefits, benefits are foregone when retirement is postponed. If this loss is suf 
ficiently large, the value of the pension may begin to decline as soon as the normal retirement age 
is reached. In any case, the relative importance of this loss increases with k. This implies that 
eventually the value of the pension must begin to decline and will do so at an accelerating rate.
5. The formula simply dates the pension contribution by the employer, which is a fraction c of 
the wage at time /. It then provides interest from whatever time the pension contribution was made 
until the time k, when the amount in the pension fund is totaled. Integrating this expression yields 
the equation in the text.
gt -r(t-k) ,
es e dt.f ..,= )cWQ
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6. In this case, the formula in the previous footnote simplifies to
k
1. Note once again that there is no explicit allowance here for the effects of mortality, although 
these effects are included in the empirical work in the next section and in all subsequent chapters.
8. Experience with the 1989 SCF suggests that the pension wealth and incentive distributions 
are approximately the same whether pensions are matched on an individual basis or by this proce 
dure.
9. More specifically, real wages each year are imputed on the basis of a regression of log 
wages on experience, experience squared, tenure, tenure squared, interactions of both experience 
and tenure with education, union status and firm size, and a set of other standard explanatory vari 
ables including dummy variables for marital status, race, sex, health status, union status, whether 
the firm size exceeded 100 employees, SMSA residence, industry (eight variables), and region 
(four variables). A wage profile is created by extrapolating the observed wage before and after 
dates on the basis of the estimated coefficients for the experience and tenure variables in the wage 
equation. Pension values are calculated by applying the resulting wage profile to the individual©s 
own pension. These calculations assume an interest rate of 6.3 percent, nominal wage growth of 
5.1 percent, and an inflation rate of 4.0 percent, roughly corresponding to the Social Security IIB 
scenario at the time of the observed mobility behavior (Social Security Trustees Annual Report 
1988). All compensation amounts are discounted to 1983 and expressed in 1983 dollars.
10. Slightly higher pension adjustments with inflation are found in Gustman and Steinmeier 
(1993a), but both estimates are relatively close.
1 1 . It should also be noted that these profiles are somewhat different from those that would be 
observed today. Pension plans must now continue to credit work beyond the normal retirement 
age. As a result, the negative accrual rates reported at age 65 and for the post-retirement period are 
considerably more muted.
12. These are plans that did not have any defined benefit component.
13. The message on the variability of pension incentives among plans has been particularly 
emphasized by Kotlikoff and Wise (1985, 1987a). An implication is that there is a great deal of 
room for error in studies that match pension incentives on the basis of plan characteristics. Further 
evidence on this point is provided in Gustman and Steinmeier (1989a), where we examine the 
relationship of pension incentives to plan characteristics.
14. Comparable results are obtained for pensions in the 1983 base period, that is, for the pen 
sions that will be used to impute the incentives affecting mobility decisions of participants in the 
SIPP and PSID surveys.
15. Again, the effects of an uncertain lifetime could be introduced by multiplying the benefit 
amounts times the appropriate survival probabilities. Such a change would have no effect on the 
points being made in this section, so the simpler notation is used.

The Literature Relevant to the 
Pension-Mobility Relationship
This chapter highlights and discusses results from the literature on 
pensions and mobility. The first section highlights the findings in the 
literature, while the second section evaluates these findings. Each sec 
tion begins with a discussion of the evidence on the penalty to mobile 
workers created by pension backloading. The discussion next briefly 
reviews explanations of why firms might value the ability to influence 
mobility. Third, there is a discussion of reduced form results that indi 
cate a negative association between pension coverage and mobility. 
Fourth is a review of a more recent effort to relate an explicit measure 
of pension backloading to mobility. Fifth, some additional findings are 
discussed. A final section discusses a number of unresolved issues 
from the literature on wage determination. 1
Evidence from the Literature
Pension Backloading and Disincentives to Mobility
A fundamental reason why pensions might discourage mobility is 
that under the defined benefit plan, benefits accrue disproportionately 
in the later years of employment. As seen in chapter 2, backloading 
arises because the defined benefit plan bases yearly pension benefits on 
final earnings and years of covered employment. Both annual earnings 
and years of covered employment increase with tenure on the job, but 
when a person leaves the firm, the pay figure used in calculating the 
pension benefit is frozen. Moreover, there are special benefits for those 
who stay with the firm until qualifying for early retirement. Conse 
quently, pensions received by terminated, vested workers are dispro 
portionately reduced in value from the pension that would have been 
received had the worker remained with the firm until qualifying for 
retirement benefits. The backloading of defined benefit plans makes it
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more costly to leave a pension covered job. 2 To the extent that pensions 
increase the cost of moving, they would reduce the likelihood of 
mobility.
Researchers of pensions have been well aware of the phenomenon 
of pension backloading. Some relate backloading directly to mobility. 
Often, however, the discussion of backloading focuses on its ramifica 
tions for implicit contracts. A central concern is to determine the extent 
of the firm©s pension liability, or how that liability varies with worker 
tenure. 3 Studies also focus on the question of pension adequacy in 
retirement. Backloading reduces pension incomes for workers who 
have held many jobs. Researchers have also focused on the relationship 
of mobility to the replacement rate, the ratio of the yearly benefit to the 
final wage or some average wage (Turner 1993). Those with a strong 
interest in the determination and adequacy of retirement incomes look 
primarily at the effect of mobility on pension benefits received, rather 
than focusing on the effects of pension provisions and backloading on 
mobility.
It is useful to consider some examples of pension backloading from 
the literature. For comparison, the pension backloading we calculated 
in table 2.4 represents a little over $17,000 in 1983 dollars. Since the 
wage was $12.58 per hour (table 2.5), or about $25,000 for a 2,000- 
hour year, the backloading represents about 70 percent of a year©s 
wages.
The first example is from Ippolito (1986), who presents an example 
of pension capital loss from mobility. His illustration is for a worker 
hired at age 35, with normal retirement at age 65, an annual real wage 
of $10,000 and a real interest rate of zero (the interest rate equals infla 
tion). Nominal wages are presumed to grow at the same rate as infla 
tion. To simplify the annuity calculation, Ippolito assumes that, with 
retirement at 65, there is a lump-sum payment of 15 percent of the 
wage times years of service. Given these assumptions, the data in table 
3.1 are generated.
The last two columns report the loss in the pension as a fraction of 
the yearly wage ($10,000). These losses are a somewhat larger percent 
age of the wage than are the amortized amounts of pension losses dis 
cussed in the paragraphs following table 2.5. There are a number of 
reasons for these differences. One factor is that a later age of retirement 
is assumed in Ippolito©s example than is apparent in the Survey of Con-
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sumer Finances (SCF) data underlying table 2.5. Also, Ippolito 
assumes a lump-sum settlement of 15 percent of the wage times years 
of service, so that higher inflation does not erode the pension after the 
individual retires. 4 In addition, the pension assumed by Ippolito is 
somewhat more generous than are the pensions found in the SCF. 5 Nev 
ertheless, despite the fact that we are comparing a theoretical example 
with real data, and that a number of assumptions in Ippolito©s example 
tend to exaggerate pension backloading, the conclusions as to the 
likely penalty to mobility from pension backloading are of comparable 
magnitudes.
Table 3.1 An Example of Loss from Pension Backloading (Ippolito)
Interest 
rate
Age 
Service
.025 
.050 
.100
Real pension 
wealth3
45 55 
10 20
$15,000 $30,000 
15,000 30,000 
15,000 30,000
Percent of 
pension lost 
from quitting
45 55 
10 20
39.3 22.1 
63.3 39.3 
86.4 63.3
Pension loss as 
a percent 
of wage
45 55 
10 20
59.0 66.3 
94.5 117.9 
129.6 189.9
SOURCE: Ippolito (1986, p. 143, table 8-3).
NOTE: Workers at age 45 have 10 years of service, and workers at age 55 have 20 years of
service.
a. This is pension wealth as measured by projected liability.
A number of researchers concerned with the effects of pension 
backloading on benefit replacement rates examine the impact of work 
ers moving between jobs and of holding more than one pension. In 
chapter 4 we show that for movers from pension-covered jobs, only a 
third have a new pension one year later, and just over a half have a new 
pension after five years. Thus pension losses from mobility are under 
stated when it is assumed that all workers who had a pension with their 
initial job find a pension on their new job. Nevertheless, it is of interest 
to ask what these studies conclude about the likely pension losses due 
to mobility from jobs offering backloaded pensions, on the assumption 
of continuous pension coverage.6
Turner (1993, p. 53) cites results from a Hay/Huggins Study (1988), 
which took the basic turnover rates from the SCF by imputing turnover
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behavior from the tenure and pension coverage distributions. This 
study defines portability loss as the difference between 100 percent and 
the ratio, expressed as a percentage, of:
 the actual retirement benefit that the worker will receive 
from all employers, to
 the retirement benefit that the worker would have received 
if all years of covered employment had been credited under 
the last pension plan that covered the worker. (Hay/Hug- 
gins 1988, p. 4)
The study considers only the primary pension and assumes coverage 
by a comparable plan on subsequent jobs. The findings include pension 
portability losses of 14.8 percent for all workers and losses averaging 
23.3 percent for workers with a loss. For a worker with 25 years of 
covered experience who has a pension of median generosity, this 23.3 
percent loss translates to about 52 percent of wages. 7
The Congressional Budget Office (1987, p. 35) has made analogous 
calculations of the effect of multiple job holding on replacement rates. 
As can be seen in table 3.2, at a 3 percent inflation rate, a pension pay 
ing 1.5 percent per year of service on the average of the last 5 years© 
salary results in a replacement rate of 46.5 percent for an individual 
who has 9 years of service in the first pension-covered job and then 
spent the next 31 years in a job offering the same pension. A second 
employee who spent 20 years in each job has a replacement rate of 
41.1 percent, and an employee who spent 40 years in a single job has a 
replacement rate of 60 percent. If each dollar of annual benefits has an 
annuitized value of $12, then the annual loss of around 15 percent of 
final salary (the rough average of employees A and B) has a present 
value of about 1.8 times final salary (12 times 15 percent). This is an 
extreme example, though, because the 1.5 percent is higher than aver 
age and because the typical pension-covered worker will have consid 
erably less than 40 years of covered experience at retirement. 8
Of those who have calculated the pension loss from mobility, Alien, 
Clark, and McDermed employ an approach closest to the one we have 
taken in chapter 2. Recall that the pension backloading in table 2.4 rep 
resents a little over $17,000 in 1983 dollars. In comparison, Alien, 
Clark, and McDermed (1987) find an average loss for 35-44 year olds 
(our sample is 31-50 year olds) of $6,530 in 1974 dollars; that trans-
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lates to $12,000 in 1983 dollars. All things considered, the findings of 
the two studies appear to agree reasonably well as to the general order 
of magnitude of the pension loss. 9
Table 3.2 Effect of Length of Service on Defined Benefit Pensions 
(An Example)
Replacement rate 
on final five-year
Years of service, Years of service, salary average 
Employee first job second job (percent)
A
B
C
9
20
40
31
20
0
46.5
41.1
60.0
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office (1987, p. 35, table 6).
Other studies have also calculated pension backloading. As dis 
cussed, the focus is more often on the effects of mobility on pension 
replacement rates when there are defined benefit plans or on the effects 
of mobility on the implicit promise made by the employer, than on the 
impact of pension backloading on mobility. Nevertheless, there have 
been a number of studies that have looked directly at the effects of pen 
sion backloading on mobility. Several other studies have assumed that 
the negative relationship between pension coverage and mobility must 
reflect backloading.
Hypotheses Explaining Why Firms Might Use 
Backloaded Pensions to Reduce Mobility
One possible explanation as to why firms might use pensions to 
reduce mobility is rooted in human capital theory. Some firms invest in 
workers by paying substantial hiring and training costs. Hence, these 
employers need to regulate turnover so as to guarantee a long enough 
payback period to warrant the investment in human capital. A negative 
pension-mobility link may be due to the efforts of the firm to reduce 
mobility incentives among those already employed.
A related hypothesis explaining adoption of defined benefit pensions 
is also motivated by the firm©s desire to economize on hiring and train-
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ing costs. Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1993) argue that firms use 
defined benefit pensions to influence self-selection by workers, with 
the aim of encouraging applications by those who are least likely to 
leave by virtue of their own preferences. If some workers are likely to 
be "stayers" while others are likely to be "movers," it will pay the firm 
to discriminate among these different types, sorting out those workers 
who, by preference, are movers. A bonus that is conditional on long- 
term attachment is worth less to a mover and will achieve the desired 
goal (Salop and Salop 1976). Thus, a desire to avoid the additional hir 
ing and training costs associated with turnover may have motivated the 
firm to adopt backloaded pensions that impose a capital loss on those 
who leave the firm. This approach would discourage those on board 
from leaving and encourage those who are considering a job not to take 
it unless they intend to stay.
The pension capital loss may also be used to screen workers for 
other desirable characteristics, such as a willingness to work. A recent 
extension of the sorting theory by Ippolito (1993 and forthcoming b) 
posits that some workers have a higher time preference than do others 
and thus more heavily discount payments to be received in future peri 
ods. Low time-preference workers are also presumed to have some 
characteristic that is unobservable ex ante but valuable to the firm, such 
as higher productivity or lower turnover rates. If capital markets are 
imperfect and workers are on the margin of borrowing through the rel 
evant period, low time-preference workers will value pensions even 
though they transform a portion of compensation into future income. 
Under these circumstances, a sharp difference in the imputed values of 
pensions will emerge between low and high time-preference workers. 
The difference in the valuation of a defined benefit and defined contri 
bution plan will also be sharper in this situation because firms are less 
likely to cash out a defined benefit plan with any significant value than 
a defined contribution plan, for which a lump-sum settlement can often 
be obtained. This will also discourage high time-preference workers 
from seeking such jobs. Once a delayed payment mechanism is found 
to be appropriate, either for economizing on costs or for encouraging 
increased work effort, the pension, with its tax-deferred status, 
becomes an attractive vehicle for inducing the desired behavior.
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Evidence on the Relationship of Pension Coverage to Turnover
There are two types of studies that have analyzed the relationship of 
pensions to turnover. One, which represents the majority of studies, 
examines the relationship of turnover or tenure to pension coverage on 
the job. A second type, discussed in the following section, attempts to 
estimate directly the effects of pension capital loss on turnover.
Table 3.3 presents results from probit analyses taken from one 
of the turnover equations estimated in Mitchell (1982, p. 295, table 3). 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The results, which are 
based on data from the 1973 and 1977 Quality of Employment Survey, 
show that there is a strong and significant negative relationship between 
pension coverage and turnover. The coefficient for males, which is the 
group analyzed in our mobility analysis, translates into a 20 percentage 
point difference in the mobility rates between individuals who are cov 
ered by a pension and those who are not.
Table 3.3 Relationship between Pension Coverage and Job Change for 
Males as Reported by Mitchell (1982)
Coefficient on pension coverage variable in 
multivariate probit equation
Males
-0.700a 
(0.155)
Females
-0.5 19a 
(0.190)
SOURCE: Mitchell (1982, p. 295, table 3).
NOTE: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
a. Indicates a t statistic of 1.96 or better.The equations include race, education, union membership,
experience, tenure, and wage as independent variables.
The differences in turnover for workers who are and are not covered 
by pensions has been known for many years. 10 It is well established that 
turnover is lower for workers covered by pension plans. 11 Turnover 
among workers with pension coverage is about half the rate for work 
ers without pensions. 12 In 1983, length of service was 8.8 years for 
employees in the Current Population Survey whose employers pro 
vided a pension, while it was 4.1 years for workers in other jobs. 13 
Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1991) survey a number of the studies in 
this area and emphasize that in the studies they review, "pension cover 
age has been the strongest correlate of mobility and length of service." 
They also present their own analysis, in which they find that turnover is
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negatively related to pension coverage, while reported job tenure is 
positively related to pension coverage, other variables constant.
Direct Analyses of the Relationship of Pension 
Backloading to Mobility
In addition to studies that focus on the relationship of pension cover 
age to turnover, there have been attempts to estimate directly the rela 
tionship of the pension capital loss to employee turnover. Alien, Clark, 
and McDermed (1993, p. 476) conclude that pension capital losses 
account for about 40 percent of the turnover difference between those 
with and without a pension.
They specify and estimate three equations using the 1975-82 Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), with information on pension capi 
tal loss computed from a separate Employee Benefit Survey and 
matched to the PSID observations on the basis of occupation and 
industry. One equation, a selection equation, estimates the probability 
of being covered by a pension as a function of the probability of turn 
over from the pension-covered job. In another version of that equation, 
the probability of coverage is a function of a variable interacting the 
likelihood of the worker leaving a pension-covered job with a measure 
of pension capital loss. These specifications are meant to relate cover 
age to the expected cost of leaving the pension-covered job. The cover 
age equation also includes other controls. A second equation estimates 
the probability of leaving a pension-covered job in the seven-year 
period from 1975 to 1982 as a function of pension capital loss. The 
controls in this equation include a measure of hourly compensation 
that incorporates the prorated value of the accrued (stay) pension, i.e., 
a measure of pension value computed using the wage at retirement 
instead of the wage in the current period. The third equation estimates 
the probability of leaving a job that does not offer a pension as a func 
tion of a set of controls, including the wage. These equations are esti 
mated jointly, and relationships among the unobservables from each 
equation are also considered. 14
Alien, Clark, and McDermed©s findings include the following:
1. A $1,000 increase in pension capital loss reduces turnover by 1.8 
percentage points, so that the overall capital loss observed in the sam-
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pie would account for 41 percent of the difference in turnover between 
those with and without pensions.
2. Workers with low odds of turnover self-select into pension-cov 
ered jobs, but they do so on the basis of observable rather than unob- 
servable characteristics. Unobservables in the pension coverage 
equation are not correlated with either of the turnover equations.
3. The expected capital loss has little effect on the odds of being in a 
job with a pension. Neither the probability of turnover nor the interac 
tion of the probability of turnover with capital loss is significant in the 
pension coverage equation.
It is important to emphasize that the correlations among the error 
terms are insignificant. Also, there is no significant effect of expected 
pension capital loss on pension coverage. This means that any selection 
into pension-covered jobs can be accommodated by estimating mobil 
ity equations without worrying about bias from selection into a pen 
sion-covered job, as long as the exogenous variables in the mobility 
equation include those observables that are associated with choosing 
pension-covered jobs. Consequently, Alien, Clark, and McDermed feel 
free to examine the effect of pension capital loss on quits and layoffs in 
a single equation mobility model.
Other Relevant Findings on the Pension-Mobility Relationship
In addition to the findings from basic pension-mobility studies, there 
are more detailed results germane to the pension-mobility relationship. 
Three are noted here. First, as emphasized by Alien, Clark, and 
McDermed (1993, p. 476), the strength of the estimated relationship 
between pensions and mobility declines with years of service. Second, 
as noted by Mitchell (1982) and as confirmed by Alien, Clark, and 
McDermed and others, pensions are more strongly related to layoffs 
than to quits, and thus are more strongly related to overall turnover 
than to quits. Moreover, when layoffs and quits are related to a measure 
of pension backloading by Alien, Clark, and McDermed, layoff proba 
bilities fall by 1.3 percentage points for each $1,000 increase in capital 
loss, but the effect of a $1,000 capital loss is to reduce quits by less 
than one-half of 1 percentage point. Third, as recently found by Even 
and Macpherson (1992), the negative pension-mobility relationship 
holds up in large firms, but not in small firms, suggesting indirectly
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that the defined benefit plans more prevalent in larger firms are inhibit 
ing mobility.
Questions About the Literature Findings
We now consider questions raised by the research that has been dis 
cussed. Specifically, we explain our doubt that backloaded defined 
benefit pensions account for a large part of the differences in mobility 
found between those who hold jobs offering pensions and those who 
hold jobs that do not.
Pension Backloading and Disincentives to Mobility
Despite the existence of a pension capital loss associated with back- 
loading and special early retirement benefits, we doubt that pensions 
create sufficient incentives to account for the level and patterns of 
mobility observed. In our previous work (Gustman and Steinmeier 
1987 and 1993b), and as emphasized by the calculations in chapter 2, 
we have noted that the disincentive to mobility created by defined ben 
efit pensions is small enough to be easily overcome by a raise of a few 
percentage points on the new job.
Why Firms Might Use a Backloaded Pension to Reduce Mobility
The analysis in chapter 2 also shows that the pattern of penalties to 
mobility induced by defined benefit plans is not consistent with a 
hypothesis emphasizing the importance of reducing hiring and training 
costs. Larger penalties are created for those with greater experience. 
Yet those with fewer years on the job are precisely the workers the firm 
would like to discourage from moving, since early mobility on their 
part will create the least return to training and hiring costs. The small 
penalty to mobility for those who have just started on the job suggests 
that the firm probably does not count on the pension to reduce mobility 
in the years immediately after hiring and training costs are incurred.
It has also been argued that vesting is responsible for reduced turn 
over from pension-covered jobs. However, there are a number of unan 
swered questions about the relationship between vesting and mobility.
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Before regulation from the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA), the vesting period was quite long, often extending 
for a number of decades. This suggests that whatever its current pur 
pose, vesting was not initially used by firms as a tool for offsetting 
training and hiring costs by reducing mobility of workers who were 
within the first decade of employment. Even now, the effect on mobil 
ity is likely to be small, although vesting rules do create a discontinuity 
in compensation accrual as the vesting period approaches. That is, 
given limitations on the vesting period under current law, which 
requires 5-year cliff vesting or graded vesting centered around the 5- 
year period, pension accruals are small enough at the time of vesting so 
that losses due to turnover during the first years of employment are 
likely to be slight (Kotlikoff and Wise 1985, 1987a). Direct calcula 
tions of the effects of a reduction in vesting from 10 to 5 years also 
suggest that recent changes in vesting rules, and related requirements 
for crediting work at young ages, are unlikely to affect incentives for 
turnover substantially (Gustman and Steinmeier 1989b).
The Relationship of Pension Coverage to Turnover
As noted, an important reason why researchers believe that pensions 
reduce mobility is that there is a strong correlation between pension 
coverage and measures of mobility or tenure. The fundamental ques 
tion to be addressed is whether this correlation reflects causality, or 
whether important causal factors that generate the correlation have 
been omitted. Much of our work in this book addresses the question of 
what omitted variables might explain the correlation between pension 
coverage and mobility.
One candidate for the omitted variable has been suggested by the 
research of Alien, Clark, and McDermed. Their finding that pension 
backloading has a greater effect on layoffs than quits, along with 
Mitchell©s earlier findings to the same effect, suggests that causality 
may run from the implicit contract, whatever its form and value, to 
mobility and pension design, rather than directly from pension back- 
loading to mobility. That is, the implicit contract, and the productivity 
or rent-sharing arrangement underlying that contract, may be the omit 
ted factor. Such an arrangement may lead to payment of a compensa 
tion premium on pension-covered jobs. That source of bias has been
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analyzed in our earlier work (Gustman and Steinmeier 1987, 1993b) 
and will be examined extensively in this book.
Direct Analyses of the Relationship of Pension Backloading to 
Mobility
The evidence in Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1993), that pension 
backloading is substantially responsible for the lower mobility from 
pension-covered jobs, is also characterized by a number of anomalies. 
The findings are not internally consistent and suggest the possibility of 
specification error in the model. In particular, the results imply that an 
additional dollar of pension capital loss would have over 20 times the 
effect on turnover as would an additional dollar of compensation. But 
why should an extra dollar realized in the form of pension backloading 
be so much more influential in reducing turnover than a dollar realized 
in the form of higher wages?
According to Alien, Clark, and McDermed, "The impact of a $1,000 
increase in the capital loss is a 1.8 percentage point reduction in the 
odds of turnover" (1993, p. 476). They also find that "a one dollar 
increase in before-tax compensation is associated with a 1.8 percentage 
point decrease in the odds of turnover..." (p. 477). A flow of $1 per 
hour in wages translates into a present value of $20,000 to $30,000 in 
the 15-to-20 years until retirement. Accordingly, their findings suggest 
that a one-dollar pension capital loss has about 20 to 30 times the 
impact of one extra dollar received as wages. On the face of it, this 
result is implausible. It is likely that some omitted factor is correlated 
with their measure of pension backloading and with mobility. A com 
plete specification of the model should produce results in which an 
extra dollar of compensation has a comparable effect on mobility, no 
matter what the source. 15
Alien, Clark, and McDermed also find that all of the sorting into 
pension-covered jobs is based on observables, not on unobservables, 
and that "the expected magnitude of capital loss has little effect on the 
sorting of workers by pension coverage" (p. 476). This finding is puz 
zling since Alien, Clark, and McDermed believe that sorting would be 
a good candidate for the omitted variable that causes an overestimate 
of the correlation between pension backloading and mobility. 16 More 
over, simultaneous equations bias, proceeding from occupational
The Literature Relevant to the Pension-Mobility Relationship 51
choices and resulting characteristics associated with mobility, to pen 
sion backloading, might provide a plausible explanation for the differ 
ences in some mobility equation estimates. These differences would 
exist between the coefficients on pension backloading on the one hand 
and the measured effects of other differences in compensation on the 
other. However, their findings also rule out an effect of pension back- 
loading on job choice.
In sum, there are a number of anomalies in the Alien, Clark, and 
McDermed studies of the relationship of pension backloading to 
mobility. These issues lead us to question a conclusion that backload 
ing accounts for a substantial part of the reduction in mobility from 
pension-covered jobs.
Other Relevant Findings Suggested in the Literature on the Pension- 
Mobility Relationship
The finding in Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1991) that pension 
capital loss reduces mobility more for younger than for older workers 
accords with a model that emphasizes the importance of the pension as 
a device for reducing hiring costs. This finding does not, however, 
mesh with the time pattern of disincentives to mobility created by the 
standard plan formula, or by relevant results from pension surveys. 
Petersen (1992) and the evidence examined in chapter 2 suggest that 
the pattern of disincentives has a basic inverted U shape, rather than a 
declining pattern with age. The net effect is that the disincentives to 
mobility created by pensions are higher a decade or two after hiring 
than in the first few years after the date of hire. If the special early 
retirement benefits are considered, the pattern of disincentives may 
even be uniformly increasing with age. In this case, mobility should 
fall with tenure until the early retirement age, as found by Stock and 
Wise (1990). 17 Given the very weak penalty to mobility in early years, 
it is hard to rationalize an effect of pensions on mobility that is very 
large for workers with low tenure. 18
The next questions for consideration are raised by findings that pen 
sion capital loss reduces turnover almost exclusively through its effect 
on (perhaps, correlation with) layoffs. Firms would have no reason to 
employ backloaded pensions to decrease mobility by reducing layoffs, 
since layoffs can be determined directly. It is possible to rationalize the
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relationship of pensions to layoffs as evidence for an implicit contract, 
in that there may be a linkage between pension capital loss and the 
firm©s reluctance to break the contract and engage in layoffs. However, 
if this is true, the purpose of the implicit contract must be something 
other than reducing worker quits; otherwise, we would expect to see a 
decrease in the quit rate as well. For instance, firms might be using the 
implicit contract to reduce shirking or encourage more effort, and a 
diminished layoff rate may be necessary in order for workers to believe 
that they will get the expected future payoffs if they cooperate. This is 
no longer a story of pensions causing lower mobility; it is a story of 
pension and layoff policies being used together by the firms for a 
broader goal.
A related possibility is reverse causality, as firms shape pensions to 
meet turnover expectations for their covered workers. That is, selection 
of plan coverage or plan type may be a result, not only of the decisions 
of the workers, as in a mover-stayer model, but of the firm©s efforts to 
provide a desirable vehicle for savings. It may be that at firms where 
turnover is likely to be higher, plans are arranged to accommodate the 
pattern of turnover. We know that this is a likely explanation for the 
prevalence of defined contribution plans in higher education, for exam 
ple. Accordingly, while Alien, Clark, and McDermed find that 
expected turnover does not account for pension coverage, it still may 
be that those workers in jobs characterized by high rates of turnover are 
more likely to be covered by defined contribution plans, or defined 
benefit plans designed specifically to impose a lower penalty for turn 
over. 19
A finding in favor of the hypothesis that pensions are used directly 
to reduce mobility is that the pension-mobility relationship persists in 
samples of large, but not in samples of small, firms. This is especially 
the case because pensions are more likely to be defined benefit in 
larger firms, and so they are more likely to be characterized by a signif 
icant pension capital loss with turnover. 20 Still, the fact that compensa 
tion and work conditions are so different between large and small firms 
(Brown and Medoff 1989) leaves open the possibility that there also is 
important omitted variable bias.
Further insight into the pension-mobility relationship might be 
gained by a more careful specification of the mobility equation, a spec 
ification that distinguishes among alternative explanations for mobil-
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ity: changing information on the quality of a match, asymmetric 
information, changing demand patterns, reverse causation, or other 
reasons. The current models of the pension-mobility relationship have 
not yet specified equations that carefully model these separate factors.
Unresolved Issues
A number of issues in the literature on wage determination remain 
unresolved and, as a consequence, leave in doubt the relationships 
determining compensation and employment that underlie our findings. 
On the conceptual level, we know that wages and pensions are jointly 
determined, together with employment and worker costs and quality, 
where by quality we mean factors affecting various dimensions of pro 
ductivity including skill and effort. Also to be considered are determi 
nants of noncompensation costs, such as turnover. But we do not have 
a very good fix on how these various elements of firm labor demand 
are determined.
Some of the relevant relationships are suggested by standard consid 
erations that arise from demand analysis in spot labor markets, but 
most of the considerations that would allow us to fully understand the 
determination of labor compensation, quantity, and quality in a model 
that incorporates pensions requires an analysis in the context of long- 
term job attachment between the worker and the firm. Institutions arise 
for influencing and adjudicating terms of employment, including but 
not limited to unions. With long-term job attachment, markets need not 
clear at each moment in time. Moreover, with long-term job attach 
ment and property rights in the job, it becomes more reasonable to sup 
pose that if there are any rents accruing to the firm, there is some 
possibility of workers capturing a portion of the rents.
With long-term attachment, there must be provision for changes in 
the economic environment. This has led to the idea of an implicit 
employment contract that would establish expected responses to the 
most common economic changes. Such arrangements may include, but 
are not restricted to, responses to various contingencies, ranging from 
the business cycle to the long-run success of the firm.
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In addition, there may be special considerations that have shaped the 
role of the pension in the implicit employment contract. These unique 
influences include unions, a changing regulatory environment, the rise 
and spread of a true labor market innovation in the form of the pension, 
and economies of scale in the provisions of certain benefits.
Considerable uncertainty persists about the terms of these arrange 
ments, however, either in a steady state environment or in one that is 
changing over time. As a result, there is uncertainty about what under 
lies the relationship between mobility, pensions, and the associated 
compensation changes that we are observing. We will find that workers 
who leave firms that offer pensions experience a compensation decline 
significantly larger than the wage decline experienced by those who 
leave jobs that do not offer pensions, but this finding remains subject to 
a number of interpretations.
One possibility is that jobs that offer pensions pay higher compensa 
tion than jobs that do not offer pensions. There is a long literature dat 
ing back to Slichter (1950) and his students that relates interindustry 
wage differentials to the presence of market power and rents received 
by firms. Certain jobs are "good jobs," providing individuals with rela 
tively higher wages. This literature, which is summarized by Segal 
(1986), does not require that compensation differences be equalizing. 
Rather, the idea is that, in the face of imperfect competition, it is possi 
ble for wages not to be equalizing. Some of these differentials may 
constitute rents that exceed any compensation differentials intended to 
raise worker productivity.
The literature on dual labor markets (Cain 1976) has addressed in 
some detail the question of whether there are good and bad jobs. Tests 
of the dual labor market hypothesis analyze whether wage differentials 
reflect compensating wage differentials or unmeasured ability and 
whether only certain work rewards formal on-the-job training.
An additional step required, if it is to be established that wage pre 
miums are more likely to accrue to pension-covered workers, is that 
high-wage jobs must have a higher propensity to offer pensions. The 
literature on pension coverage, and on coverage by defined benefit 
plans, does suggest that these plans are more likely to be offered to 
those in union jobs, in jobs in large firms, and in jobs in particular 
industries. (See Gustman and Mitchell 1992 and Gustman, Mitchell, 
and Steinmeier 1994 for surveys of the relevant evidence.)
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A related literature, efficiency wage studies, argues that wage premi 
ums are paid in certain industries and by certain firms as a method for 
increasing productivity. Thus, firms pay higher wages than the individ 
ual can obtain elsewhere as a way of maintaining worker discipline and 
work effort. In this case the worker does receive a wage premium over 
and above compensation on the next best job. At least some, and per 
haps all, of the higher wage results from a compensating wage differ 
ence.
Some of the controversy about the payment of wage premiums has 
addressed the question of the optimal arrangement for structuring 
incentive pay. Lazear©s work (1979, 1983) provides a basis for many 
discussions of incentive pay models where monitoring is costly, and it 
has the advantage of incorporating an explicit role for pensions. At 
issue is whether it is necessary to pay greater compensation in order to 
increase work effort, or whether it is sufficient to structure compensa 
tion so that at the time of hire workers post a bond and are repaid the 
value of the bond over the course of the employment arrangement. 
Akerlof and Katz (1989) argue, for example, that efficient bonding 
schemes are not possible and that the use of an up-front age-earnings 
profile as a mechanism for bonding is not fully efficient, so that in the 
presence of monitoring costs it will pay to offer efficiency wages. 21
According to the traditional view on the supply side of the labor 
market, the payment of higher wages with tenure is explained by the 
presence of job-specific training (Becker 1964; Mincer 1974). Topel 
(1990) has attempted to estimate the size of wage loss when turnover 
causes forfeiture of specific human capital. Other forms of investment 
that might result in a wage loss with turnover include the effort in 
obtaining an optimal job match (Jovanovic 1979a and b). Although it is 
clear that specific investment should raise the post-training wage of 
those who have engaged in such activity, it is not clear why specific 
training should raise the value of lifetime earnings net of costs. If the 
costs and benefits from such training are shared, a worker of a given 
quality should receive the same lifetime compensation as would be 
received in other employment that did not involve specific training.
In order to better understand the wage determination process, and 
the reasons for wage differences with turnover, we need to improve our 
comprehension not only of the determination of compensation differ 
ences among jobs, but of the relationship between compensation and
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tenure on a given job. The question of what underlies the wage tenure, 
or compensation tenure, profile is fundamental to understanding how 
compensation is determined over the period of job attachment. This is 
an unsettled issue. Some argue that apparent seniority premiums that 
have been attributed to specific training are really the result of selection 
bias. Relevant references to this debate include Abraham and Farber 
(1985, 1987), Altonji and Shakotko (1987), and Topel (1986, 1990).
An obvious question is whether those who appear to be receiving a 
wage premium are really being paid for some unobservable dimension 
of higher quality. There have been a number of efforts to determine 
whether those who are receiving higher wages are more desirable to 
the firm. One basic idea is to look at job movers and to see whether 
those who appear to be receiving a wage premium actually receive a 
higher wage in alternative employment. Refinements of this idea have 
been developed in studies analyzing the differences in wage changes 
for those who leave their old jobs for various reasons (Gibbons and 
Katz 1989, 1991). None of the relevant studies has been able to explain 
the wage differentials observed for employees in particular industries, 
or at larger firms, by resorting to unmeasured individual characteris 
tics. That is, workers from particular industries and large firms typi 
cally categorized as high-wage employers do experience larger wage 
declines than do workers from low-wage industries or smaller firms, 
even controlling for the reason for job change.
Ippolito (forthcoming b) has used the idea of worker heterogeneity 
to explain pension backloading. He theorizes that the firm uses the 
backloaded pension to sort out workers with different degrees of time 
preference and that time preference of workers is correlated with other 
worker characteristics, which are then related to turnover. The direct 
evidence we have discussed finds no relationship between turnover and 
unmeasured worker characteristics, and there is as yet no empirical 
support for Ippolito©s conjectures on the relationship of pensions to 
such characteristics.
Studies of compensating wage differentials are directly germane to 
the question of how pensions relate to compensation. That literature 
has not been especially successful in isolating compensating wage dif 
ferentials for job conditions (Brown 1980). There also have been spe 
cial efforts to isolate compensating wage differentials for pensions. 
Most studies find a positive relationship between pension coverage and
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wages (Gordon and Blinder 1980), and between pension values and 
wages (Gustman and Steinmeier 1989a). Recent work has attempted to 
apply hedonic techniques to isolate the pension-wage tradeoff. It sug 
gests that if productivity is held constant, a negative tradeoff between 
pensions and wages might be generated. However, identification of 
exogenous instruments has been a real problem. Thus, the leading 
work in this area, Montgomery, Shaw, and Benedict (1992), for exam 
ple, uses pension characteristics as instruments in the estimation. The 
pension plan features are jointly determined with the wage and pension 
level, however, and are thus endogenously determined.
It might be argued that older job changers face special disadvan 
tages. Barnow and Ehrenberg (1979) show that one consequence of 
backloaded pensions is that a firm©s pension costs are greater when it 
hires older workers. It has also been argued that firms are unwilling to 
invest in the specific training for older workers that they are willing to 
provide for younger workers. Older workers are attached to the firm for 
fewer years, and thus the firm has less time to recapture its investment 
(Hutchens 1986). Because workers who share in the returns to specific 
investment are also expected to invest in specific training, it is not clear 
why the net present value of older job losers© compensation streams 
should necessarily be reduced as a result of the firm©s unwillingness to 
invest in their training. Indeed, if the older job mover were being 
trained upon initial hire, shared investment activities would depress 
rather than increase the observed wage. A possible explanation is that 
workers are valuable to the firm only if the firm can also invest in their 
specific training. Alternatively, there must be something else about the 
relationship between the net wage paid to the worker and the type of 
job that accounts for the decline in wages observed with turnover of 
older workers.
There are interactions among these various models. The specific 
training literature focuses our attention on job training at the beginning 
of the period of employment (Oi 1983). However, as we will continue 
to argue, it is unlikely that pensions create incentives that would allow 
the firm to economize on hiring and training costs at the time of initial 
hire. Others, such as Ippolito in the studies noted previously, argue that 
training takes place throughout the period of job attachment. Thus, 
pensions that discourage turnover among more mature workers are, 
nevertheless, economizing on training costs. While new CPS data have
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become available on training activity by workers and there is useful 
data from the National Longitudinal Surveys of Labor Market Experi 
ence (NLS), we have no consensus on the distribution of specific train 
ing over the course of job attachment. 22
In sum, the research has not yet clearly explained compensation dif 
ferences in the labor market, particularly those differences between 
jobs offering pensions and jobs without pensions. A better understand 
ing of this phenomenon is needed in order to determine what mecha 
nism accounts for the decline in compensation with turnover from 
pension-covered jobs. The outstanding questions are fundamental to 
labor economics, and we are not able to resolve them here.
In the remainder of the book we will present evidence that there is 
an important omitted factor from studies of the relationship of pension 
incentives to mobility. Further, the evidence suggests the omitted factor 
is a compensation premium paid on pension-covered jobs. This chapter 
has laid a foundation for that finding. It has suggested a number of 
problems with the current literature on the pension-mobility relation 
ship, and also indicates that payment of a wage premium on pension- 
covered jobs is consistent with other findings in labor economics.
NOTES
1. The analysis in this chapter draws heavily on our own previous published work, Gustman 
and Steinmeier 1993b, as well as on studies we have completed with Olivia Mitchell (Gustman 
and Mitchell 1992 and Gustman, Mitchell, and Steinmeier 1993 and 1994).
2. There are other benefit formulas, such those typical in the union sector, in which a flat dollar 
payment is given for each year of service. These dollar amounts are increased from one contract 
to the next, so that the plans mimic pensions in which benefits are based on final average salary or 
lifetime earnings. Workers who leave such plans early also suffer the analog of a pension capital 
loss.
3. A central question is whether the firm©s pension liability should be the legal liability, in 
which case the benefit accrued to date is the pension amount owed on the assumption that today is 
the worker©s last day of employment. Alternatively, the pension liability could be calculated 
assuming the worker continues employment at the firm; the pension liability would be evaluated 
using the wage projected at the time of retirement. Under current actuarial practice, the projected 
liability is used. Bulow (1982) argues for use of the legal liability concept, while Ippolito (1986) 
argues for use of the projected liability and the existence of an implicit employment contract. For 
calculations of the differences in the liabilities, which are a direct reflection of pension backload- 
ing, see Gustman and Steinmeier (1989a).
4. That is, the assumption that pensions are paid as a lump sum at the beginning of the retire 
ment period, and that the equivalent of the lump-sum payment determined by a given wage his 
tory does not vary with the inflation rate, is tantamount to assuming that benefits are fully indexed 
after retirement. The evidence suggests that between one-third and one-half of benefits in retire-
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ment have been indexed (Alien, Clark, and Sumner 1986; Gustman and Steinmeier 1993a). The 
data in chapter 2 are based on the assumption of partial indexing of benefits after retirement.
5. In the example, the individual would receive $45,000 (15 percent of $10,000 times 30) 
upon retirement at 65. The present value of wages would be $300,000 (30 times $10,000). Thus, 
the pension amounts to 15 percent of the value of his wages over the period, which would place 
this individual at almost the 75th percentile among the actual SCF pension-covered workers in 
table 2.3.
6. As we also note, some of those who did not have a pension on their initial job do find a pen 
sion on their new jobs. For that reason, compensation gain is missed when it is assumed that pen 
sion status remains unchanged with mobility.
7. According to table 2.3, median pension wealth for individuals in the 55-65 age range is 
about 9 percent of wage wealth. This means that an individual with 25 years of covered employ 
ment would have pension wealth equal to about 2.25 times annual earnings (.09 times 25). Thus a 
loss of 23.3 percent of pension wealth would result in a loss of about 52 percent of annual earn 
ings (.233 times 2.25).
8. Given these figures, the total value of the pension would be equal to 7.2 years of earnings 
(12 times the 60 percent replacement rate if the worker does not leave the firm), or about 18 per 
cent of the earnings over the working life (7.2 of 40 years). This compares to a median value of 9 
percent for 55-65 year-old workers in table 2.3. For a worker who has been on the job for 15 years 
and has another 15 years to go until retirement, the replacement rate would be 45 percent if the 
worker continues in the same job until retirement and 36.75 percent if he or she changes jobs. 
This produces a benefit loss of only 8 percent versus the considerably larger losses shown in table 
3.2.
9. The estimates of backloading by Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1987) involve some under 
statement. Specifically, their procedure does not catch the spikes in the accrual profile, which we 
found in table 2.3 to be sizable. It also seems likely that pension generosity increased to some 
degree between 1974 and 1983.
10. See Ross (1958) and the U.S. Department of Labor (1964). 
1 1 . See also Ippolito (1987), among others.
12. For example, in the sample from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 
that we examine, one-year mobility rates were about 20 percent for those without pensions and 6 
percent for those with pensions. Five-year mobility rates were 57.8 and 32.4 percent, respectively, 
in the PSID.
13. Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1993).
14. To be more specific, the three equations estimated by Alien, Clark, and McDermed are as 
follows, in the original notation:
TNi=$3l ^3i +£3(
where P* is a latent variable indicating the odds that a particular worker will be covered by a pen 
sion; T*j and TN* are latent variables indicating the odds of leaving a job with a pension (P) and 
without a pension (AO; X),-, A^,- and X^, are vectors of control variables; and TPi = Prob (Tpt > 0) 
(Alien, Clark, and McDermed, 1993, p. 467). The error terms are normally distributed, with non 
zero covariances between EJ/ and 82(- and between ej/ and £3/ , but, with zero covariance between 
e2, and e3/ .
15. It would be appropriate to adjust for differences in risk among sources of compensation, 
but, due to unexpected turnover, potential income from backloading of pensions appears to be a
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highly risky element of compensation. Accordingly, failure to adjust for risk should lead to an 
overstatement rather than an understatement of the importance of pension backloading as an influ 
ence on mobility.
16. If this finding is accepted, a direct implication is that a single-equation mobility model 
may be applied to an analysis of mobility from pension and nonpension jobs without causing bias. 
This conclusion is consistent with the approach of Alien, Clark, and McDermed in examining the 
relationship of pensions to quits and layoffs. The only requirement is that observable variables 
associated with selection into pension-covered jobs be held constant.
17. In the Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1991) study, covering the 1975 to 1982 period, the 
mean pension capital loss from turnover is $821 for those under age 25, $2,926 for those between 
25 and 34, $6,526 for those between 35 and 44, and $8,503 for those 45 to 54.
18. Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1991) suggest that the negative effect of pensions on mobil 
ity of younger workers is due to selection, in which stayers are more likely to accept pension-cov 
ered jobs because they defer earnings, and that the effect of this self-selection is more likely to 
show up at younger ages. This implies that young workers who are stayers must impute great 
value to the expected pension, despite the very small cost of leaving the firm in the first few years 
of employment. However, their own results show that expected pension capital loss has no effect 
on selection into pension-covered jobs This suggests that if selection is important, it works when 
those with the observable characteristics of stayers choose pension-covered jobs, whatever the 
incentives from backloading.
19. Consistent with this view, Dorsey (1987) finds that, among manufacturing industries, the 
probability of coverage by a defined contribution plan is positively related to the layoff rate in the 
industry. This conclusion is also consistent with a view that firms reduce layoffs where there is an 
obligation under the implicit contract.
20. Estimates of the relationship between coverage and turnover, even when standardizing for 
plan type, provide only limited information about causality. Thus, in analyzing variation in the 
pension-mobility relationship with firm size, Even and Macpherson (1992) conclude that"... once 
the type of pension plan is controlled for, the effect of pensions on tenure varies less systemati 
cally with employer size, though there is weak evidence that DB plans have a greater effect at 
larger employers." More precise findings require use of direct information on plan incentives.
21. Related references on the efficiency wage controversy include Krueger and Summers 
(1987, 1988), Dickens and Katz (1987), and Katz and Summers (1989).
22. For a recent survey of what is known from the NLS data about training over the life cycle, 
see Light (1994).
Descriptive Data 
and Multivariate Analyses
This chapter presents some basic descriptive findings pertaining to 
the relationship between pensions, job mobility, and wages. These 
results take the form of cross tabs and simple multivariate analyses and 
suggest the following conclusions:
 Workers on pension-covered jobs exhibit lower turnover than those 
on nonpension jobs.
 Workers with pensions have higher wages and thus even higher 
compensation than those without pensions.
 Wage losses are greater for movers from pension-covered than 
from nonpension jobs.
 Movers from jobs with pensions are more likely than movers from 
jobs without pensions to locate a pension on their new jobs. Never 
theless, when pensions are considered, they increase the relative 
compensation loss for movers from pension jobs and raise the com 
pensation gain for movers from nonpension jobs.
 Defined contribution plans, which are not backloaded, have the 
same negative association with mobility as do defined benefit 
plans, which are backloaded.
The Data
The data used in this chapter are from three surveys: (1) the 1983 
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which has retrospective data to 
analyze mobility between 1978 and 1983; (2) the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP), which has panel data covering 
mobility over the period from 1984 to 1985; and (3) the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID), which has panel data on mobility from 
1984 and 1989. 1
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The data available in the three surveys are not comparable along a 
number of dimensions. The SCF is the only one of the surveys to have 
a matched employer-provided description of the pension plan attached 
to the survey responses of covered workers. These were obtained by 
asking the survey respondent the name of the employer and by then 
writing to the employer or searching U.S. Department of Labor files 
for the plan description. For the SIPP and PSID data, plan descriptions 
are matched on the basis of job characteristics from the sample of SCF 
plan descriptions. All three surveys indicate whether the individual is 
covered by a pension; however, the SCF and SIPP are the only surveys 
to contain usable self-reported information on plan type, along with 
other pension characteristics as described by the covered individual. 
The PSID collected information on plan type and other details of the 
pension from covered individuals, but it did so only for those age 45 
and over. As a result, self-reported pension information is missing for 
most of the age range of interest for our mobility analysis. On the other 
hand, information on the reason for separation is available for the full 
sample in the PSID, but it is only selectively available in the other sur 
veys, if at all. 2
The SCF observations are based on interviews in 1983, which 
obtained retrospective information on job history. The base period was 
1978. The survey asked about the wage and other characteristics of the 
1978 job only if that job involved a pension or if it was the individual©s 
longest prior job. Given this format, information on the wage and char 
acteristics of the 1978 job is unavailable for some individuals. Accord 
ingly, some of the simple base-period descriptive relationships can be 
calculated only for the true panels (SIPP and PSID) and not for the 
SCF data. Although censoring limits the availability of descriptive sta 
tistics for the retrospective SCF data, the structural analysis corrects 
for this problem econometrically and thus allows consistent estimation 
of compensation and its components on the 1978 job.
For the SIPP sample, the first interview was in 1983. The 1983 panel 
was interviewed every four months for two and a half years. The fourth 
and seventh interviews, conducted one year apart in 1984 and 1985, 
contain topical modules with questions pertaining to the individual©s 
pension. Those interviews are the ones used here. For all individuals in 
the survey, the fourth interview covers a period in 1984, and the sev-
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enth covers a period in 1985. Some supplementary information from 
the third, fifth, and sixth interviews is also utilized.
The PSID sample works with information that was collected pri 
marily in 1984 and 1989, although again some use is made of informa 
tion collected in the intervening years (such as the reason for leaving 
the 1984 job, if that occurred). The 1984 and 1989 interviews provide 
information on current pension coverage, which is not available for 
any of the intermediate years.
Males were selected in each sample who were 31-50 years old at the 
beginning of the sample period. 3 To be eligible for selection, individu 
als had to be employed for at least 30 hours per week in private sector, 
nonagricultural firms at the beginning of the period. The study exam 
ines the mobility of prime-aged workers. 4 It does not consider the 
mobility of younger workers who are in the early stages of job search, 
nor does it consider the age range in which job change may be related 
to retirement or contemplation of retirement.
Four potential sources of differences among the surveys may be 
noted. First, the surveys cover different years. There is evidence that 
mobility at the end of the 1980s was different from mobility in earlier 
years.5 The data are not sufficient for us to separate the effects of the 
survey year on the outcomes of interest, but it may be that differences 
in the results between the PSID and the two other surveys are partly a 
reflection of differences in the year of the survey. 6 Second, the period 
over which mobility is measured is shorter in the SIPP sample. Less 
mobility is observable over a shorter period, and those workers with 
multiple separations receive more weight in a shorter than in a longer 
period. 7 Third, SCF job change information is based on retrospective 
data, while for the PSID and SIPP, true panel data are available. 8 
Fourth, the employer-provided pension information, which is not dis 
cussed in this chapter but is used in the structural analysis of chapters 6 
and 7, is obtained from the individual©s employer in the SCF but must 
be matched on the basis of other reported characteristics in the PSID or 
SIPP.9
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The Findings
Turnover
Table 4.1 presents descriptive data on mobility, wages, and pensions 
using information from the three surveys. 10 Relative mobility from non- 
pension jobs is considerably higher than it is from pension jobs in each 
of the surveys, but the differences in mobility rates are much larger in 
the retrospective SCF data than they are in the panel data sets. The 
descriptive statistics from the SCF presented in table 4.1 suggest that 
males 31-50 years old without pensions are over six times as likely to 
move as those with pensions (59.1 percent versus 8.6 percent). SIPP 
data indicate that individuals initially without pensions are over three 
times more likely (19.5 percent versus 6.1 percent) to move from the 
1984 job than are individuals with pensions. The PSID data exhibit 
turnover rates of 57.8 percent for those in a nonpension job and 32.4 
percent for those in a pension job over a five-year period, indicating a 
slightly less than two-to-one ratio of mobility rates in accordance with 
pension status.
The relative differences among surveys in mobility rates of those 
without pensions are not large, considering that the SCF and PSID both 
cover five-year periods, while the SIPP covers only a one-year period. 
They are particularly close between the PSID and SCF samples, which 
calculate mobility over a five-year period. Differences in the relative 
mobility rates among pension-covered workers are more substantial. It 
is possible that differences in the time periods covered may account for 
some of the discrepancies. An alternative explanation is that the SCF 
asked specifically about any previous job with a pension. If the job his 
tory did not include 1978, the individual was presumed to have been 
working in a nonpension job at that time. If individuals who left pen 
sion jobs held in 1978 did not report those jobs (this question was at 
the tail end of a job history section), the mobility rate from pension 
jobs would be biased downward.
Table 4.2 presents estimates of the relationship between pension 
coverage and mobility from multivariate equations relating turnover to 
pension coverage." These equations allow us to standardize for the 
effects of observable differences among individuals that may be corre-
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Table 4.1 Mobility, Wages, and Pension Data for Males 31 to 50 Years 
Old, from the SCF, SIPP, and PSID
No pension 
in initial job
Pension in initial 
job
Survey Stayers Movers Stayers Movers
1978-83 SCFa
Number of movers and stayers 106 153 
Percent movers 59.1 % 
Mean wage in 1978 (initial job) $8.19 $8.93 
Mean wage in 1983 d $9.11 
Percent with pension in 1983 d 38.6%
1984-85 SIPPb
Number of movers and stayers 803 195 
Percent movers 19.5% 
Mean wage in 1984 (initial job) $8.71 $7.72 
Mean wage in 1985 $8.86 $8.23 
Percent with pension in 1985 d 13.8% 
Primary 1984 plan was defined 
benefit d d
1984-89 PSIDc
Number of movers and stayers 79 118 
Percent movers 57.8% 
Mean wage in 1984 (initial job) $9.19 $9.35 
Mean wage in 1989 $9.95 $9.12 
Percent with pension in 1989 d 37.0%
338 32
8.6%
$11.91 $12.63 
d $10.30 
d 43.8%
1,646 107
6.1%
$11.88 $11.22
$11.89 $10.52
d 35.8%
64.3% 63.6%
263 126
32.4%
$12.92 $11.85 
$13.09 $10.59
d 53.2%
a. Data from the SCF are based on the authors© computations. Wages are indexed to 1983 by the
Index of Hourly Earnings (1988 Economic Report of the President, table B-44).
b. SIPP figures are from Gustman and Steinmeier (1993b, table 1), and from our own
computations. Wages are indexed to 1984 by the Index of Hourly Earnings (1988 Economic
Report of the President, table B-44).
c. Data from the PSID are based on the authors© computations. Wages are indexed to 1984 by the
Wage and Salary Employment Cost Index (1991 Economic Report of the President, table B-45).
d. Not applicable.
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lated with pension coverage and account for some of the observed dif 
ferences in mobility between workers with and without pensions. As 
can be seen, the relationship between pension coverage and mobility is 
significant in all three probits. According the SCF retrospective data, 
those workers with pensions are 57 percent less likely to show turnover 
than those without pensions. The SIPP data indicate that the difference 
in turnover is 9 percent at the means for the one-year period covered. 
In the PSID panel, the turnover rate is 21 percent lower for pension- 
covered workers. Thus, the negative relationship of pension coverage 
to turnover is much stronger in the retrospective SCF data.
Table 4.2 Effects of Pension Coverage in Reduced Form Mobility 
Equations
1978-83 SCF 1984-85 SIPP 1984-89 PSID
_____ (10.90) ___________ (6.50) ___________ (4.24) _____
NOTES: Dependent variable is 1 if the individual separates and is 0 otherwise. Entries are probit 
marginal effects of the probability of separation for males age 31-50 in the initial year. Absolute 
values of asymptotic t statistics are given in parentheses. Other independent variables in the 
equations are indicated in appendix table 4.3.
Wages and Compensation
Line 3 of each panel of table 4.1 indicates the wages for movers and 
stayers, classified by pension coverage on their initial jobs. The results 
based on SCF data suggest that, in their initial jobs, stayers with pen 
sions earned about 45 percent more than did stayers without pensions. 
In the SIPP data, stayers with pensions earned 36 percent more than 
stayers without pensions in their initial jobs, while in the PSID data 
they earned 41 percent more. Movers from pension-covered employ 
ment earned 45 percent more in their initial jobs than movers from 
nonpension jobs in the SIPP, and 27 percent more in the PSID. In the 
SCF data, the differential was 41 percent. Were the pensions evaluated, 
as they are in later chapters, and the value of the pension added to the 
wage differential, the resulting compensation margin in favor of pen 
sion-covered workers would be even wider.
There is an obvious question about the wage differentials between 
those workers with and without pensions. Are these wage differentials
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due to individual characteristics that enhance productivity, or do work 
ers in pension-covered jobs receive wage premiums that may affect 
mobility? That is, to what extent, if any, will the higher wages of pen 
sion-covered workers on their initial jobs carry over into their opportu 
nities on alternative jobs?
Suppose that the entire compensation differential between workers 
with and without pensions were due to individual characteristics, such 
as unmeasured ability. In this circumstance, the compensation on any 
alternative job would be identical to the compensation on the current 
job. We should not find, as we do, that pension workers face worse 
alternatives (relative to their current jobs) than nonpension workers.
Consider the other extreme. Suppose that compensation on the cur 
rent job were entirely a reflection of the job rather than the person. 
Equivalent workers would be paid more on some jobs (e.g., pension 
jobs) than on others (e.g., nonpension jobs), either as a result of rent 
sharing or because of some productivity-enhancing scheme that calls 
for above-market wages. 12 In this case, the compensation difference 
between the pension and nonpension workers would indicate the dif 
ference in mobility disincentives among otherwise identical workers. 
Indeed, in a mobility equation the compensation level on the current 
job would standardize appropriately for any difference in mobility 
incentives facing workers on different jobs. 13
It is possible, of course, that the compensation of workers on their 
current jobs is due to a mix of both explanations, unmeasured individ 
ual characteristics and differences in the compensation offered to oth 
erwise identical workers. To isolate the incentive for mobility between 
the current job and other jobs, one would need an explicit estimate of 
all the factors shaping differences between the current and the opportu 
nity wage. Information on the current wage alone would not be suffi 
cient to control for the compensation differential associated with 
moving.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present estimates of standard wage equations for 
the initial period in the two panel data sets. 14 The first two equations are 
for workers in nonpension and pension jobs, respectively, and the final 
equation is for the whole sample. The coefficients for the pension vari 
ables in the two data sets indicate that workers in pension jobs receive 
over 16 percent more in wages in the SIPP, holding observable charac-
Table 4.3 Estimates of Wage Equations from the SIPP Data
Estimate (t statistic)
Variable
Job characteristics
Pension
Union
Firm size > 100
Industry
Mining
Construction
Nondurable manufacturing
Transportation, communication & public 
utilities
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Finance, insurance & real estate
Services
Personal characteristics
Experience (x 0.01)
Experience squared (x 0.001)
Tenure (x 0.01)
Jobs 
without pensions
a
0.173
0.023
0.039
0.048
0.009
0.000
-0.038
-0.238
0.062
-0.165
0.910
-0.179
3.744
(3.29)
(0.68)
(0.24)
(0.76)
(0.15)
(0.00)
(0.57)
(4.31)
(0.79)
(3.13)
(0.85)
(1.41)
(2.43)
Jobs 
with pensions
a
0.001
0.060
0.078
0.307
-0.068
0.037
-0.053
-0.206
0.055
-0.137
0.103
-0.044
0.147
(0.05)
(2.39)
(1.03)
(7.16)
(2.44)
(1.22)
(1-39)
(5.75)
(1.26)
(3.95)
(0.14)
(0.54)
(0.18)
All jobs
0.164
0.060
0.044
0.066
0.175
-0.042
0.031
-0.035
-0.217
0.071
-0.113
0.417
-0.087
1.531
(8.00)
(2.85)
(2.19)
(0.92)
(5.00)
(1.56)
(1.06)
(1.04)
(7.23)
(1.81)
(4.98)
(0.70)
(1.26)
(2.20)
Tenure squared (x 0.001)
Education (xO.l)
Education squared (x 0.01)
Experience * education (x 0.001)
Tenure * education (x 0.001)
Married
Poor health
Black
Region
North Central
South
West
Constant
R2
Number of observations
-0.649
-0.434
0.494
0.503
-1.278
0.090
0.024
-0.168
-0.041
-0.044
0.057
1.533
(2.09)
(1.36)
(4.50)
(0.70)
(1.23)
(2.26)
(0.34)
(2.60)
(0.86)
(0.99)
(1.13)
(5.74)
0.262
870
-0.368
-0.261
0.245
0.433
1.318
0.066
-0.194
-0.187
-0.040
-0.026
0.036
2.045
(2.55)
(1.33)
(3.60)
(0.94)
(2.62)
(2.45)
(4.48)
(4.86)
(1.62)
(1.01)
(1.25)
(11.69)
0.262
1,677
-0.425 (3.25)
-0.204 (1.22)
0.307 (5.25)
0.441 (1.13)
0.273 (0.62)
0.074 (3.29)
-0.115 (3.07)
-0.182 (5.40)
-0.038 (1.68)
-0.040 (1.76)
0.047 (1.85)
1.639 (11.30)
0.315
2,547
NOTES: Absolute t statistics are in parentheses. 
a. Not applicable.
Dependent variable is natural log of the hourly wage. Durable manufacturing is the omitted industry.
Table 4.4 Estimates of Wage Equations from the PSID Data
Estimate (t statistic)
Variable
Job characteristics
Pension
Union
Industry
Mining
Construction
Transportation, communication & public
utilities
Trade
Finance, insurance & real estate
Services
Personal characteristics
Experience (x 0.01)
Experience squared (x 0.001)
Tenure (x 0.01)
Tenure squared (x 0.001)
Education (xO.l)
Education squared (x 0.01)
Jobs 
without pensions
a
0.362
0.096
0.259
0.065
-0.101
0.239
-0.069
3.000
-0.699
-1.861
0.046
-1.457
0.966
(2.98)
(0.48)
(2.73)
(0.65)
(1.23)
(1.49)
(0.78)
(0.86)
(1.55)
(0.67)
(0.10)
(1.17)
(2.36)
Jobs 
with pensions
a
-0.001
0.146
0.138
0.105
-0.171
-0.096
-0.196
0.943
-0.167
1.194
-0.129
-0.901
0.617
(0.04)
(1.07)
(1.97)
(2.51)
(3.32)
(1.13)
(3.63)
(0.52)
(0.68)
(0.83)
(0.66)
(1.49)
(3.16)
All jobs
0.143
0.050
0.105
0.179
0.111
-0.153
-0.008
-0.137
1.166
-0.203
1.525
-0.184
-0.681
0.596
(4.24)
(1.40)
(0.94)
(3.30)
(2.86)
(3.55)
(0.11)
(3.00)
(0.72)
(0.94)
(1.30)
(1.04)
(1.27)
(3.45)
Experience * education (x 0.001)
Tenure * education (x 0.001)
Married
Poor health
Black
Region
Northeast
South
West
SMSA
Constant
R2
Number of observations
0.194
1.993
-0.015
0.160
-0.271
0.093
-0.118
-0.099
0.165
2.042
(0.11)
(1.04)
(0.21)
(1.35)
(1.86)
(1.08)
(1.55)
(1.07)
(2.73)
(2.00)
0.488
193
0.479
-0.094
0.013
-0.193
-0.215
0.058
-0.063
0.059
0.086
2.260
(0.48)
(0.10)
(0.24)
(3.04)
(3.13)
(1-39)
(1.57)
(1.25)
(2-59)
(4.50)
0.392
477
0.353
-0.188
0.020
-0.120
-0.207
0.064
-0.091
0.022
0.096
1.819
(0.42)
(0.24)
(0.47)
(2.13)
(3.32)
(1.68)
(2.55)
(0.51)
(3.28)
(4.04)
0.442
670
NOTES: Absolute t statistics are in parentheses. Dependent variable is natural log of the hourly wage. Manufacturing is the omitted industry, 
a. Not applicable.
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teristics of the individual and the job constant, while for the PSID the 
comparable figure is over 14 percent. These figures are fairly typical 
for wage regressions of this type. It is, of course, an open question as to 
whether the higher wage for pension-covered jobs is economic rent or 
is compensation for unobservable worker characteristics not correlated 
with the observable variables.
These wage equations, along with analogous equations estimated 
for 1983 for the SCF, provide the experience and tenure coefficients 
needed to project wages. This projection, in turn, provides the basis for 
the compensation amounts used later in the analysis (and previously in 
the descriptive tables 2.3 and 2.4). For the SIPP, standard statistical 
tests indicate that the wage equations for workers with and without 
pensions are significantly different from one another, so separate equa 
tions are used in the later analysis. For the PSID, the test for differ 
ences between the equations for those with and without pensions is on 
the margin at 5 percent significance, and further tests indicate that the 
interaction terms between experience, tenure, and education are not 
jointly significant. 15 In view of the relatively small number of observa 
tions in the equation for workers without pensions, the combined equa 
tion is (without the interaction terms) employed to obtain the 
compensation amounts.
Wage Changes for Movers
We now turn to the data on wage changes for movers. The fourth 
line in each panel in table 4.1 indicates the wages at the end of the 
period, and a comparison of these figures with the third line yields the 
wage changes over the period. 16 Figure 4.1 depicts the changes in the 
wages for movers from pension and nonpension jobs in all three sur 
veys, as calculated from the data in table 4.1.
Movers from pension jobs in all three surveys experience losses, 
while there are gains to movers from nonpension jobs in the SCF and 
the SIPP, and much smaller losses to movers from nonpension than 
pension jobs in the PSID. (Stayers in the two panel data sets, both 
those initially with and without pensions, experience small wage 
gains.) Relative to the wage in their old jobs, movers from nonpension 
jobs fare 8.1 percentage points better than movers from pension jobs in 
the PSID. In the SIPP, they fare 12.8 percentage points better, while in
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the SCF, they fare a whopping 20.4 percentage points better. These 
descriptive data certainly suggest that those who leave pension jobs 
fare relatively worse than do those who leave nonpension jobs.
Figure 4.1 Wage Changes for Movers
1978-83 SCF 1984-85 SIPP 1984-89 PSID
From jobs without pensions  From jobs with pensions
Pensions and Compensation Changes for Movers
An additional outcome of interest is the relative success of movers 
from pension-covered employment and of movers from jobs that did 
not initially offer a pension in securing new jobs that provide a pen 
sion. From the fifth row of each of the panels in table 4.1, it can be seen 
that 36 to 53 percent of those who left a pension job located new 
employment that included a pension. This means that about half of 
those who left a pension job lost pension coverage on their new job. On 
the other hand, 14 to 39 percent of those who left a nonpension job 
gained a pension coverage. The net effect of considering pensions in 
compensation change is to increase the relative compensation loss for 
movers from pension jobs and the compensation gains for those who 
left nonpension jobs.
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Calculations from the 1983 SCF suggests that pensions are worth an 
average of 12.9 percent of compensation until retirement. In the SIPP, 
13.8 percent of movers from jobs without pensions found pensions on 
their new jobs. The effect is to increase the size of the average compen 
sation gain by 1.8 percentage points (13.8 percent of 12.9 percent). As 
compared to the wage gain of 6.6 percent, the compensation gain is 8.4 
percent. Analogously, 35.8 percent of those who left a pension job 
locate a pension on their new job, which means that 62.4 percent do 
not. For these workers, consideration of pensions widens a wage loss 
of 6.2 percent to a compensation loss of 15.5 percent (6.2 percent plus 
64.2 percent of 12.9 percent). For the PSID, movers from jobs without 
pensions have a compensation gain of 2.3 percent (-2.5 percent plus 
37.0 percent of 12.9 percent), while workers who leave a pension job 
suffer a compensation loss of 16.6 percent (-10.6 percent minus 46.8 
percent of 12.9 percent). For the SCF, the two figures are a 7.0 percent 
gain and a 29.6 percent loss for movers from jobs with and without 
pensions, respectively. For both the SIPP and the PSID, the effect of 
pensions approximately doubles the differential between pension and 
nonpension movers in the PSID and the SIPP.
Multivariate results for success in finding pensions in the new job 
tell much the same story. For those who have changed jobs, the partial 
relationships from multivariate equations between pension coverage on 
the initial job and on the new job are reported in table 4.5. 17 These
Table 4.5 Effects of Pension Coverage in Initial Job on Pension Coverage 
in New Job
Estimate (t statistic)
1984-85 1984-89 
____________________SIPP___________PSID_____
Pension coverage 0.117 (1.79) 0.121 (1.61) ~
NOTES: Table entries are marginal effects from probit estimates. Absolute values of asymptotic 
t statistics are in parentheses. Dependent variable is 1 if the individual has a pension in the final 
year and is 0 otherwise.
results indicate the difference in net outcomes associated with having a 
pension on the original job. They suggest that, in both the SIPP and the 
PSID data, a person who moved from a pension job was only about 12 
percent more likely to have obtained a new job that offered a pension. 18
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The comparable differences in table 4.1 were 22 percent (35.8 percent 
minus 13.8 percent) in the SIPP data and 16 percent (53.2 percent 
minus 37 percent) in the PSID data. Since the multivariate results sug 
gest that movers from pension jobs have marginal effects of 12 percent 
relative to movers from nonpension jobs in finding new employment 
with pensions, the gap calculated in the previous few paragraphs would 
be, if anything, understated.
Association of Defined Contribution Plans with Mobility
For the SIPP panel data, the fraction of pension-covered workers 
whose initial pension is a defined benefit plan, the most common type 
of primary plan, is reported in the last row of the middle section of 
table 4.1. 19 In that data set, almost two-thirds of the primary plans for 
those initially covered in 1984 are defined benefit.
Table 4.6 further examines descriptive data from the SIPP. It disag 
gregates the results for pension-covered workers according to whether 
the coverage was by a defined benefit or defined contribution plan. 
Because the SIPP question sequence on plan type is atypical, two sets 
of results are included for defined contribution plans. Respondents 
were first asked, "Is _©s (basic) retirement plan a profit-sharing plan?" 
If they responded no, they were then asked, "Are the retirement bene 
fits of _©s (basic) pension plan determined by years of service and pay 
or by the amount of contributions to the plan?" In the first set of 
defined contribution results, respondents are classified as having 
defined contribution plans if they answered yes to the initial question 
or chose the second alternative of the second question. Another set of 
defined contribution results is limited to only those respondents who 
had nonprofit-sharing defined contribution plans (i.e., those who 
responded no to the first question and chose the second alternative to 
the second question). These plans comprise only about 10 percent of 
the total plans, and hence should be relatively uncontaminated by mis- 
classified defined benefit plans.
According to the SIPP data in table 4.6, workers with defined contri 
bution plans are slightly more mobile than workers with defined benefit 
plans (6.2 percent or 6.9 percent versus 6.0 percent), but the differ 
ences are not significant. In terms of wages, the patterns of workers 
covered by defined benefit and nonprofit-sharing defined contribution
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plans are very similar, with movers suffering around a 10 percent wage 
loss in both cases. For workers under profit-sharing plans, the pattern is 
slightly different. Movers from these plans appear to come from lower 
levels in the wage distribution and do not suffer any wage loss in their 
new jobs. However, this group has the lowest mobility rate of all (5.9 
percent for the profit-sharing plans only), indicating that just a small 
number of these workers found better alternative jobs.
Table 4.6 Wages, Pensions, and Mobility by Pension Status and Plan 
Type in the Initial Survey: SIPP
Pension type Stayers Movers
Defined benefit pension in 1984 job
Percent movers a a 6.0% (1,126) 
Mean wage in 1984 $11.95 (960) $11.94 (58) 
Mean wage in 1985 $11.94 (960) $10.81 (58) 
Percent with 1985 pension a a 42.9% (63)
Defined contribution pension in 1984 job (including profit-sharing plans) 
Percent movers a a 6.2% (627) 
Mean wage in 1984 $11.73 (530) $9.94 (30) 
Mean wage in 1985 $11.82 (530) $9.96 (30) 
Percent with 1985 pension a a 21.9% (32)
Defined contribution pension in 1984 job (excluding profit-sharing plans) 
Percent movers a a 6.9% (174) 
Mean wage in 1984 $11.53 (149) $12.03 (8) 
Mean wage in 1985 $11.44 (149) $10.70 (8) 
Percent with 1985 pension a a 22.2% (9)
NOTES: Figures in parentheses are numbers of observations. Wages are indexed to 1984 dollars 
by the Index of Average Hourly Earnings (1989 Economic Report of the President, table B-44) 
and are included in the means only if valid wage observations are available in both years. Means 
are geometric means (i.e., antilogs of mean log wages). Wages less than $1 or greater than $50 
are excluded from the analysis, 
a. Not applicable.
Table 4.7 presents estimates of the relationship of plan type to 
mobility in the context of a probit equation formulated with SIPP data.
Table 4.7 Pension Effects from Mobility Equations Using SIPP Panel Data
Estimate (t statistic)
Pension explanatory variables
Pension coverage
Defined benefit pension
Defined contribution pension
Profit-sharing pension
Nonprofit-sharing pension
Log-likelihood
Number of observations
Equation 1 Equation 2
-0.090 (6.50)
-0.092 (5.87)
-0.087 (4.93)
-748.34 -748.31
2,545 2,545
Equation 3
-0.092 (5.86)
-0.090 (4.51)
-0.080 (2.70)
-748.25
2,545
NOTES: The dependent variable is job separation. Entries are marginal responses in probit estimates. Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of 
asymptotic t statistics. Additional explanatory variables are age, education, experience, years until expected retirement, with binary variables for 
manufacturing, white collar, management, union status, firm size over 100, race, marital status, children under 18, home ownership, and residence in a 
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA).
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Analogous results are presented in table 4.8 for the retrospective SCF 
data. The first column in each table gives the marginal effect of the 
pension coverage variable in a probit equation that also relates mobility 
to personal and job characteristics. 20 The job characteristics in the SIPP 
data refer to the initial job; in the SCF data, they refer to the longest 
job. In the SIPP data, union status and work experience are as of the 
end of the period covered by the third interview, while the other vari 
ables pertain to the beginning of the period covered by the fourth inter 
view.
Table 4.8 Pension Effects from Mobility Equations Using SCF 
Retrospective Data
Estimate (t statistic)
Pension explanatory variables Equation 1 Equation 2
Pension coverage
Defined benefit pension
Defined contribution pension
Log-likelihood
Number of observations
-0.57 (10.90)
-242.21
581
-0.61 (10.23)
-0.69 (3.77)
-239.85
581
NOTES: The dependent variable is job separation. Table entries are estimated marginal effects 
of a probit model. Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of asymptotic i-statistics.
The marginal effect of a simple pension coverage variable is highly 
significant in this equation. Indeed, the pension variable has by far the 
most powerful impact on mobility behavior of any of the variables 
considered. In the case of the SIPP data, evaluated at the means, pen 
sions are associated with a 9 percentage point reduction in one-year 
mobility rates, which is two-thirds of the pension/nonpension mobility 
differential. For the five-year mobility rate in the SCF data, pension 
coverage is associated with a 57 percentage point difference in mobil 
ity.
The second columns of data in tables 4.7 and 4.8 report marginal 
effects from an equation that separates the pension variable according 
to whether the pension is defined benefit or defined contribution. To the 
extent that the impact of pensions on mobility operates through back- 
loading, defined contribution plans should not exhibit any effect since 
they are not backloaded (see table 2.4). Nevertheless, in both data sets,
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the coefficients of the defined benefit and defined contribution vari 
ables are each highly significant and are almost identical in magnitude, 
and a formal test of the hypothesis that they are equal is not rejected at 
almost any level of significance.
The third column appears only in table 4.7, which is for the SIPP 
data. That column refers to results separating the defined contribution 
variable into profit-sharing plans and nonprofit-sharing plans, as dis 
cussed previously. Again, there is little evidence of a strong differential 
effect of defined benefit and defined contribution plans on mobility. 
These results are not what one would expect if backloading were an 
important factor in the differential mobility rates from pension versus 
nonpension jobs, and they raise further questions about the cause of 
any relationship found between pension backloading and mobility.
Overview of Descriptive Results
Cross tabs and simple multivariate analyses from three surveys 
point to the conclusions that wages are higher on jobs offering pen 
sions than on jobs that do not offer pensions, that compensation differ 
ences are even wider, and that there are systematic relationships 
between pension coverage, compensation level, and mobility. Movers 
from pension jobs experience large losses in wages and larger losses in 
compensation. In contrast, movers from nonpension jobs experience 
wage gains in two of the three surveys and a small wage loss in the 
third, with compensation gains in all three surveys. Contrary to the pre 
dictions of models in which pension backloading accounts for the dif 
ference in mobility between workers who are covered by pensions and 
those who are not, defined contribution plans are just as likely to be 
associated with reduced mobility as are defined benefit plans. Thus, the 
results suggest both that compensation is higher on pension-covered 
jobs and that it is the higher compensation, rather than pension back- 
loading, that is associated with lower mobility from these jobs.
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NOTES
1. When we analyzed the panel data from the 1986 SCF in a report to the U.S. Department of 
Labor (Gustman and Steinmeier 1990), we found the attrition bias from the survey to be severe 
and systematic, so as to affect the reliability of the resulting analysis. The panel from the 1989 
SCF was not available at the time of writing this book.
2. Analysis with the SIPP data indicated that the subsample for which the reason for turnover 
was available was not representative of the full sample. See our report to the U.S. Labor Depart 
ment (Gustman and Steinmeier 1990).
3. The data analysis in this book is confined to males in order to avoid the complicating effects 
of career interruptions.
4. Mobility is considered to have occurred for an individual if there was a separation from the 
initial job and a new job was started by the beginning of the last period covered in the survey. In 
the SCF, this occurred if the individual©s current job (or last job, if not currently employed) began 
after 1978. In the SIPP, it occurred if, in the intervening interviews, the individual clearly indi 
cated that he had stopped working at one job and had started another. (The SIPP provides job 
numbers, but these are unreliable indicators as to whether or not jobs in two different interviews 
were the same.) In the PSID, mobility occurred if the current job as of 1989 began after 1984 or if 
the individual reported that he separated from his previous employer in any of the intervening sur 
veys. For all of the surveys, individuals who did not hold jobs in the initial year were dropped 
from the sample.
5. Farber (1993) finds that there is some evidence that job displacement was different between 
the late and the early 1980s. In the later period, displacement was more likely to affect those in 
nonmanufacturing and to affect older workers with less tenure.
6. In an attempt to provide a comparable analysis with the PSID and SIPP data, we also esti 
mated the mobility model for a two-year period with the PSID data. However, with fewer observa 
tions on mobility, the estimating procedure does not converge for the shorter period.
7. Thus, the SCF and PSID data will be used to calculate mobility over a five-year period. 
Given the limited number of observations in the SCF and the PSID and the availability of pension 
information in the PSID only for 1984 and 1989, it is not practical to analyze mobility for either 
survey over the shorter, one-year period analyzed with the SIPP data. On the other hand, the SIPP 
data are not available for the longer period.
8. Another potential source of differences in outcomes is attrition. Attrition equations are pre 
sented for the panel data from the SIPP and PSID in the appendix to this chapter. Major differ 
ences in attrition are not apparent. However, there is no attrition in the retrospective survey, 
although there is censoring of some data in the base period, which is discussed in this chapter.
9. As the discussion in chapter 3 indicates, previous studies of mobility that estimated pension 
backloading and related backloading to mobility also did not have direct measures of pension 
backloading available. These studies had to match pension incentives to individuals on the basis 
of industry and other characteristics reported by the respondent.
10. Further descriptive statistics for the SIPP and PSID are in appendix tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
Because not all initial jobs are observed in the retrospective SCF, a corresponding table cannot be 
calculated for that data set.
11. The full results underlying table 4.2 in the text are reported in appendix table 4.3.
12. To the extent that additional compensation reflects a reward for additional effort, the dis 
utility of the additional effort should be netted out of current compensation.
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13. Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1991) attempt to standardize for the opportunities facing 
different workers on alternative jobs by including the current wage and human capital indicators 
in the mobility equation.
14. Given the censoring of some wage observations in the initial period for the retrospective 
SCF data, a simple estimate of a wage equation is not presented.
15. The F statistic for the hypothesis that the coefficients of the two equations are equal is 
1.88, which is almost exactly the same as the 5 percent critical value of 1.89 for F(20,628). The F 
statistic for excluding the two interaction terms in the combined equation is 0.09.
16. In the retrospective data, wage changes are observable only for movers; even then, there is 
some censoring of observations for those who moved during the period. Accordingly, in evaluat 
ing these descriptive numbers, it must be remembered that the data are not fully representative and 
are not adjusted for selectivity bias and censoring, as are the compensation estimates made while 
fitting the full econometric models in chapter 6.
17. The full multivariate results are reported in appendix table 4.4.
18. Referring now only to the SIPP data, the pension figures for the new job are limited to 
individuals who report participation in a pension plan at the time of the 1985 survey. Including 
those who are not participating because they "have not worked for the employer long enough" 
raises to 20.6 percent the share of movers from nonpension jobs who gained pensions in their new 
jobs and reduces to 55.8 percent the proportion of movers from pension jobs who lost their pen 
sions.
19. Again, the PSID data do not indicate plan type for the age range covered by the study.
20. The full results for the first equations of both tables are presented in appendix table 4.3. 
The other equations use the same explanatory variables, except that the pension variable is split as 
indicated.
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Appendix Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics for SIPP Movers and Stayers
Estimate (Observations)
No pension in 1984
Variable
Wages and pensions 
1984 log wage 
1985 log wage 
1985 pension 
1984 defined benefit plan 
1984 defined contribution plan 
1984 multiple plans 
1985 defined benefit plan 
1985 defined contribution plan 
1985 multiple plans
Personal characteristics
Black
Age
Experience
Expected retirement age
Education
Married
Children
Stayers
2.164 
2.182 
0.0
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a
7.,5
38.4
18,
64,
12,
77.
60,
,8
,2
,7
.8
,8
(654) 
(654) 
(803)
(803)
(803)
(773)
(264)
(802)
(803)
(803)
Movers
2.044 
2.108 
13.8
a 
a
a
54.5 
45.5 
13.6
6.
37,
17,
64,
12,
75.
63,
,7
6
,7
9
,7
9
1
(133) 
(133) 
(160)
(22) 
(22) 
(22)
(195)
(195)
(186)
(53)
(195)
(195)
(195)
Pension in 1984
Stayers
2.474 
2.476 
100.0 
64.3 
35.7
8.8
a
a 
a
7.0
39.8
20.4
62.3
13.3
85.7
66.6
(1,490) 
(1,490) 
(1,646) 
(1,646) 
(1,646) 
(1,646)
(1
(1
(1
(1
(1
(1
,646)
,646)
,608)
(757)
,646)
,646)
,646)
Movers
2.418 
2.353 
35.8 
63.6 
36.4 
9.3 
73.5 
26.5 
5.9
2.8
39.3
18.8
63.3
13.3
89.7
67.3
(88) 
(88) 
(95) 
(107) 
(107) 
(107) 
(34) 
(34) 
(34)
(107)
(107)
(101)
(41)
(107)
(107)
(107)
Job characteristics
Firm size: < 25 employees
25-99
100+
Union
SMSA
Blue collar
White collar
Management & professional
Mining
Construction
Durable manufacturing
Nondurable manufacturing
Transportation, communication, and 
public utilities
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Finance, insurance & real estate
Services
37.4
20.9
41.7
11.9
52.6
49.6
10.6
39.9
1.1
9.5
18.6
9.7
9.6
8.1
15.8
6.1
21.5
(803)
(803)
(803)
(731)
(803)
(803)
(803)
(803)
(803)
(803)
(803)
(803)
(803)
(803)
(803)
(803)
(803)
39.5
21.0
39.5
8.9
60.0
57.4
11.8
30.8
0.5
20.0
20.0
10.3
8.2
3.6
15.9
4.6
16.9
(195)
(195)
(195)
(168)
(195)
(195)
(195)
(195)
(195)
(195)
(195)
(195)
(195)
(195)
(195)
(195)
(195)
8.1
9.7
82.3
35.1
54.6
45.0
11.4
43.6
1.4
5.2
29.4
16.9
13.9
7.4
8.7
5.6
11.5
(1,646)
(1,646)
(1,646)
(1,591)
(1,646)
(1,646)
(1,646)
(1,646)
(1,642)
(1,642)
(1,642)
(1,642)
(1,642)
(1,642)
(1,642)
(1,642)
(1,642)
9.3
20.6
70.1
35.0
52.3
41.1
13.1
45.8
3.8
17.9
17.9
17.0
8.5
8.5
9.4
4.7
12.3
(107)
(107)
(107)
(100)
(107)
(107)
(107)
(107)
(106)
(106)
(106)
(106)
(106)
(106)
(106)
(106)
(106)
NOTE: Number of observations for each cell is in parentheses, 
a. Not applicable or no observation.
Appendix Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics for PSID Movers and Stayers
Estimate (Observations)
No pension in 1984
Variable
Wages and pensions 
1984 wage
1989 wage
1989 pension
Personal characteristics
Experience
Age
Education
Black
Married
Children
Home ownership
Spouse employed
Job characteristics
Manufacturing
Blue collar
White collar
Management & professional
Stayers
2.218
2.298
31
18
37
12,
7,
82,
70
79,
59
24,
46,
16,
36
.6
.2
.3
.7
.6
.3
.9
.7
.5
.1
.8
.5
.7
(59)
(59)
(79)
(77)
(79)
(78)
(79)
(79)
(79)
(79)
(79)
(79)
(79)
(79)
(79)
Movers
2.236
2.211
37.0
18.8
37.9
13.1
1.9
78.7
74.1
73.1
48.1
20.4
46.3
12.0
41.7
(53)
(53)
(108)
(102)
(108)
(108)
(108)
(108)
(108)
(108)
(108)
(108)
(108)
(108)
(108)
Pension in 1984
Stayers
2.559
2.572
85
18
38
13
5
.6
.9
.5
.1
.3
92.0
75
88
60
48
52,
6
41
.7
.2
.8
.3
.5
.1
.4
(221)
(221)
(263)
(261)
(263)
(263)
(263)
(263)
(263)
(263)
(263)
(263)
(263)
(263)
(263)
Movers
2.472
2.36
53,.2
17.4
37,
14,
4,
87.
73,
73,
52,
36,
35,
16,
47.
,7
,1
.8
.3
,8
,8
.4
,5
.7
.7
.6
(78)
(78)
(126)
(125)
(126)
(125)
(126)
(126)
(126)
(126)
(126)
(126)
(126)
(126)
(126)
Union 10.1 (79) 4.6 (108) 36.3 (262) 16.7 (126) 
SMSA________________45.6 (79)______55.1 (107)______51.5 (262)______56.3 (126) 
NOTE: Number of observations for each cell is in parentheses.
Appendix Table 4.3 Probit Estimates of Reduced Form Mobility Equations
Marginal effects (t statistic)
Variable
Personal characteristics
Years of experience
Years of education
Years until expected retirement
Black
Age
Married
Children under 18
Home ownership
Spouse employed
Job characteristics
Manufacturing
White collar
Management/professional
Union
Firm size > 100 employees
Pension coverage
1978-1983 
SCF
0.02
0.01
0.01
-0.18
-0.01
-0.02
0.07
-0.23
0.00b
0.07
0.10
0.01
0.00b
0.03
-0.57
(2.46)
(1.17)
(1.71)
(1.87)
(0.79)
(0.26)
(1.25)
(4.03)
(0.01)
(1.32)
(1.14)
(0.11)
(0.06)
(0.53)
(10.90)
1984-1985 
SIPP
o.oob
o.oob
o.oob
-0.07
o.oob
0.01
0.01
-0.05
a
-0.01
o.oob
-0.02
0.00b
-0.01
-0.09
(1.21)
(0.17)
(1.44)
(2.15)
(1.22)
(0.64)
(0.83)
(0.27)
(0.71)
(0.00)
(0.96)
(0.13)
(0.98)
(6.50)
1984-1989 
PSID
o.oob
0.03
a
-0.14
0.01
-0.02
0.07
-0.21
-0.05
-0.04
0.05
-0.05
-0.19
a
-0.21
(0.08)
(2.33)
(1.31)
(0.22)
(0.21)
(1.06)
(3.45)
(1.03)
(0.82)
(0.69)
(0.84)
(2.91)
(4.24)
SMSA 0.01 (0.25) 0.01 (0.99) 0.02 (0.54)
Log-likelihood -242.21 -748.34 -340.39
Number of observations 581 2,545 561
NOTE: Absolute values of asymtotic t statistics are in parentheses. Dependent variable is 1 if the individual separates and is 0 otherwise.
a. Variable is omitted from this equation.
b. Coefficient is less than 0.005 in absolute value.
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Appendix Table 4.4 Probit Estimates of Final Pension Status for Those 
Who Change Jobs
Marginal effects (t statistic)
Variable
Personal characteristics
Years of experience
Years of education
Black
Age
Married
Children under 18
Home ownership
Spouse employed
Characteristics of initial job
Manufacturing
White collar
Management/professional
Union
Firm size > 100 employees
Pension
SMSA
Log-likelihood
Number of observations
1984-1985 SIPP
o.oob
0.01
-0.11
o.oob
0.08
o.oob
0.06
a
0.08
0.18
0.17
0.26
-0.03
0.12
0.02
-108
(0.38)
(0.44)
(0.58)
(0.11)
(0.81)
(0.06)
(0.89)
(1.24)
(1.68)
(2.04)
(3.11)
(0.40)
(1.79)
(0.35)
.74
232
1984-1989 PSID
-0.01 (0.57)
0.00 (0.77)
-0.15 (0.71)
0.01 (0.44)
-0.01 (0.07)
0.13 (1.20)
0.13 (1.46)
-0.13 (1.63)
0.11 (1.35)
0.04 (0.34)
0.05 (0.56)
0.07 (0.55)
a
0.12 (1.61)
-0.03 (0.40)
-145.65
226
NOTE: Absolute values of asymptotic t statistics are in parentheses. Dependent variable is 1 if
the individual has a pension after separation and is 0 otherwise.
a. Variable is omitted from this equation.
b. Coefficient is less than 0.005 in absolute value.
Appendix to Chapter 4 
Part B: Analysis of Attrition
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Appendix Table 4.5 Probit Equations Analyzing Attrition Among Pension-Covered Workers
Marginal effects (t statistic)
1984-1985 SIPP
Variable
Personal characteristics 
Years of experience
Years of education
Years until expected
retirement
Black
Age
Married
Children under 18
Home ownership
Spouse employment
Pension-covered 
workers
-0.001
0.005
-0.001
0.037
0.003
-0.030
0.003
-0.040
a
(0.30)
(1.27)
(0.23)
(1.07)
(0.77)
(0.98)
(0.12)
(1.58)
Nonpensioned 
workers
-0.002
-0.003
0.002
-0.081
0.002
0.021
-0.046
-0.038
a
(0.78)
(0.56)
(0.25)
(1.52)
(0.26)
(0.58)
(1.54)
(1.38)
1984-1989 PSID
Pension-covered 
workers
0.001
0.011
a
-0.024
-0.001
0.026
-0.099
-0.030
-0.014
(0.08)
(1.04)
(0.31)
(0.16)
(0.38)
(2.38)
(0.61)
(0.35)
Nonpensioned 
workers
o.ooob
0.001
a
0.102
0.001
0.049
-0.014
-0.012
-0.053
(0.04)
(0.65)
(0.74)
(0.06)
(0.47)
(0.16)
(0.17)
(0.88)
Job characteristics
Log wage
Manufacturing
White collar
Management/professional
Union
Firm size > 100 employees
SMSA
Log-likelihood
Number of observations
a
0.013 (0.71)
0.011 (0.34)
-0.041 (1.54)
-0.007 (0.32)
0.042 (1.68)
0.021 (1.15)
-1,081.04
2,134
a
-0.037 (1.29)
0.106 (2.59)
-0.009 (0.27)
0.026 (0.62)
0.025 (0.94)
0.023 (0.89)
-578.7
1,140
-0.006 (1.30)
0.027 (0.70)
-0.078 (0.93)
-0.037 (0.68)
0.038 (0.83)
a
0.038 (1.01)
-132.94
382
0.000b (0.08)
0.034 (0.59)
-0.080 (0.83)
-0.158 (1.97)
a
a
-0.029 (0.51)
-41.93
148
NOTE: Absolute values of asymptotic t statistics are in parentheses. Dependent variable is 1 for attrition and is 0 otherwise.
a. Variable is omitted from this equation.
b. Coefficient is less than 0.005 in absolute value.

5 
Econometric Specification
of the Mobility 
and Compensation Equations
Having discussed descriptive results relating to pensions, wages, 
and mobility, we now turn to the specification of our econometric 
mobility model. The model will be estimated in chapters 6 and 7. Three 
versions of the model are considered.
The first version, estimated for the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), 
starts with two equations for compensation in the current and next best 
jobs. It adds a mobility equation in which mobility is a function of the 
difference in compensation in these two jobs, with compensation in 
both cases being measured over the remainder of the individual©s work 
ing life. The model allows for the fact that we do not observe compen 
sation in the next best job unless the individual moves.
The second version of the model, estimated for the 1983 Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF), adds a selection equation since we do not 
always observe the individual©s starting job in that data set. After esti 
mating these models, we are able to simulate the effects of the compen 
sation differential between the two jobs. Further, for pension-covered 
workers, we can separate the part of the differential due to backloading 
and simulate its effect on mobility. This will permit us to gauge the 
importance of backloading as an impediment to mobility.
The third form of the model relaxes a constraint that is implicit in 
the first two versions. In this case, the compensation differential in the 
mobility equation is split into two parts: one due to pension backload 
ing and the second due to other causes of compensation differentials 
between the present and next best job. By allowing the coefficients on 
separate variables measuring backloading and other compensation dif 
ferentials to be estimated freely within the mobility equation, we create 
a specification test for the model. If the model were completely speci 
fied to incorporate all dimensions of behavior important to the turnover 
decision, one would expect identical coefficients in the mobility equa-
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tion for the effect of the two parts of the compensation differential. 
That is, in the absence of specification error, the effect on the prospects 
for mobility from a dollar©s worth of compensation should be the same 
whether it comes from pension backloading or from some other 
source. 1 That model is estimated in chapter 7 with data from the SIPP 
and the PSID. The PSID data are also used to estimate the latter ver 
sion of the model with quits rather than total job separations as the out 
come, implicitly assuming that layoffs are random.
The Basic Model
In the basic version of the model, mobility is indicated by the latent 
variable M*,
(5.1) M* = <x(lnCc -lnCfl)+X1 p,+e 1 .
If mobility has occurred, M is positive; otherwise, it is negative. Cc is 
compensation in the current job, and Ca is compensation in the alterna 
tive job, with all compensation measured in dollars per hour until 
retirement. The expectation is that a will be negative, as higher relative 
compensation on the current job discourages mobility. X} is a vector of 
explanatory variables, (3, is a vector of coefficients, and e, is a normally 
distributed error term.
Compensation in the current job (Cc) is specified with the following 
equation:
(5.2) InC =
c
where X2 is a vector of explanatory variables, (32 is a vector of coeffi 
cients, and e2 is a normally distributed error term. Compensation in the 
alternative job (Ca), which is observed only if the individual moves, is 
given in a similar equation:
(5.3) lnCa =
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where X3 is another set of explanatory variables, (33 is a vector of coef 
ficients, and 83 is another normally distributed error term. Note that X3 , 
in theory, cannot contain job characteristics of the new job, since these 
are only observed if an individual moves. In practice, the explanatory 
variables in X2 and X3 are the same.
The compensation levels in each job include both the value of wages 
and pensions. Cc and Ca are calculated as the average hourly amount of 
wages plus pension accrual to each year of service from the start of the 
period until retirement. Here, retirement is the earlier of the individ 
ual©s expected retirement age or the age of normal retirement in the 
individual©s pension plan (if the worker has one). The rationale is that if 
an individual will ever find it advantageous to switch jobs before the 
normal retirement age, it will be as soon as possible, given the positive 
effects of tenure on wages and the typical backloading of pension ben 
efits toward the end of the job. Hence, the appropriate comparison is 
the total compensation in the two jobs from the current date until the 
normal retirement age in the plan or until the individual©s expected 
retirement date, if that is earlier.
To facilitate estimation, the term for Ca is substituted from equation 
(5.3) into (5.1):
(5.4) M* = oc(lnCc -X3 p 3 ) + X 1 P,+eJ©.
In this equation, £? = £,- ae3 .
Equations (5.2), (5.3), and (5.4) and the correlation among the error 
terms in the three equations are estimated jointly by maximum likeli 
hood. The maximum likelihood procedures are analogous for estimat 
ing the basic model, as specified in equations (5.2) to (5.4), and for 
estimating the alternative versions of the model presented in the next 
section. The details of the likelihood function and its estimation are 
deferred to an appendix.
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The Basic Model as Modified for Censoring 
of Wage Observations in the Initial Period
In the retrospective SCF, the 1978 job is not observed for some indi 
viduals because of the manner in which the job history was collected. 
Cc cannot be calculated for those individuals, and another equation is 
required to describe whether or not the 1978 job, and hence Cc, is 
observed.2 This selection equation uses the latent variable / :
(5.5) /* = X4 p4 + £4
^j
where the 1978 job is observed if / is positive and is not observed oth 
erwise. X4 is a vector of explanatory variables, (34 is a vector of coeffi 
cients, and £4 is a normally distributed error term. For (5.5) to be valid 
as a selection equation, X must include all the explanatory variables in 
both the mobility equation (5.1) and the compensation equations (5.2) 
and (5.3). 3
The fact that we cannot always observe Cc means that we must also 
substitute in for Cc in equation (5.4):
(5.6) M* = a(X2 p2 -X3 p3 ) H-Xjpj+e*. 
In this equation, £f = e, + a(e2 - £3).
The Mobility Equation with Pension Backloading and Other 
Compensation Differences as Separate Independent Variables
The mobility equation to be estimated with the third version of the 
model is given by
(5.7) M* = oc^lnC^-lnCJ + cc2 (lnCn -
where, again, M is an indicator variable that is positive if the worker 
changes jobs during the period and negative otherwise. Cc and Cn are 
the compensation in the current job and the non-backloaded part of
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compensation in the current job, respectively, and Ca is compensation 
in the alternative job, with all compensation measured in dollars per 
hour until retirement. The first two terms on the right-hand side of the 
equation are the backloaded and nonbackloaded parts of the compensa 
tion premium, with OC] and a2 as their coefficients. As before, X, is a 
vector of explanatory variables, and e, is a normally distributed error 
term.
The equations for lnCa and InQ are as specified in equations (5.2) 
and (5.3). To estimate the mobility equation, following the procedures 
outlined earlier, we first substitute from equation (5.3).
(5.8) M* = a!(lnCc -lnCn ) + a2 (lnCn -X3 |3 3 )
Once again, e^ = e, - a2£3 . Since the error structure of this model is 
exactly the same as in the first model, the set of equations (5.2), (5.3), 
and (5.8) can be estimated by the same maximum likelihood proce 
dures.
Having specified the econometric model, we now turn to its estima 
tion. Chapter 6 discusses the estimation of the model in which mobility 
is a function of the overall compensation differential between the ini 
tial job and the next best alternative.
Appendix to Chapter 5 
Derivation of the Likelihood Function
In this appendix, we will derive the likelihood function for the second mod 
el. The likelihood functions for the other models are similar, except for the lack 
of the selection equation and the integrals related to that equation.
To facilitate the presentation of the estimation procedure, a slight change in 
notation will be convenient. We have denoted the compound error term from 
the mobility equation (5.6) to be e*. To simplify notation, let e* be equal to e(. 
for the remaining equations (5.2,5.3, and 5.5), and let the correlation matrix for 
the e* as Z*. The correlation matrix Z for the original e ( s can be derived from 
Z* by straightforward calculations, if desired.
It is assumed that the error terms e( are statistically independent of the ex 
planatory variables in the X vectors for the various equations. If so, the likeli 
hood function for the model is simply the product of the probability 
expressions for the individual observations. The form of these probability ex 
pressions depends on which compensation values are observed. There are three 
possible cases, as follows. First, consider the situation where the 1978 job is 
included in the employment history and where the individual did change jobs 
during the period, so that both compensation values are observed. The proba 
bility density of this observation is given as
(5.9) PR.= J J/(l*)<fc*<fe*
-M-l
where M and / are the deterministic parts of equations (5.5) and (5.6), respec 
tively, and j indexes the individual, e* is a vector of the four e* s, with e* and 
e* taking on the values solved from equations (5.2) and (5.3) using the ob 
served compensation values and the values of the explanatory variables. This 
probability expression integrates the probability density /(e*) of the error 
terms over the region where the mobility indicator is positive (M > 0) and the 
selection indicator is positive (/* > 0).
The second case arises if the 1978 job is not observed and the individual 
changed jobs during the period. This implies that Cc the compensation value 
for the 1978 current job, is not observed but that Ca, the compensation value
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for the alternative job, is observed. The probability density for the observation 
for this case is
(5.10) PRj = J J/(e* e*, £*)<fe*<fe* .
This equation is different in two respects from the expression in the previous 
example. First, the limits in the second integral are changed to reflect the lack 
of observation for the 1978 job. Also, the probability density /(e* , e* , e* ) has 
been integrated out with respect to e| , the residual in the equation determining 
the unobserved compensation value in 1978.
The third case occurs if the 1978 job is observed and the individual re 
mained in the job over the period. Here, Cc is observed, but Ca is not. The prob 
ability density of the observation is
(5.11) PRj= J J
This is the same kind of integral as in the previous case, except for obvious 
changes in the integration limits and the substitution of e|, which can be com 
puted in this case, for e*, which cannot.
There is one data problem that is relevant to the estimation procedure. The 
data necessary to construct wage information for a particular job are missing in 
about 15 percent of the cases. An ideal solution would be to use separate selec 
tion equations for these cases, but doing so would increase the dimensionality 
of the cumulative normal to be evaluated by two dimensions and would make 
the estimation procedure computationally much more difficult. Instead, we 
make the assumption that the process inducing the omissions is statistically in 
dependent to the explanatory variables and error terms in the various equations. 
The likelihood function can then be integrated out with respect to the error 
terms associated with missing wages. This would cause e.* or e*, depending 
on which wage is missing, to be dropped from the appropriate probability den 
sity formula for the observation. For example, suppose that the 1978 job is ob 
served and a job change did occur, but that the 1978 wage is missing. The 
probability density for the individual in this case would be
00 00
(5.12) PR. = J J/(4e* ejjdejdfe* .
-to-1
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If instead the 1978 job is not observed, a job change did occur, and the alterna 
tive job wage is missing, the probability density would be
00 -/
(5.13) />/?.= J J/(E*,eJ)«feX.
Having constructed the log-likelihood from the sum of the logs of the prob 
ability expressions PRj of the individual observations, maximum likelihood es 
timates are obtained by maximizing this function with respect to the parameters 
in the model. These parameters include a, the 8s, and the elements of the cor 
relation matrix £*. The maximization technique is a scoring algorithm with a 
linear search along the indicated direction in combination with the Berndt- 
Hall-Hall-Hausman routine for evaluating the expected second derivative ma 
trix (Berndt et al. 1974). This algorithm also provides asymptotic standard er 
rors for the estimated parameters of the model.
NOTES
1. It would be unreasonable to expect precise agreement between the two estimated coeffi 
cients. Important factors have been omitted, such as the risk associated with each form of com 
pensation, or associated differences in effort that go unmeasured. Nevertheless, large 
discrepancies in the estimated coefficients should point to major misspecifications that cause the 
error term in the mobility equation to be correlated with pension backloading or with the remain 
der of the compensation differential.
2. Note, however, that even though the retrospective SCF missed some 1978 jobs (which 
necessitated the selection equation), it specifically asked about previous pension-covered jobs, so 
that if the question were answered, the data should include all 1978 jobs with pensions.
3. As noted, Ca is not observed for individuals who remained in their 1978 jobs at least 
through 1983. Normally, this would require another selection equation, but the selection equation 
in this case is the mobility equation (5.1), which is already included in the model. Hence, an addi 
tional equation is not required.
6
Econometric Estimates
with Mobility a Function
of Compensation Differentials
The distinguishing feature of the first two versions of the mobility 
model developed in chapter 5 is that, in the mobility equation, there is 
only a single measure of the compensation differential between those 
workers on pension-covered jobs and those on jobs not offering pen 
sions. That is, in the estimation of the mobility equation itself, the com 
pensation differential is not decomposed into components attributable 
to backloading and to other factors. That estimation is postponed until 
chapter 7. Instead, the models in this chapter estimate the effect of the 
total compensation differential on mobility. To isolate the effect of 
backloading, we separate that part of the compensation differential and 
infer its effects on compensation from the coefficient on the compensa 
tion differential in the mobility equation. This coefficient is simply the 
a in equation (5.4).
We begin by fitting the first version of the model, which is suitable 
to panel data, to results from the Survey of Income and Program Partic 
ipation (SIPP) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Then 
we fit the second version of the model to the retrospective Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF). Once these models are estimated and we 
have parameter estimates for mobility and compensation equations, we 
turn to simulation analysis. These simulations help to answer two ques 
tions. First, can the compensation differentials between current and 
best alternative jobs explain very much of the difference in mobility 
between pension-covered and noncovered workers, or can the differ 
ence be explained primarily by the other variables in the mobility equa 
tion? Second, how much does pension backloading affect the 
difference in mobility rates between these two groups? In these simula 
tions, we maintain the underlying assumption that a one-dollar differ 
ential in compensation, whatever its source, should have the same 
effect on mobility.
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The empirical results in this chapter indicate that it is not the pen 
sion capital loss from mobility that is primarily responsible for the neg 
ative relationship between pension coverage and mobility. Those who 
are covered by pensions receive a higher level of compensation on their 
jobs than do those without pensions, and at least a part of this appears 
to be a compensation premium over and above what these workers 
could obtain elsewhere. It is this premium, rather than the pension loss 
from moving, that accounts for the large difference in mobility 
between pension-covered workers and those who are not covered by a 
pension on their initial jobs.
Model Based on SIPP Data Estimates
This section estimates the first version of the pension-mobility 
model described in chapter 5, using the data from the SIPP. 1 Job 
changes are measured over the one-year period between the fourth and 
seventh interviews in the SIPP. As before, a job change is considered to 
have occurred when the individual leaves the position held at the 
beginning of the period and takes one with a different employer.
Unlike the SCF, the SIPP does not have available an employer-pro 
vided pension plan description. Instead, SIPP individuals are matched 
with employer plan descriptions from the SCF with the same industry, 
occupation, and union status. The wage profile of the SIPP worker is 
applied to the detailed plan description for each of the SCF plans in the 
industry/occupation/union status cell, and the pension amounts for the 
SIPP worker are taken as the weighted average of the pension amounts 
for the pensions in the cell. The matching process uses SIC three-digit 
industries and three occupations; if there are no pension-provider 
observations in that cell, cells are collapsed to two-digit or one-digit 
industries, as required, until a filled cell is found. In no cases are union 
plans used to impute nonunion plans, or vice versa. This procedure 
allows the pension calculations to take account of the wide differences 
in plans across industries, occupations, and union status.
In the SIPP estimates, the mobility equation is identified by exclud 
ing the pension variable. With regard to the two compensation equa 
tions, identification is achieved by excluding the household variables.
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Compensation is calculated as the average per-hour amount of 
wages plus increases in pension values between the initial year and the 
earlier of the individual©s expected date of retirement from full-time 
work or the normal retirement age specified in the pension plan (if the 
employee had one). If the individual did not provide an expected retire 
ment age, the terminal date for the compensation calculations is taken 
to be the normal retirement age in the pension plan for employees with 
pensions and age 65 for employees without pensions. A real wage pro 
file is created by using the observed wage and extrapolating to dates 
before and after on the basis of the estimated coefficients of the experi 
ence and tenure variables in the wage regressions reported in chapter 4. 
This is converted to a nominal profile by taking into account the gen 
eral growth of nominal wages. Pension values are calculated by apply 
ing the resulting wage profile to the individual©s own pension. All 
compensation amounts reported in this section are discounted to 1984 
and expressed in 1984 dollars.
Table 6.1 presents estimates for this model. The estimates for the 
mobility latent variable are in the left two columns of data, and the esti 
mates for the compensation in the initial and alternative jobs are in the 
remaining columns. For the mobility equation, only the measures of 
the compensation premium and home ownership are significant at stan 
dard levels. Home ownership lowers estimated mobility by 3.3 percent 
age points, and a 10 percent larger compensation difference between 
the initial and alternative job is estimated to decrease mobility by 2.9 
percentage points (10 percent of 0.293).
The equation for compensation in the initial job exhibits coefficients 
that are consistent with expectations. Compensation is significantly 
and positively related to pension coverage, white-collar jobs, manage 
ment and professional employment, union and large-firm employment, 
level of education, and work in a Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Area (SMSA). Compensation is significantly lower for Blacks. In the 
alternative compensation equation, coefficients are significant for 
schooling and location in an SMSA, with some other estimated coeffi 
cients near significance. Pension coverage in the job held in the base 
period is associated with a compensation premium of about 22 percent, 
the difference between the coefficients on the pension coverage vari 
ables in the 1984 compensation equation and in the alternative job 
compensation equation (0.343 minus 0.126).
Table 6.1 Estimates of the Model with Mobility Determined by a Single Measure of the Compensation Premium 
Based on 1984-85 Data from the SIPP
Model component
Constant
Compensation premium (a)
Pension coverage
Manufacturing
White collar
Management/professional
Union status
Firm size > 100
Years of experience
Years until retirement
Age
Education
Race (Black)
Married
Children under 18
Home ownership
Mobility equation
Marginal 
effect
-0.293
a
0.004
0.024
0.011
0.023
0.018
-0.002
-0.001
0.002
0.002
0.059
0.009
0.009
-0.033
(t statistic)
(2.58)
(0.17)
(0.58)
(0.37)
(0.63)
(0.65)
(0.75)
(0.32)
(0.91)
(0.45)
(0.63)
(0.61)
(0.75)
(2.06)
Compensation in 
1984 job
Estimate (t statistic)
1.430
a
0.343
0.029
0.073
0.233
0.117
0.058
0.000b
-0.003
a
0.058
-0.190
a
a
a
(14.80)
(17.80)
(1.45)
(2.42)
(10.28)
(4.79)
(3.03)
(0.17)
(1.37)
(16.66)
(4.88)
Compensation in 
alternative job
Estimate (t statistic)
0.939
a
0.126
-0.006
-0.008
0.157
0.034
-0.038
0.002
0.010
a
0.067
-0.551
a
a
a
(1.43)
(0.74)
(0.09)
(0.07)
(1.57)
(0.32)
(0.43)
(0.26)
(1.03)
(4.19)
(1.85)
SMSA -0.024 (0.98) 0.061 (3.40) 0.177 (2.43)
Standard deviation of error terms 0.425 (92.53) 0.477 (7.62)
Correlation matrix of error terms 1.000
Log-likelihood
Number of observations
0.707 (2.40)
1.000
-2,304.57
2,545
0.409
0.355
1.000
(1.03)
(4.33)
~
NOTES: Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of asymptotic t statistics. See text for descriptions of the dependent variables. The job characteristics
in the alternative job equation refer to the characteristics in the initial job, not to the characteristics of the alternative job.
a. Variable is omitted from this equation.
b. Coefficient is less than 0.0005 in absolute value.
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To interpret the correlations reported in the table, it is important to 
remember that they refer to the e* terms, that is, the composite errors 
after substituting for the alternative wage into equation (5.4). The cor 
relations for the original error terms can be found by using the standard 
formulas for variances, covariances, and correlations. The resulting 
estimated correlation matrix is as follows: 2
Compensation Compensation 
Mobility equation in 1984 job in alternative job
1.000 0.413 -0.414
1.000 0.355
1.000
Thus, although the estimated value of /?(£*, £2) is strongly positive at 
0.707, the estimated value of p(£\, £2), which is the correlation 
between the probability of mobility for unobserved reasons and the 
level of compensation offered on the initial job for unobserved reasons, 
is reduced to 0.413. The fact that the error terms in these two equations 
are positively correlated follows the pattern of many of the observed 
variables that are entered in both equations. For example, being in a 
large firm raises initial compensation, and it also increases the proba 
bility of mobility, holding the compensation premium constant.
Simulations
Simulations with the model allow us to do two things. First, we can 
see how well the model fits the data, both for the whole sample and for 
subgroups of particular interest. Second, the simulations can help us to 
ascertain the degree to which the lower mobility of pension-covered 
workers is due to pension backloading and the degree to which it is due 
to the greater pay and benefits on pension-covered jobs.
These simulations are performed as follows. For each individual, the 
nonstochastic part of equation (5.4) is calculated as M . If compensa 
tion in either the current or alternative job is observed, it is possible to 
calculate £2 and/or £3 from equations (5.2) and (5.3), given the coeffi 
cient estimates and the values for the explanatory variables. It is then
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possible to calculate the probability that the individual would have 
changed jobs in the one-year interval. 3
Consider now how well the model predicts the actual mobility rate, 
both for the sample as a whole and for important subgroups within the 
sample. The simulations relevant for this question are presented in 
table 6.2. The first column of data in the table gives the observed 
mobility rate for the group in question during the one-year period, 
while the middle column gives the mobility rate simulated by the 
model using the explanatory variables for that particular group.
Table 6.2 Model Validation Simulations Based on 1984-85 Data from the 
SIPP
Group
Full sample
Individuals with pensions
Individuals without pensions
Union members
Not union members
Sample 
mobility 
(percent)
9.73
5.71
17.35
6.91
10.76
Simulated 
mobility 
(percent)
9.71
5.71
17.27
7.16
10.64
Number of 
observations
2,545
1,678
867
692
1,853
The simulations capture the disparities in mobility rates among very 
different groups rather well. For example, the actual one-year job 
mobility for the sample is about 11.6 percentage points higher for indi 
viduals without pensions than for individuals with pensions, and the 
magnitude of this differential is reflected in the simulated mobility 
rates. This is particularly encouraging because pensions are not an 
explicit explanatory variable in the mobility equation in the model. A 
similar result holds, though less dramatically, when the mobility rates 
are compared between union members and others. In this case, the 
mobility rate among union members is 3.9 percentage points lower 
than for individuals not in unions, and, again, the magnitude of this dif 
ferential is reflected in the simulation results. Thus, the simulation 
model does appear to do a good job of predicting differences in the 
mobility rates of various groups, even of some groups not explicitly 
represented in the mobility equation itself.
Next we would like to examine the role of pensions in affecting job 
mobility. In order to assess the importance of backloading for mobility,
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it is necessary to consider the magnitude of the backloading as well as 
the impact per dollar. This is done in table 6.3, which presents the 
results of several simulations using sample members with pensions. 
The results in the first column of data simply repeat the base simulation 
reported in table 6.2. (The numbers do not match for various sub 
groups, since table 6.2 represents all members of a subgroup and table 
6.3 represents only members of the subgroup with pensions.) In the 
second column, one part of the compensation premium is deleted. For 
instance, in the first part of the table, the simulations exclude the back- 
loaded part of the compensation premium and calculate the mobility 
rate that would occur if only the nonbackloaded part of the premium 
were present.4
Table 6.3 Simulations of Effects of Backloading and Other Changes in 
Compensation on Mobility Based on 1984-85 Data from the SIPP
Original Postchange
mobility rate mobility rate Number of
Group (percent) (percent) observations
Effects of eliminating pension backloading on
All individuals with pensions 5.71 6.39 1,678 
46-50 year-olds 4.35 5.35 359 
Union members 5.70 6.49 590 
Not union members 5.72 6.34 1,088
Effects of dropping pension compensation entirely 
All individuals with pensions 5.71 10.38 1,678
Effects of higher compensation in pension jobs, as measured by
compensation equation estimates 
All individuals with pensions 5.71 14.39 1,678
The first four rows of the table analyze the effects of the backload 
ing component of compensation for each of four populations of pen 
sion-covered workers. Recall that the basic mobility rates for pension- 
covered and noncovered workers were 5.7 percent and 17.4 percent, 
respectively, in the descriptive data of table 6.2. The comparison 
between the two data columns in the first row of table 6.3 suggests that 
backloading accounts for about two-thirds of one percentage point of 
mobility, or about 6 percent of the total difference in mobility rates
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between pensioned workers and nonpensioned workers. The impact of 
backloading is somewhat larger for older workers. When the same 
exercise is done in the second row for the 359 pension-covered workers 
in the 46-50 age range, excluding backloading raises the mobility rate 
from 4.35 percent to 5.35 percent, a full percentage point. This is half 
again as large as the effect for the full age range, but it is still small rel 
ative to the gap in mobility rates between pensioned and nonpensioned 
workers. As seen in the third and fourth rows, the estimated effects of 
pension backloading on mobility for subgroups categorized by union 
status are also below 1 percentage point.
The fifth row of data in the table excludes the pension entirely from 
the premium. As might be expected on the basis of the relative sizes of 
pension values and backloading reported in table 2.2, the total effect of 
the pension, at almost 4.7 percentage points, is substantially larger than 
the effect of backloading alone. This is to say that most of the effect of 
pensions on mobility occurs because of the basic value of the pensions 
themselves, not because they are backloaded.
The final row in the table reports the effect of eliminating the entire 
compensation premium associated with pension jobs. To estimate the 
value of the premium, the effects of pensions in the two compensation 
equations are compared. As reported in table 6.1, the coefficient of the 
pension variable in the current compensation equation is 0.343, while 
the corresponding coefficient in the alternative compensation equation 
is 0.126 (with t statistics of 17.80 and 0.74, respectively). These esti 
mates imply that pensions are associated with an increase of 0.217 in 
the difference between log compensations in the current job and the 
alternative job, where the difference is the compensation premium. The 
simulation excludes this amount from the premium, with the result that 
mobility would increase by about 8.7 percentage points. This is about 
three-fourths of the total differential between the mobility rates of pen 
sioned and nonpensioned workers in table 6.2. In comparison with the 
much smaller reduction from backloading alone, it suggests that the 
nonbackloaded part of the premium has more responsibility for the rel 
atively low mobility rates among pension-covered workers. To put it 
another way, restructuring pensions to be perfectly portable would 
increase the mobility of pension-covered workers very little.
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Model Based on Data from the PSID Estimates
Table 6.4 presents the estimates of the mobility model for data from 
the PSID. In the PSID, as with the SIPP, it is necessary to calculate 
pension amounts based on a match with the employer pension plan 
data from the SCF.
The results of this estimation are broadly consistent with the results 
from the SIPP estimation in the previous section. In the mobility equa 
tion, the compensation premium is one of two significant variables, 
along with home ownership as the other. The result implies that a 10 
percent gain in the compensation premium would decrease mobility by 
6.4 percentage points. Once again, the amount of compensation in the 
1984 job is positively and significantly influenced by pension cover 
age, manufacturing employment, managerial and professional work, 
union employment, higher levels of schooling, and work in an SMSA. 
Blacks again receive significantly lower compensation. Consistent with 
earlier findings, schooling is the dominant variable in the compensa 
tion equation in alternative employment. Finally, the effect of pension 
coverage in the initial job on the difference between the compensation 
in that job and in the alternative job (30 percent) is a bit above the com 
pensation difference found with the SIPP data (22 percent). 5
Analysis of Quits
In this section, the PSID provides the only data allowing analysis 
that distinguishes quits from layoffs. Appendix table 6.1 presents the 
results of the estimation of the three-equation model in which turnover 
is defined as quits rather than as separations. These results are analo 
gous to those in table 6.4 and indicate that, in the PSID data, there are 
no significant differences in findings when quits are substituted for 
separations. In particular, a very similar coefficient estimate is obtained 
both for the marginal effect of the compensation premium (at -0.552 
with a t statistic of 2.34, versus -0.648 with a t statistic of 2.29). The 
other key result is the coefficient on the pension measure in the equa 
tions for compensation on the 1984 job and on the alternative job. The 
pension coefficients in the two equations are .276 with a t statistic of 
7.61 and .013, with a t statistic of 0.09. The implication is that having a
Table 6.4 Estimates of the Model with Mobility Determined by a Single Measure of the Compensation Premium 
Based on 1984-89 Data from the PSID
Model component
Constant
Compensation premium (a)
Pension coverage
Manufacturing
White collar
Management/professional
Union status
Years of experience
Age
Education
Race (Black)
Married
Children under 18
Home ownership
Spouse employment
SMSA
Mobility equation
Marginal 
effect
-0.648
a
0.111
-0.063
-0.016
0.102
-0.002
0.007
-0.022
-0.070
0.000b
-0.010
-0.186
-0.025
0.043
(t statistic)
(2.29)
(1.14)
(0.29)
(0.12)
(0.58)
(0.19)
(0.68)
(0.79)
(0.23)
(0.00)
(0.16)
(2.93)
(0.49)
(0.46)
Compensation in 
1984 job
Estimate (t statistic)
2.150
a
0.276
0.069
0.073
0.240
0.202
0.000
a
0.071
-0.264
a
a
a
a
0.087
(60.28)
(7.58)
(1.82)
(1.08)
(5.21)
(3.83)
(0.16)
(7.94)
(3.40)
(2.54)
Compensation in 
alternative job
Estimate (t statistic)
2.092
a
-0.026
0.191
0.189
0.243
-0.156
-0.008
a
0.125
-0.291
a
a
a
a
0.086
(10.40)
(0.14)
(1.52)
(0.59)
(1.27)
(0.89)
(0.67)
(3.44)
(0.65)
(0.65)
Table 6.4 (continued)
Compensation in Compensation in 
Model component Mobility equation 1984 job alternative job
Marginal 
effect (t statistic) Estimate (t statistic) Estimate (t statistic)
Standard deviation of error terms
Correlation matrix of error terms 1 .000
Log-likelihood
Number of observations
0.341 (32.78) 0.519 (6.27)
0.531 (2.00) 0.479 (1.34)
1.000 -- 0.322 (2.58)
1.000
-531.58
474
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of asymptotic t statistics. See text for descriptions of the dependent variables.The job characteristics
in the alternative compensation equation refer to the characteristics in the initial job, not to the characteristics of the alternative job. Firm size is unavailable
in the PSID, and years until retirement is omitted because it is reported only for those age 45 or older.
a. Variable is omitted from the equation.
b. Coefficient is less than 0.0005 in absolute value.
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pension on the current job raises compensation relative to the next best 
opportunity by about twenty-five percent.
Simulations
Model validation simulations for the PSID data are presented in 
table 6.5. In this case, the period for mobility is five years. Again the 
simulated mobility rates capture the disparities in outcomes among the 
groups. There is, however, more of an underprediction of mobility for 
those without pensions than was evident with the SIPP data.
Table 6.5 Model Validation Simulations Based on 1984-89 Data 
from the PSID
Group
Full sample
Individuals with pensions
Individuals without pensions
Union members
Not union members
Sample 
mobility 
(percent)
41.8
32.1
64.2
23.9
48.0
Simulated 
mobility 
(percent)
40.9
33.3
58.4
23.7
46.9
Number of 
observations
474
331
143
119
355
Consider now the simulations examining the effects of pensions on 
mobility, decomposing the effects into those associated with backload- 
ing and with the compensation premium on pension-covered jobs. 
These simulations are presented in table 6.6. Again, the results in the 
first column of data are for the base simulations using observed com 
pensation in the mobility equation, while the results in the second col 
umn are based on simulations that exclude some part of the 
compensation premium.
As shown in the last row of the table, the total effect of the compen 
sation differences associated with holding a pension-covered job is a 
reduction in mobility from 54.1 percent to 33.3 percent. Thus, the com 
pensation premium can account for most of the difference in mobility 
rates between pensioned and nonpensioned workers (32.4 percent ver 
sus 57.8 percent, from table 4.1). However, the portion of the differ 
ence that is due to pension backloading is only 3.2 percentage points 
(36.5 percent minus 33.3 percent), which is small compared to the
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effect of the full value of the pension, or of the compensation premium 
on pension-covered jobs. For 46-to-50-year-olds, pension backloading 
per se has almost twice the effect that backloading does for the full 
sample, but it is still not the major reason that workers in pension jobs 
have lower turnover rates than workers in nonpension jobs.
Table 6.6 Simulations of Effects of Backloading and Other Changes in 
Compensation on Mobility Based on 1984-89 Data from the PSID____
Original Postchange 
mobility rate mobility rate Number of 
Group (percent) (percent) observations
Effects of eliminating pension backloading
All individuals with pensions 33.3 36.5 331 
46-50 year-olds 27.5 33.0 50 
Union members 22.1 25.5 108 
Not union members 39.1 42.2 223
Effects of dropping pension compensation entirely 
All individuals with pensions 33.3 43.2 331
Effects of higher compensation in pension jobs, as measured by
compensation equation estimates 
All individuals with pensions 33.3 54.1 331
Model Estimates Based on Retrospective Data from the SCF
This section presents estimates of the mobility model using retro 
spective SCF data. As explained in chapter 5, the econometric method 
ology is slightly modified from that developed for true panel data. All 
versions of the model must deal with the lack of information on the 
opportunity wage for those who stayed in the same job over the period 
of observation. In addition, when estimating the model with retrospec 
tive data, there is a lack of information on the base period job for some 
of those who moved. The modification in methodology addresses the 
problem of data that is missing for that reason.
Mobility is calculated on the basis of a job change in the five-year 
period preceding the survey, that is, from 1978 to 1983. Basic descrip 
tive information on job-changing behavior over this period has been
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presented in chapter 4. Once again, these data suggest that mobility is 
significantly lower among pension-covered workers.
Several of the employment-related measures, including industry, 
occupation, union status, and firm size, which are used as explanatory 
variables in the model, refer to the longest-held job. This is necessi 
tated because information on these variables for the 1978 job is not 
available for everyone in the sample. 6 Since the variables for the long 
est-held job refer to a major labor force experience, they should be 
fairly indicative of the 1978 job as well. The nature of the data set 
imposes another temporal mismatch, which involves several of the 
household variables, including marital status, the presence of children, 
home ownership, and whether the wife was employed. The values of 
these variables pertain to 1983, the year in which the data set was col 
lected, although again it would be preferable to use values for 1978.
Before moving to the estimates for the model, one problem with 
measuring pension values and pension incentives retrospectively in the 
SCF should be noted. The pension-provider data in the survey are 
available only for jobs held in 1983, not in 1978. Even then there are 
some individuals who claim eligibility for pensions but for whom pen 
sion-provider records are absent in the data set, and there are other 
individuals for whom pension-provider records are available but are 
seriously deficient in some critical regard. No pension-provider infor 
mation at all is available for the small group of individuals who indi 
cated having a pension in 1978 but who changed jobs before 1983. 
Therefore, missing pension data are imputed using techniques 
described in the first section of this chapter. In total, imputations are 
made for about two-fifths (41 percent) of the pension values. Twenty- 
three percent are imputed on the basis of three-digit industry cells and 
7 percent and 9 percent on the basis of two-digit and one-digit industry 
cells, respectively, all using the correct occupation category and union 
status. The remaining 2 percent are imputed by collapsing cells across 
occupations, with 1 percent using three-digit industry and 1 percent 
using two-digit industry cells.
Table 6.7 presents the results of the maximum likelihood estimator 
of the second version of the full model, as described in chapter 5. 7 With 
this procedure, the maximum of the likelihood function is achieved at 
the boundary defined by the requirement that the estimated correlation 
matrix for the error terms (Z*) be positive definite. The standard errors
Table 6.7 Estimates of the Model With Mobility Determined by a Single Measure of the Compensation Premium 
Based on 1978-83 Retrospective Data from the SCF
Model component
Mobility 
equation
Marginal 
effect (t stat)
Constant
Compensation premium (a)
Pension coverage3
Manufacturing13
White collarb
Management/professional15
Union5
Firm size > 100b
Years of experience2
Years until expected retirement3
Age3
Years of education3
Race (Black)c
Married0
-0.83
d
0.12
-0.17
0.06
-0.15
d
0.02
0.01
-0.01
-0.01
0.08
0.08
(2.92)
(0.86)
(0.78)
(0.47)
(0.98)
(1.29)
(0.45)
(0.56)
(0.48)
(0.23)
(0.64)
Compensation in 
1978 job
Estimate
1.248
d
0.392
0.074
0.064
0.226
0.110
0.120
-0.004
-0.006
d
0.087
-0.186
d
(t stat)
(4.63)
(5.02)
(1.42)
(0.78)
(3.59)
(2.10)
(2.14)
(0.93)
(1.35)
(8.07)
(2.12)
Compensation in 
alternative job
Estimate
0.786
d
-0.362
0.055
0.454
0.135
0.304
0.019
0.000e
0.001
d
0.122
-0.513
d
(t stat)
(0.72)
(1.59)
(0.39)
(1.85)
(0.97)
(1.70)
(0.19)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(4.16)
(1.37)
1978 job selection 
equation
Estimate
-1.164
d
d
-0.034
-0.500
0.185
-0.087
-0.279
-0.028
0.001
0.037
-0.005
0.287
0.010
(t stat)
(0.46)
(0.14)
(1.39)
(0.64)
(0.32)
(1.27)
(0.95)
(0.03)
(0.70)
(0.11)
(0.74)
(0.02)
Children under 18C 0.05 (0.62) 
Home ownership0 -0.33 (3.90) 
Wife employed0 -0.03 (0.44) 
SMSAC -0.08 (0.64)
Standard deviation of error terms
Correlation matrix of error terms 1 .00
Log-likelihood
Number of observations
d d 0.028 (0.10) 
d d 0.600 (2.34) 
d d 0.054 (0.22) 
0.109 (2.32) 0.228 (1.86) 0.170 (0.80)
0.41 (26.91) 0.57 (9.00)
0.14 (1.01) 0.61 (3.14) -0.95
1.00 -- 0.45 (3.47) 0.03 (0.11)
1.00 -- -0.34 (0.11)
1.00
-597.99
558
NOTE: Figures in parentheses are absolute values of asymptotic t statistics.
a. Measured in 1978.
b. Job held longest.
c. Measured in 1983.
d. Variable is omitted from this equation.
e. Coefficient is less than 0.0005 in absolute value.
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in table 6.7 are, therefore, the result of a constrained estimation. All of 
the correlation parameters, except the correlation between the error 
terms in the 1978 job selection and mobility equations, are treated as 
free, with this remaining correlation calculated as the value necessary 
to just meet the positive semidefiniteness requirement. As a conse 
quence of this procedure, no standard error is estimated for this corre 
lation, as indicated in the table, and the estimated standard errors for 
the remaining correlations should be interpreted with this constraint in 
mind.
In the mobility equation, only two of the variables are significant at 
standard levels. As with the SIPP, one of these is home ownership and 
the other is the compensation premium, which is of particular interest 
to this study. Once again, the impact of the compensation premium 
variable on mobility is by far the largest. The estimates imply that a 10 
percent gain in this variable would result in an 8.3 percentage point 
decrease in job mobility. This effect is about one-third larger than the 
effect found over the comparable five-year period using the PSID data. 
Among the remaining variables, union membership has the expected 
negative effect on mobility and is sizable, but not significant.
In the 1978 job compensation equation, quite a few of the coeffi 
cients are significant, and the significant coefficients all have the 
expected signs. Compensation is positively and significantly related to 
pension eligibility, management/professional occupations, union mem 
bership, firm size, education, and SMSA residency, and is significantly 
lower for Blacks. For compensation in an alternate job, education once 
again has a clearly significant impact, in the positive direction. Other 
variables close to significance include union membership, SMSA resi 
dency, and white-collar occupations.
The one major difference between the results based on panel data 
from the SIPP and PSID on the one hand, and the retrospective SCF 
data on the other, is in the magnitude of the effect of pension coverage 
on the current and alternative job. With data from all three surveys the 
pension measure is significant only in the equation for compensation 
on the current job, and the estimated difference in pension coefficients 
between the current and next best job is only about half as large in the 
SIPP and PSID data as in the SCF data.
The 1978 job selection equation suggests that average compensation 
values are not much affected by the inclusion or exclusion of the 1978
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job from the job history. Only one variable, home ownership, is signifi 
cant in this equation, and this variable is not a determinant of compen 
sation. Nor are the correlations between the error term in the job 
selection equation and the error terms of the two compensation equa 
tions significant. The lack of correlation implies that the presence or 
absence of the 1978 job from the job history does not greatly influence 
compensation values through unobserved factors contained in the error 
terms.
The other correlation estimates contain few surprises. The estimated 
correlation matrix of the original error terms, calculated along the same 
lines as in note 2, is the following:
Mobility Compensation Compensation 1978 job 
equation in 1978 job in alternative job selection equation
1.00 0.34 -0.06 -0.27
1.00 0.45 0.03
1.00 -0.34
1.00
The correlation pattern among the first three error terms is similar to 
that of the SIPP estimates, except that here the correlation between e, 
and e3 is negligible. The correlations in the last column imply that the 
error term in the 1978 job selection equation is negatively associated 
both with the error term in the mobility equation and with the error 
term in the alternative job compensation equation. The negative corre 
lations are not surprising, since the 1978 job will not be missing in the 
job history unless the individual changed jobs in the interim, and a low 
alternative wage makes it less likely that the individual will have 
changed jobs. The error terms in the two compensation equations are 
moderately correlated at 0.45, and the correlation is significant.
Model Validation
Table 6.8 compares the actual mobility rate with the rate predicted 
by the simulations, for the sample as a whole and for the indicated sub 
groups within the sample. 8 Consider how well the simulations capture 
the disparities in mobility rates among the different groups. The actual 
five-year job mobility for individuals without pensions is about 47 per-
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centage points higher than for individuals with pensions, and this entire 
differential is reflected in the simulated mobility rates. Once more, we 
note that this is so despite the fact that pensions are not included as an 
explanatory variable in the mobility equation in the model. Differences 
in mobility between union members and nonunion members are also 
predicted well. In this case, the mobility rate among union members is 
about 12 percentage points lower than for individuals not in unions, 
and again the whole differential is reflected in the simulation results.
Table 6.8 Model Validation Simulations Based on 1978-83 Retrospective 
Data from the SCF
Group
Full sample
Individuals with pensions
Individuals without pensions
Union members
Not union members
Sample 
mobility 
(percent)
28.0
8.8
55.9
20.1
32.5
Simulated 
mobility 
(percent)
29.8
10.1
58.4
21.2
34.9
Number of 
observations
558
331
227
204
354
Unlike the simulations based on estimates from the SIPP and PSID 
data, the SCF simulations in table 6.8 are consistently one to two per 
centage points higher than the actual data. The reasons for this are not 
entirely clear but may be related to the likelihood of maximization 
occurring along a boundary. In any case, this overestimation is quite 
small when compared to the large-scale differences in mobility rates 
among different groups, and it does not seem to have affected the abil 
ity of the model to predict these differences among groups success 
fully.
Simulations
We turn again to the role of pensions in affecting job mobility. Table 
6.9 presents the relevant simulations. The top portion of the table 
examines the effect of pension backloading on mobility, both for the 
whole sample of individuals covered by pensions and for the specific 
subgroups considered previously. For those with pensions, the simu 
lated five-year mobility rate with the observed compensation is 10.3
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percent. Eliminating backloading, the mobility rate rises only to 11.6 
percent. This small effect reflects the fact that backloading in the sam 
ple for table 6.7 amounts to only about 3 percent of compensation (as 
calculated according to note 4) between 1978 and the expected retire 
ment age.
Table 6.9 Simulations of Effects of Backloading and Other Changes in 
Compensation on Mobility, Based on 1978-83 Retrospective Data from 
the SCF______________________________________
Original Postchange 
mobility rate mobility rate Number of 
Group (percent) (percent) observations
Effects of eliminating pension backloading
All individuals with pensions 10.3 11.6 286 
46-50 year-olds 9.8 12.3 54 
Union members 11.8 13.3 143 
Not union members 8.9 9.8 143
Effects of dropping pension compensation entirely 
All individuals with pensions 10.3 15.7 286
Effects of higher compensation in pension jobs, as measured by
compensation equation estimates 
All individuals with pensions 10.3 52.3 286
Again, the effect for the older individuals in the group, who are 
closer to the retirement ages specified in the plans and for whom the 
incentive impacts of backloading should be greater, is indeed larger. 
However, the increase in these workers© mobility rates is only about 
2.5 percentage points over the five-year period. This is still very small 
when compared to the nearly 50 percentage point difference in the 
mobility rates of those with and without pensions (table 6.8). The 
effect of backloading is also not very large among either union or non 
union members as a group, as indicated by the next two rows in the 
table.
When we simulate the effect of eliminating pensions, with no com 
pensating adjustments in wages or other benefits, thereby removing the 
effects of the pension backloading as well as of the pension value 
itself, the impact on mobility is over four times as large as that of sim-
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ply eliminating backloading. Nevertheless, the effect is still relatively 
small compared to the total differential in mobility between those with 
and without pensions.
In the last line of the table, we analyze the effects of changing the 
compensation premium measure in the mobility equation by the 
amount the estimated pension coefficients indicate in the compensation 
equations. The estimates of the compensation equations in table 6.7 
suggest that a pension in the 1978 job reduces lnCa , the alternative job 
compensation, by 0.362 and increases lnCc , the compensation in that 
job, by 0.392. Hence, the effect of a pension on the difference between 
lnCc and lnCa , which is the compensation premium associated with 
current employment on a pension-covered job, is 0.754. (Again, this is 
about twice the difference found with the SIPP and PSID data.) To sim 
ulate the effect of this change, the value of M in the simulations is 
increased by 0.754 times the coefficient of the compensation premium 
variable. The results of this simulation are indeed striking. Job mobility 
would increase to 52.3 percent were the compensation premium abol 
ished, which is very close to the measured mobility for those without 
pensions.
This outcome is sensitive to the estimated difference in pension 
coefficients in the two compensation equations, and these coefficients, 
particularly in the alternative job equation, are not precisely estimated. 
The estimated difference of 0.754 is comparable to the actual differ 
ence of 0.568 in the mean log compensation between pensioned and 
nonpensioned workers in the sample for table 6.7. Further, even if the 
difference and its associated impact on job mobility were cut in half, it 
would be very difficult to avoid the conclusion that mobility in pension 
jobs is low mostly because these jobs pay a high compensation pre 
mium. Only a relatively minor role appears to be played by the back- 
loading of pensions, whereby benefits are concentrated toward the end 
of the job.
Other Issues in Specification
In the model specification, the assumptions have generally tended to 
bias the results toward showing larger effects of pension backloading
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than in fact exist. First, the pension variable is omitted completely from 
the mobility equation. This omission forces the large pension effect in 
the reduced form equation to work entirely through the compensation 
gain measure, likely biasing the coefficient upward. The bias would 
occur if pensions do have a direct effect on mobility or if they are prox 
ies for other variables that should enter the mobility equation. Second, 
the model has treated a dollar©s worth of expected pension benefits as 
having the same value as a dollar of earnings. In fact, most people 
would argue that, because of the greater uncertainty regarding the 
eventual receipt of pensions, these benefits should be valued at some 
lesser amount. This would mean that even more of the effect of pen 
sions on mobility should be attributed to the wage premium and even 
less to pensions and backloading than our results would indicate. 
Finally, we have not included the possibility that individuals in pen 
sion-covered jobs have a lower inherent propensity to change jobs. The 
impact of backloading would be overstated to the extent that mobility 
actually due to heterogeneity is instead attributed to pension-related 
factors.9 Hence, we conclude that our estimates of the small impacts of 
pension backloading on mobility are, if anything, likely to be an over 
statement of the true effects.
Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has shown that a model consisting of a mobility equa 
tion and equations for compensation on the current job and compensa 
tion on the next best job may be used to determine the likely effects on 
mobility from pension backloading and from compensation differen 
tials between the current and next best job. The model assumes that all 
sources of compensation differences have the same effect on workers© 
mobility decisions. Accordingly, mobility has been expressed as a 
function of the compensation difference between the current job and 
the next best alternative. In the process of estimating the mobility 
equation, we have allowed for the fact that compensation in the next 
best employment is not observed for stayers.
Econometric estimates have been obtained from three different data 
sets. These estimates indicate that compensation differences vary
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directly with pension coverage. Pension-covered workers receive 
higher future compensation on their current jobs due to backloading of 
their pensions, due to the contribution of the pension to compensation, 
and because the pension benefit is not offset by lower wages, but 
instead is accompanied by higher wages.
The examination of compensation on current and alternative 
employment suggests that, on pension-covered jobs, the compensation 
premium constitutes a much more important fraction of the loss from 
job termination than does backloading of pension benefits. Simulations 
with the mobility equations confirm that it is not backloading, but the 
wage premium that explains the large difference in mobility between 
workers with pension-covered and noncovered jobs. These differences 
in mobility have been broken down into components reflecting the 
effects of pension backloading and the other sources of compensation 
differences for employment with and without pensions. In each case, 
the findings in tables 6.3, 6.6, and 6.9 suggest that pension backloading 
accounts for no more than about 10 percent of the difference in mobil 
ity between those workers on pension-covered jobs and those holding 
jobs that do not offer pensions.
NOTES
1. This section incorporates material from our article (Gustman and Steinmeier 1993b), which, 
in turn, is based on a report to the U.S. Department of Labor (Gustman and Steinmeier 1990, 
under contract No. J-9-P-8-0098.)
2. Recalling that the variance of e* is normalized to unity, and using the standard formula for 
correlation (p )2 = a^/CiC^), the covariance matrix of the composite error terms (the e*) can be 
calculated as: 1.000 0.300 0.195 
0.181 0.072 
0.228
Since the relation between £ l and e* is £] = £*+ oe3 , Var(E)) = Var(ef ) + 2aCov(e* , e3) + 
a2Var(e3), Cov(ei, e2) = Cov(e!f, e2) + ocCov(e2 , e3), and Cov (ei, e3) = Cov(e* , e3) + <xVar(e3 ). 
Evaluating these formulas yields the following covariance matrix of the original error terms: 
1.005 0.176 -0.198 
0.181 0.072 
0.228 
Applying the standard formula for correlations gives the correlation matrix in the text.
3. This probability is
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which is the integral of the probability density for e* above the value of -M . If either the com 
pensation in the current or alternative job is unobserved so that e2 or £3 cannot be calculated, the 
density function/is integrated out with respect to those error terms. The simulated mobility rate 
for the sample is the sample weighted average of the mobility probabilities for the individuals in 
the sample. In the results presented in table 6.2, the simulated mobility rates are weighted aver 
ages, but runs with unweighted averages gave very close to the same results.
4. The effect of pension backloading is computed in accordance with the discussion in chapter 
2. For each individual in a pension covered job, we calculate the value of the pension rights should 
the individual remain until retirement. We then make a calculation for a defined contribution plan 
of the same value at retirement, which serves as the counterfactual plan with the elimination of the 
backloading that typically occurs in a defined benefit plan.
5. The correlation matrix among the original error terms, calculated along the lines of note 2, 
is: 1.000 0.260 -0.407 
1.000 0.322 
1.000
These figures are approximately the same as for the SIPP estimates, with the exception of the 
correlation between E! and e2 , which is only about two-thirds as large.
6. The SCF did not collect a full work history for all respondents. In particular, information is 
reported for the current and longest-held job, which for some individuals who moved after 1978 
may not be the job held in 1978.
7. Some additional details of the estimation are as follows:
Agricultural employment and self-employment are screened on the basis of the individual©s 
longest-held job, since information on these characteristics is not always available for the 1978 
job.
If the individual was unemployed in 1983, he or she was considered to be a mover if the previ 
ous job began after 1978, and a stayer if the previous job began before 1978. This effectively mea 
sures mobility as the taking of a new job and not as the separation (which may or may not be 
temporary) from an old job.
The general growth rate of nominal wages used in the calculations is the 30-year average from 
1953-83, and the discount factor is equal to the general growth rate of nominal wages.
By the construction of the data set, all 1978 jobs with pensions are observed. Hence, the pen 
sion coefficient in the 1978 job selection equation has an implied value of +   and is not esti 
mated.
Also note that in the mobility equation, an additional year of experience is accompanied by 
another year of age and by a reduction in the number of years until expected retirement. All three 
coefficients must be considered to determine the total effect on mobility of becoming another year 
older, which is close to nil.
8. Simulations with the retrospective SCF involve slightly different calculations than the sim 
ulations with the panel data. For each individual, the nonstochastic parts of equations (5.5) and 
(5.6) in Chapter 5 are calculated as / and M , respectively. Also, if compensation in either the 
current or alternative job is observed, it is possible to calculate the values e2 and/or e3 from equa 
tions (5.2) and (5.3). If the 1978 job is observed, it is possible to calculate the probability that the 
individual would have changed jobs in the one-year interval as
PR; = J / (e*| e2, e3 , £4 > -/) de]
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If the 1978 job is not observed, the probability is
PRj = J/(e*|e2, e3 , e4 <-/
In both cases, the probability is the integral of the conditional probability density for Ef above the 
value of -M . Note that if the 1978 job involved a pension, / is infinitely positive, since the SCF 
specifically asked about previous pension jobs. As before, if either the compensation in the current 
or alternative job is unobserved so that £2 or £3 cannot be calculated, the density function f is inte 
grated out with respect to those error terms. The simulated mobility rate for the sample is the aver 
age of the mobility probabilities for the individuals in the sample.
9. The effects of self selection of stayers into pension covered jobs remains in doubt. We have 
included in the mobility equation those observables which Alien, Clark and McDermed (1991) 
find are correlated with selection into pension covered jobs. Moreover, Alien, Clark and 
McDermed conclude that unobservables do not play an important role in the selection process.
Appendix to Chapter 6: PSID Results with Quits Only as the Dependent Variable 
and with a Single Measure of the Compensation Premium
Appendix Table 6.1 PSID Model Estimates with Quits Only as the Dependent Variable
Model component
Constant
Compensation premium (a)
Pension coverage
Manufacturing
White collar
Management/professional
Union status
Years of experience
Age
Education
Race (Black)
Married
Children under 18
Home ownership
Mobility equation
Marginal 
effect
-0.552
a
-0.169
-0.155
0.031
-0.024
-0.000b
0.001
-0.011
-0.240
0.056
-0.001
-0.175
(t stat)
(2.34)
(1.95)
(0.71)
(0.24)
(0.14)
(0.02)
(0.06)
(0.43)
(0.74)
(0.58)
(0.01)
(2.56)
Compensation in 
1984 job
Estimate
2.150
a
0.276
0.069
0.074
0.241
0.202
0.000b
a
0.071
-0.264
a
a
a
(t stat)
(59.61)
(7.61)
(1.83)
(1.08)
(5.16)
(3.87)
(0.16)
(7.90)
(3.47)
Compensation in 
alternative job
Estimate
2.181
a
0.013
0.227
0.205
0.244
-0.097
-0.006
a
0.122
-0.310
a
a
a
(t stat)
(18.75)
(0.09)
(1.80)
(0.60)
(1.29)
(0.58)
(0.55)
(3.65)
(0.66)
Appendix Table 6.1 (continued)
Model component
Spouse employment
SMSA
Standard deviation of error terms
Correlation matrix of error terms
Log-likelihood
Number of observations
Mobility equation
Marginal 
effect (t stat)
0.020 (0.40)
0.028 (0.31)
1.00
Compensation in 
1984 job
Estimate (t stat)
a
0.087 (2.54)
0.341 (33.12)
0.574 (2.29)
1.00
-433.8
474
Compensation in 
alternative job
Estimate
a
0.073
0.505
0.317
0.346
1.00
(t stat)
(0.55)
(14.49)
(2.16)
(4.27)
-
NOTES: Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of asymptotic t statistics. See text for descriptions of the dependent variables. The job characteristics
in the alternative compensation equation refer to characteristics in the initial job, not to the characteristics of the alternative job.
a. Variable is omitted from this equation.
b. Coefficient is less than 0.0005 in absolute value.
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Econometric Estimates with Separate
Backloading and Compensation
Premium Variables
A further modification of the mobility model is analyzed in this 
chapter. Specifically, we estimate the model with the mobility equation 
discussed in the last section of chapter 5, and specified in equation 
(5.7). Recall that Cc is compensation in the current job, including back- 
loading, Cn is the current job compensation, excluding backloading, 
and Ca is compensation in an alternative job. (If the current job does 
not have a pension, Cc will be equal to Cn.) Equation (5.7) divides the 
compensation premium between the current and alternative jobs into 
two parts, (InQ - InQ) and (lnCn - lnCa), representing pension back- 
loading and the remainder of the compensation difference, respec 
tively, between the current and alternative jobs. The coefficients of 
these two parts, which are oq and (X2, respectively, are permitted to be 
free. If the specification captures all of the major influences on mobil 
ity, one would expect the coefficients on the pension backloading and 
compensation premium measures to be similar. The model is estimated 
with data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 
and from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). 1
Results Based on SIPP Data
Table 7.1 presents results from estimating the mobility model with 
the SIPP data. As the estimates in the columns for the mobility equa 
tion indicate, when the parameters for backloading and for the com 
pensation premium are allowed to be free, they are estimated to be 
fairly close in value. Comparing the log-likelihood values between the 
constrained version of the model as reported in chapter 6 and the 
unconstrained version of the model, the hypothesis of equality of these 
two coefficients is not rejected at any reasonable level of significance.
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Table 7.1 Estimates of the Model with Mobility Determined by Separate Measures of Pension Backloading and the 
Compensation Premium Based on 1984-85 Data from the SIPP
Model component
Constant
Backloading ((Xj)
Compensation premium (o^)
Pension coverage
Manufacturing
White collar
Management/professional
Union status
Firm size > 100 
Years of experience
Years until retirement
Age
Education
Race (Black)
Married
Children under 18
Mobility equation
Marginal 
effect
-0.354
-0.304
a
0.005
0.009
0.008
0.012
0.012 
-0.002
-0.001
0.002
-0.002
0.066
0.009
0.009
(t statistic)
(1.68)
(2.48)
(0.20)
(0.52)
(0.46)
(0.71)
(0.68) 
(0.67)
(0.40)
(0.82)
(0.48)
(0.67)
(0.61)
(0.76)
Compensation in 
1984 job
Estimate (t statistic)
1.430
a
a
0.342
0.029
0.073
0.232
0.117
0.058 
0.000b
-0.003
a
0.058
-0.189
a
a
(14.79)
(17.77)
(1.45)
(2.41)
(10.25)
(4.78)
(3.04) 
(0.17)
(1.38)
(16.65)
(4.86)
Compensation in 
alternative job
Estimate (t statistic)
0.955
a
a
0.143
-0.007
-0.002
0.150
0.023
-0.036 
0.002
0.009
a
0.067
-0.552
a
a
(1.43)
(0.81)
(0.09)
(0.01)
(1.48)
(0.21)
(0.40) 
(0.23)
(0.98)
(4.15)
(1.85)
Home ownership -0.032 (1.81)
SMSA -0.027 (1.02)
Standard deviation of error terms
Correlation matrix of error terms 1 .000
Log-likelihood
Number of observations
a
0.061 (3.41)
0.426 (92.35)
0.734 (2.32)
1.000
-2,304.45
2,545
a
0.179
0.480
0.406
0.364
1.000
(2.41)
(8.14)
(1.06)
(4.56)
-
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of asymptotic t statistics. See text for descriptions of the dependent variables. The job characteristics
in the alternative job equation refer to the characteristics in the initial job, not to the characteristics of the alternative job.
a. Variable is omitted from this equation.
b. Coefficient is less than 0.0005 in absolute value.
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This means that, when estimating the model with SIPP data, once a 
proper measure of the compensation premium is included in the mobil 
ity equation, there is no evidence that pension backloading has any 
greater impact per dollar on mobility than does any other component of 
the premium.
Comparing the other coefficients in the mobility equation and in the 
compensation equations to those found in table 6.1, there are no impor 
tant differences for the constrained version of the model. Notably, the 
estimate of the compensation differences between pension and nonpen- 
sion jobs is similar whether or not the compensation differential for 
work on the current and next best job is decomposed into a measure of 
backloading and a residual.
Results Based on PSID Data
Table 7.2 presents the analogous results to table 7.1 using data from 
the 1984-89 PSID. In the mobility equation in table 7.2, the coefficient 
on the measure of pension backloading(-6.518) is almost one hundred 
times the size of the coefficient on the remainder of the compensation 
premium for the pension-covered job (-0.066). The specification is 
clearly not adequate for fully explaining mobility in the PSID data. 
These findings are in sharp contrast to the results obtained with the 
SIPP data. 2
There are some obvious differences between the PSID and SIPP 
samples that might account for these variations in findings. One 
straightforward approach to determining the reason for these differ 
ences is to reestimate the PSID results using a one- or two-year mobil 
ity period, covering 1984 to 1985 or 1986. We tried to fit the model to 
this shorter period using the PSID. Such an estimate would reveal any 
difference in behavior between the earlier and later period or any dif 
ferences in the pension-mobility relationship between shorter and 
longer periods. During longer time spans, observed mobility is more 
often associated with repeated job changes, thereby affecting the 
observed mobility relationship. However, the estimates for the shorter 
period would not converge. A probable cause of the problem is that
Table 7.2 Estimates of the Model with Mobility Determined by Separate Measures of Pension Backloading and the 
Compensation Premium, Based on 1984-1989 Data from the PSID
Model component
Constant
Backloading (o^)
Compensation premium (<X2)
Pension coverage
Manufacturing
White collar
Management/professional
Union status
Years of experience
Age
Education
Race (Black)
Married
Children under 18
Spouse employment
Home ownership
Mobility equation
Marginal 
effect
-6.518
-0.066
a
-0.007
0.079
0.015
-0.095
-0.005
0.020
0.011
-0.086
0.002
0.014
-0.041
-0.211
(t stat)
(5.76)
(0.21)
(0.10)
(0.70)
(0.20)
(0.66)
(0.43)
(1.49)
(0.52)
(0.70)
(0.02)
(0.17)
(0.66)
(2.93)
Compensation in 
1984 job
Estimate
2.150
a
a
0.237
0.062
0.060
0.235
0.189
-0.003
a
0.070
-0.266
a
a
a
a
(t stat)
(61.75)
(6.69)
(1.67)
(0.89)
(5.16)
(3.66)
(0.96)
(8.02)
(3.48)
Compensation in 
alternative job
Estimate
2.191
a
a
0.027
0.215
0.189
0.245
-0.125
-0.007
a
0.122
-0.305
a
a
a
a
(t stat)
(12.46)
(0.21)
(1.68)
(0.60)
(1.32)
(0.75)
(0.66)
(3.50)
(0.69)
Table 7.2 (continued)
Model component Mobility equation
Marginal 
effect (t stat)
SMSA 0.044 (0.77)
Standard deviation of error terms
Correlation matrix of error terms 1 .000
Log-likelihood
Number of observations
Compensation in 
1984 job
Estimate (t stat)
0.090 (2.66)
0.334 (32.39)
0.084 (0.30)
1.000
-500.60
474
Compensation in 
alternative job
Estimate
0.080
0.502
0.094
0.359
1.000
(t stat)
(0.61)
(14.43)
(0.21)
(4.19)
~
NOTES: Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of asymptotic t statistics. See text for descriptions of the dependent variables. The job characteristics 
in the alternative job equation refer to the characteristics in the initial job, not to the characteristics of the alternative job. 
a. Variable is omitted from this equation.
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with the fewer observations in the PSID, there is not enough mobility 
in the data over the shorter period.
Violation of the constraint that coefficients o^ and oc2 should be 
close in value may also suggest the existence of some omitted factor in 
the analysis that is correlated with the measure of pension backloading. 
The work by Alien, Clark, and McDermed suggests that the omitted 
factor is not unmeasured worker preference for pension-covered jobs. 
An obvious question is why the effects of an omitted factor should be 
evident in the PSID data but not in the SIPP data.
Whatever the reason for the difference in the estimated values of o^ 
and oc2 in the PSID sample, it means that the story is not finished. The 
constraint that a marginal dollar of compensation, regardless of its 
source, should have the same effect on mobility of the compensation 
difference is based on strong a priori reasoning. Moreover, if the 
requirement were violated, one would expect the source of the inequal 
ity to be liquidity constraints and risk differentials. Both of these fac 
tors should cause the effect of a dollar of pension backloading to be 
weaker than the effect of a marginal dollar of compensation from 
another source. The data strongly suggest that it is not pension back- 
loading per se that holds the individual on the job and accounts for 
lower turnover on pension-covered jobs. One cannot rule out the possi 
bility that there may be some other factor related to the implicit con 
tract that is correlated with the measure of pension backloading; 
however, as we have seen, such an omission is not strongly influential 
in shaping the results from the SIPP data.
NOTES
1. To estimate this model with data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), it would be 
necessary to divide equation (5.2) into two parts: one for the backloading and one for the rest of 
the compensation differential. Both equations would have to be substituted into equation (5.4) to 
yield an equation analogous to (5.6), and this specification would require two good instruments in 
order to estimate it. Given that the maximization of the likelihood for the version of the model 
estimated in chapter 6 occurred along a constraint, it is doubtful that there is sufficient information 
to allow a satisfactory estimation of the version of the model in which backloading and compensa 
tion differential appear as separate arguments.
2. The finding that the pension capital loss variable has a substantially larger coefficient than 
does a measure of compensation is consistent with results based on the PSID in Alien, Clark, and 
McDermed (1993), discussed in chapter 3.
Appendix to Chapter 7: PSID Results with Quits Only as the Dependent Variable 
and with Separate Measures of the Backloading and Compensation Premiums
Appendix Table 7.1 PSID Results of Model with Separate Backloading and Compensation Premium Variables 
Using Quits as the Dependent Variable
Model component
Constant
Backloading (oq)
Compensation premium (0.2)
Pension coverage
Manufacturing
White collar
Management/professional
Union status
Years of experience
Age
Education
Race (Black)
Married
Children under 18
Home ownership
Spouse employment
Mobility equation
Marginal 
effect
-6.423
0.100
a
-0.065
-0.069
0.061
-0.246
-0.004
0.012
0.026
-0.339
0.069
0.018
-0.207
0.019
(t stat)
(6.29)
(0.31)
(0.82)
(0.52)
(0.81)
(1.57)
(0.28)
(0.88)
(1.23)
(1.67)
(0.55)
(0.22)
(2.62)
(0.29)
Compensation in 
1984 job
Estimate
2.15
a
a
0.237
0.062
0.060
0.235
0.190
-0.003
a
0.070
-0.266
a
a
a
a
(t stat)
(61.21)
(6.68)
(1.67)
(0.89)
(5.12)
(3.75)
(0.99)
(7.97)
(3.62)
Compensation in 
alternative job
Estimate
2.176
a
a
0.018
0.222
0.209
0.246
-0.111
-0.007
a
0.120
-0.317
a
a
a
a
(t stat)
(19.02)
(0.15)
(1.80)
(0.62)
(1-32)
(0.67)
(0.66)
(3.63)
(0.67)
SMSA 0.028 (0.48) 0.090 (2.65) 0.079 (0.61)
Standard deviation of error term 0.334 (32.85) 0.501 (14.34)
Correlation matrix of error terms 1 .000
Log-likelihood
Number of observations
-0.023 (0.07)
1.000
-408.16
474
0.150
0.358
1.000
(0.61)
(4.53)
-
NOTES: Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of asymptotic t statistics. See text for descriptions of the dependent variables. The job characteristics 
in the alternative job equation refer to the characteristics of the initial job, not to the characteristics of the alternative job. 
a. Variable is omitted from this equation.

8 
Pension Policies and Their Effects
Overview
Backloaded pensions have recently come under scrutiny as possible 
targets for legislation. A major goal of such reform would be to alter 
the distribution of payments and incentives in favor of groups of work 
ers who have been shortchanged by backloaded pensions. These 
include workers whose jobs are terminated through no fault of their 
own, such as those laid off from pension-covered jobs; women who 
may leave a pensioned job for family considerations; and possibly indi 
viduals who are unable to continue working for health reasons. 
Another goal of proposed legislation is to insure retirement income for 
these groups. If workers with typical defined benefit pensions switched 
jobs midway through their careers, they will have less income during 
retirement because of the backloading in the first pension. The policy 
concern is that this reduced income will result in a substantial cut in the 
standard of living and may even make it more likely that individuals 
will need public assistance. A third goal is to make it easier for workers 
to move from declining fields toward more promising growth areas. By 
providing incentives for workers to stay with their current firms, back- 
loaded pensions can place burdens both on waning industries, which 
are forced to offer additional incentives to induce workers to leave, and 
on growing industries, which may have to raise their wages to attract 
the people they need.
Several policies have been contemplated or enacted to increase the 
portability of pensions by reducing backloading.© For example, the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 specifies that, with the exception of multiemployer 
plans, the period of time for cliff vesting can be no longer than 5 years, 
as opposed to the previous 10-year maximum. However, since that did 
not address other pension provisions that cause backloading, the act by 
itself did not increase portability considerably, except for workers who 
were hired in their late forties and fifties. Even after 10 years, the value
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of the pension is only a small fraction of its eventual value for most 
workers.
To illustrate, recall the figures in table 2.1, which pertain to a worker 
who is hired at age 25 and retires at age 62. By reducing the vesting 
period from 10 to 5 years, a 30-year-old worker with 5 years of tenure, 
who previously would not have been eligible for a pension at all, now 
qualifies. However, that pension has less than 3 percent of its eventual 
value, and the present value of the pension is equal to only a couple of 
weeks© wages. Reducing the vesting period for young workers 
decreases the size of the backloading to some degree, but a substantial 
amount of backloading remains. For workers hired closer to retirement, 
however, the reduction in the vesting period is more important, since 
there is much less time before the workers begin to collect the pension.
Another policy to enhance the pension values of early leavers is to 
require that pension benefits be paid on the basis of the projected wage 
at normal retirement rather than the actual wage at the time of separa 
tion. This potential reform has been analyzed by the Congressional 
Budget Office (1987, pp. 116-17), but as of yet it has not been enacted 
into law. It would prevent erosion in the value of the calculated benefit 
that occurs due to inflation between the time workers leave the firm and 
the time they actually begin to collect the pension.
This policy would also make the vesting period more important. 
Consider again the worker illustrated in table 2.1. If the required period 
for vesting is 10 years, then a 30-year-old worker with 5 years of ten 
ure would not have any pension regardless of whether the pension val 
ues were calculated based on projected wages or actual wages. With a 
5-year vesting period, however, the worker would be eligible for a pen 
sion equal to 14 percent (5/37) of its final value if projected wages are 
used in the calculation, versus 3 percent if actual wages are used. 2 This 
suggests that the vesting period is a more important issue if pensions 
are awarded based on projected wages rather than on actual wages.
Still another policy to reduce backloading would be to shift pensions 
toward defined contribution plans. To some degree, this has already 
been accomplished, although not intentionally. In 1979, legislation was 
passed that introduced 401(k) plans, and clarification of their tax status 
in the early 1980s made these plans very attractive. As a result, the late 
1980s and 1990s witnessed an explosive growth of 401(k) plans. Many 
were added as secondary plans, but a substantial number were intro-
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duced as primary plans. It is possible that future legislation will force 
employers to offer 401(k) or similar plans to their employees. A mod 
est proposal would compel employers who currently provide pensions 
to at least offer 401(k) plans as supplementary plans if they do not 
already do so and would force those who do not provide pensions to 
offer 401(k) plans. A more substantial proposal would require employ 
ers who currently offer defined benefit pensions to offer 401(k)-type 
plans as an alternative. This last proposal would be attractive to new 
employees. However, it would not be attractive to employees enrolled 
in defined benefit plans for a period of time, since the previous years of 
service in the defined benefit plan would still be subject to backload- 
ing.
There are a number of possible effects of policies to increase pen 
sion portability. The conventional wisdom asserts that backloaded pen 
sions reduce the likelihood that the worker will leave the firm to take 
another job. It is plausible that firms might want to use backloading in 
order to save on hiring costs or to recover the costs of training a new 
employee. Eliminating the incentives provided by a backloaded pen 
sion makes it more likely that the worker will leave the firm and that 
the firm will lose its investment in training and will then have to incur 
hiring costs to replace the worker. However, it has been the main thrust 
of this book that this effect is minor. The incentives provided by back- 
loaded pensions are simply not large enough to hold a worker in the 
face of an alternative job offer, even if that offer involves only a modest 
wage increase. The correlation between backloaded pensions and low 
rates of mobility reported in previous studies does not reflect a causal 
relationship but occurs because of the failure to control for the fact that 
the job alternatives of workers with pensions are less attractive, relative 
to their current positions, than the alternatives for workers who do not 
have pensions.
Another possible effect is on productivity. Some authors have 
claimed that backloaded pensions are an integral part of a compensa 
tion scheme designed to enhance work incentives and increase produc 
tivity. The reasoning is that, if workers are caught "shirking," they may 
be subject to dismissal, which would, in turn, deny them the opportu 
nity to realize the large increases in pension value in the years just 
before retirement. Evidence on the relationship between deferred com 
pensation and productivity is weak, primarily because productivity is
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so much harder to measure than mobility. However, our research does 
suggest that if backloaded pensions reduce shirking and increase pro 
ductivity, the effect is likely to be rather small as compared to the 
effects of the other elements of the compensation premium. That is, 
workers are probably reluctant to engage in activities that may result in 
dismissal primarily because they could not find another job that pays 
comparable wages, and only secondarily because they will lose the 
opportunity to realize large increases in their pension values in the 
future.
Both with respect to mobility and to shirking, the incentives pro 
vided by backloaded pensions are much larger to workers who are 
within 5 or 10 years of retirement than to their younger co-workers. 
Our analysis has dealt primarily with workers in their thirties and for 
ties, who have a number of years before retirement. For someone who 
is only a couple of years away from retirement, increases in pension 
value represent a much larger percentage of compensation than is the 
case for younger workers. Thus, although backloaded pensions may 
not be important determinants of mobility and productivity for workers 
in general, they may well be a significant factor for older workers.
Funding levels of the plans may also be affected. If a plan is funded 
on the basis of the benefits for which the company is currently liable, a 
firm will have to contribute only a relatively small amount towards the 
pension until the worker nears retirement. If legislation were to require 
plans to pay benefits on the basis of projected salary, the firm would 
have to contribute considerably more to cover its commitment. How 
ever, the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA) has already encouraged firms to fund pensions on the basis of 
projected salary, not current salary. Thus, a move toward basing pen 
sion calculations on projected salary should not have a large effect, 
since most firms already fund plans in this way.
A final effect of a move away from backloaded plans is on the distri 
bution of pension payments. In fact, since the effects on mobility, pro 
ductivity, and funding are likely to be weak, it is likely that this is the 
most important consequence of such a policy. The most obvious result 
of a shift from backloaded plans would be to enhance the pensions of 
workers who change jobs before retirement, particularly workers who 
hold pensioned jobs early in their careers and then move. However, 
some amount of caution is needed in analyzing a policy encouraging
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pension portability, since such a policy may have side effects on groups 
other than the target population.
The next two sections of this chapter consider the impacts of various 
approaches to make pensions more portable. A model of the firm and 
its pension plan is used to simulate the effects of pension policies. Dif 
ferent policies determine the level of pension contributions and, ulti 
mately, the wage of various groups in the firm, even those groups not 
intentionally affected by the policy. The analysis will focus on redis- 
tributive effects, particularly how these policies are likely to influence 
the wages and pensions of those not targeted as well as those in the tar 
geted group. In general, we will not be concerned with determining 
whether government intervention is justified.
A Model of Pension Benefits and Funding
A mechanical approach to the analysis of pension policies would 
assume that legislation meant to induce certain changes in plan provi 
sions is simply translated into comparable revisions in pensions. 3 This 
is not likely to be the case. Policies designed to increase pension porta 
bility are likely to cause changes in labor costs. Whether or not firms 
pay a wage premium, that is, whether or not workers are receiving 
compensation on pension-covered jobs that exceeds their opportunity 
wage, as long as the amount of compensation is determinate, increases 
in pension costs will induce adjustments in the remainder of the com 
pensation package. Such adjustments will redistribute pensions and 
wages among workers who are leaving the firm or retiring at different 
ages.
In this section we develop a model that is useful for analyzing the 
first-round responses of firms to changes in pension policies. The 
model is then used to explore the effects of the various types of legisla 
tion that have been or might be adopted to modify the degree of pen 
sion backloading in defined benefit plans.
Overall worker productivity is constrained to match overall worker 
compensation within each period in this model. The firm is also 
expected to contribute to the pension fund an amount that covers the 
increase in pension liability, calculated on a projected salary basis.
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Management knows that some workers will leave the firm before 
retirement and that some will stay but does not know which workers 
are in each group. To allocate the pension contributions among 
employees, the firm subtracts the same proportion of salary from each 
worker and pays each person a wage equal to the value of that person©s 
output less the pension contribution. This means that the firm does not 
necessarily pay each worker an amount equal to the value of that 
worker©s output over the course of his or her employment. Workers 
who leave the firm early will have more taken out as pension contribu 
tions than they ultimately receive as pension benefits, with the reverse 
being true for workers who stay until retirement. For the workers as a 
whole, however, the firm does adjust wages to reflect pension contribu 
tions, so that total compensation for the group is equal to its output.
In this environment, changes in pension policy that increase the 
value of some workers© pensions will require the firm to raise the over 
all contribution rate to the pension fund. With unchanged output, the 
higher pension contribution will tend to depress somewhat the overall 
level of wages at the firm. The lower wages will affect other workers as 
well as those who are receiving the increased pension values. For 
example, a policy that raises the value of pensions for early leavers 
may well have the side effect of reducing wages (and hence compensa 
tion) for some who stay until they are eligible to retire.
The model we use in this section shows the first-order effects of the 
policy changes. By first-order effects, we mean the impacts on pension 
values and wages, not on hiring, retirement patterns, or productivity. 
Although these first-order results should indicate the major effects on 
pension values, additional, smaller changes may occur as firms and 
workers adjust their hiring and retirement behavior in response to the 
new environment.
In the model, the firm maintains a steady-state labor force. Each 
year, it hires the same number of 25-year-old workers, half of whom 
will leave at age 30 and half at the firm©s retirement age of 62. The pen 
sion plan is characterized by a simple, final-average-salary defined 
benefit formula. Benefits are 1 percent of the average of the final salary 
times years of credited service. Although this generosity coefficient is 
somewhat low in comparison with reported data, the pension benefit 
formula does not include a social security offset that would otherwise 
reduce the value of the pension. For an employee who joins the firm at
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age 25, retires at age 62, and dies at age 80 (the presumed age of death 
of all workers in the model), a generosity coefficient of 1 percent leads 
to a pension with a present value at the time of hire that is a little over 
10 percent of the present value of the wage stream. In comparison with 
available data (Gustman and Steinmeier 1989), the 10 percent ratio is 
slightly low but not unreasonable.
The plan is funded so as to cover its liabilities on a projected liabil 
ity basis. For those currently employed, the projected liability is calcu 
lated as a prorated share of the present value of the pension that would 
be paid if half of the workers remained with the firm until retirement 
and the other half left after five years. That is, management is assumed 
to know the distribution of separation ages but not necessarily which 
workers will leave early and which workers will stay until retirement. 
The prorated share is the ratio of the present value of the wage paid to 
date divided by the present value of the wage to be paid over the full 
term of attachment.
To finance the pension plan, the firm first must calculate the amount 
of contributions needed each year to maintain the level of funding just 
described. The firm then compares the level of contributions to the total 
value of the output of its labor force in a given year and calculates a 
contribution rate as a percentage of that value. This contribution rate 
is applied uniformly to all workers who are employed at the firm that 
year, and each worker is paid a wage that is equal to the difference 
between the value of his or her output and the amount of the pension 
contribution. The calculations allow for the feedback effect of wages 
on the amount of the pension liability, so that, in fact, the contribution 
rate and wages are determined simultaneously.
This type of financing is consistent with available evidence regard 
ing the relationship between wages and increments in pension values. 
Certainly, for an individual worker, compensation does not appear to 
match productivity on a year-by-year basis. We have seen that pension 
accrual profiles are characterized by sharp spikes at the time that bene 
fits become vested, and that there are even sharper spikes when the 
worker satisfies the eligibility requirements for early or normal retire 
ment benefits. At these times, there does not appear to be an offsetting 
depression in wages. In conjunction with fairly smooth presumed 
growth in productivity, the relatively even growth of wages, despite the 
jumps and dips in the accrual pattern of pensions, suggests that if
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workers pay for pensions in the form of reduced wages, the path of 
these payments is also comparatively smooth over time.
One final premise has been noted but warrants some further discus 
sion. The assumption that the productivity of workers is fixed, particu 
larly with respect to changes in the rules governing pensions, runs 
counter to many of the explanations as to why pensions have the spe 
cific defined benefit form observed for most plans. These explanations 
usually involve the effect of the plans on overall productivity. However, 
at this time there is no consensus as to whether pensions affect produc 
tivity and, if so, by how much, and almost all of the current hypotheses 
are not fully consistent with the empirical evidence. (See Gustman and 
Steinmeier 1989b; Gustman and Mitchell 1992; Gustman, Mitchell, 
and Steinmeier 1994.)4 In the absence of agreement on this issue, the 
following analysis ignores any effect of changes in pension rules on 
productivity. For similar reasons, the analysis only addresses the 
change in the pension contribution rates necessary to keep the plans 
funded, rather than other revisions in pension plans by firms in 
response to policy changes.
Effects of Potential Pension Policies 
on the Distribution of Compensation
Using the model just outlined, this section presents the results of 
simulations evaluating policies designed to increase pension portabil 
ity. The firm is assumed to have been hiring the same number of work 
ers for a long enough time to have achieved an equilibrium, and the 
pension is also assumed to have been in existence sufficiently long for 
its financing per worker to be in equilibrium. For these simulations, 
productivity in the base year is assumed to be $20,000 per worker, 
growing at the rate of 6 percent per year (in nominal terms). This pro 
jection of wage growth is consistent with rates used by the Congres 
sional Budget Office (CBO) for the late 1980s (1987, p. 154) and with 
postwar experience. The interest rate used in these calculations is 6 
percent, which is about 1 percentage point lower than the estimate used 
by the CBO.
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Effect of Earlier Vesting
One approach to improving the situation of early leavers is to 
require earlier vesting. The first two columns of data in table 8.1 show 
the situation with 10-year cliff vesting. In order to finance the pensions 
of the half of the individuals who stay until retirement, the firm must 
make contributions equal to approximately 9.5 percent of payroll. For 
both the short-tenure workers and the long-tenure workers, these pen 
sion contributions (line 2 of the table) are subtracted from productivity 
to yield wages. The workers who stay until retirement get pensions 
whose present value is 10.8 percent of the present value of their wages. 
The remaining 1.3 percent is financed by the workers who leave at age 
30, who make pension contributions but receive nothing in return.
The vesting period is shortened to five years in the middle two col 
umns. With this change, all of the workers are now eligible for pen 
sions. Instead of not receiving a pension at all, the short-tenure workers 
now receive a pension with a present value that amounts to 1.7 percent 
of their wages. This is much lower than the percentage received by 
workers who stay until retirement because the final (nominal) wage is 
used in the pension formula. Note that because the short-tenure work 
ers now receive some pension benefits, the contribution rate to the pen 
sion plan has risen from 9.5 percent to 9.7 percent of payroll. This 
increase is borne mostly by the workers who stay until retirement, 
causing both their wages and pensions to decline. Because the pensions 
of the short-tenure workers are so small, however, the compensation 
reduction of the long-tenure workers is minor, amounting to only 0.2 
percent of their lifetime compensation.
Effect of Using Projected Wages in the Pension Formula
Even if one©s benefits are fully vested, pension benefits received by 
early leavers are worth proportionately less than the benefits of those 
who stay to retirement. A mechanical reason for this result is that bene 
fits for early leavers are calculated using the wage at separation rather 
than the wage that would be received had the worker stayed until nor 
mal retirement (Bulow 1982). Requiring that an employer use the wage 
projected to the normal retirement age would eliminate the loss due to 
using the current nominal wage in computing benefits for terminated,
Table 8.1 Policies to Assist Early Leavers
10-year vesting using 
actual wage at separation
Benefit factors
Productivity 
- Pension contribution 
= Wages 
+ Pension benefits 
= Total compensation
Pension/wage ratio 
Compensation/productivity ratio
Leave at 30
$100,000 
8,708 
91,292 
0 
91,212
0 
0.913
Retire at 62
$740,000 
64,439 
675,561 
73,147 
748,708
0.108 
1.012
5-year vesting using actual 
wage at separation
Leave at 30
$100,000 
8,874 
91,126 
1,529 
92,655
0.017 
0.927
Retire at 62
$740,000 
65,669
674,331 
73,014 
747,345
0.108 
1.010
5-year vesting using 
projected wage at 
retirement
Leave at 30
$100,000 
9,770 
90,230 
9,770 
100,000
0.108 
1.000
Retire at 62
$740,000 
72,296 
667,704 
72,296 
740,000
0.108 
1.000
NOTE: AH dollar amounts are the present values of the corresponding streams, discounted back to the base year.
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vested employees under a defined benefit plan. The last two columns of 
table 8.1 show the result of such a policy. When there is full vesting 
and the projected wage at normal retirement instead of the current 
wage is used in calculating benefits for early leavers, the pension value 
for the short-tenure workers rises to $9,770. This is the amount that 
results when there is no pension backloading. Backloading is inherent 
in using the nominal wage at the time of separation to calculate pen 
sion benefits; this practice reduces the present value of the pension for 
early leavers by about 84 percent as compared to a nonbackloaded pen 
sion (comparing $1,529 to $9,770).
In this case, the pension contribution has gone up to about 10.8 per 
cent. The higher pension contribution affects everyone, but whereas the 
short-tenure workers recoup the increased pension contributions (and 
more) with enhanced pension benefits, the long-tenure workers incur 
drops in both wages and pensions. As compared with the middle col 
umns of table 8.1, wages for long-tenure workers are lower by over 
$6,600, and the pension is lower by over $700. The net effect of using 
projected wages in the benefit formula is to redistribute over $7,300 
from each long-tenure worker to each short-tenure worker. More pre 
cisely, the high-tenure workers lose the $7,300 subsidy that had been 
given to them by the practice of using backloaded pensions. This 
$7,300 transfer represents over 7 percent of the total compensation of 
the low-tenure workers but only about 1 percent of the total compensa 
tion of the high-tenure workers.
Effect of Changing to Defined Contribution Pensions
If the firm had a defined contribution plan with a contribution rate of 
10.8 percent, the figures in equilibrium would look exactly like the fig 
ures in the last two columns of table 8.1. The long-tenure workers 
would not be as well off as with backloaded pensions, but they would 
still be paid an amount equal to their value of their output. If a firm 
with a defined benefit pension offers workers the opportunity to con 
vert to a defined contribution pension, it is fairly clear that workers 
who are anticipating a short stay at the firm will be ahead by making 
the change. For longer-term workers, however, the conclusion will 
depend to some extent upon the specifics of the offer. If the wages to be 
used in the defined benefit calculation were the unadjusted nominal
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wages at the time of conversion, long-tenure workers would incur the 
equivalent of a pension capital loss if they converted and would have 
strong incentives to remain with the defined benefit plan. If the wages 
to be used were wages at retirement, the decision of the long-tenure 
workers would depend upon the level of the pension contribution of the 
defined contribution plan relative to the generosity of the defined bene 
fit formula. Another determinant would be the degree to which the 
individual values the defined benefit pension©s annuity aspect, which is 
likely to be absent from a defined contribution plan.
Other Considerations
The analyses reported in this chapter pertain to stylized pension 
plans. We have tried to select plan parameters that, on the basis of our 
previous research, are representative. Nevertheless, the examples are 
much simpler than most of the plans encountered in our empirical 
work. Moreover, the effects of these various policies will depend on 
the actual employment mix within the firm, whether employment is 
growing or shrinking, and expected patterns of turnover.
There are features of pension plans, in addition to vesting require 
ments and the choice of wage used in the formula, that affect pension 
portability. Eligibility requirements for normal retirement based on 
years of service and actuarial bonuses for early retirement raise the 
penalty on early leavers. Such provisions increase the value of the pen 
sions of other groups and hence the contribution rates of all. Also, there 
are many idiosyncratic features of pensions affecting incentives for 
mobility. Frequently, a single plan uses different formulas in calculat 
ing benefits for terminated vested workers, early retirees, and normal 
retirees. Indeed, the choice of formula used for calculating normal 
retirement benefits may vary with the years of service accumulated by 
the worker. Using the projected wage in the pension formula would not 
eliminate these influences on portability, and any effort to make pen 
sions fully portable would have to take these plan features into 
account.
In sum, the recent easing of vesting requirements will not provide 
much additional protection to early leavers. Eliminating the backload- 
ing of pensions will have a greater effect. Furthermore, neither policy
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is likely to have much of an impact on the incentives for turnover for 
workers in the first decades of attachment to the firm.
Caveats for Pension Policy Analysis
If we had found that pension backloading provided strong disincen 
tives to mobility, especially at young ages, it would suggest that back- 
loading of defined benefit pensions meets one of the necessary 
conditions for a firm to have adopted pensions as a device for regulat 
ing mobility, presumably to increase productivity and/or reduce labor 
costs. Also, if we had found that defined benefit pensions were impor 
tant in determining the incentives for turnover, and the extent of turn 
over, we would add one more building block to our understanding of 
the factors underlying the reasons for pension plans and for their spe 
cific characteristics. It could then be asserted with some confidence 
that the features of the pension, such as backloading, play an important 
role in determining a number of outcomes of interest.
Our findings suggest, however, that backloaded pension plans have a 
smaller effect on the incentives relevant to mobility decisions than the 
literature has implied. Our research also suggests that the relationship 
of the cost of mobility to observed mobility behavior is weaker than 
that indicated by the conventional literature. A further conclusion is 
that pensions are not likely to be a major tool for influencing mobility, 
and thus it is unlikely that mobility considerations are an important 
motivation for the adoption of defined benefit plans by firms.
None of this means that pension characteristics are unimportant to 
pension recipients who experience turnover from their jobs at different 
ages. In addition, a fundamental concern of policy makers is the distri 
bution of retirement incomes, which is affected by the turnover experi 
ence of covered workers. What our findings do suggest is that an 
analysis of the relationship of pension plan provisions to pension 
incomes may safely disregard the impact of pension changes on mobil 
ity. More broadly speaking, our analysis suggests that policy makers 
may be less concerned with the effects of pension regulation on mobil 
ity and productivity than they might otherwise be.
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Of course, pension legislation has had a number of goals in addition 
to the ones cited above. One objective is to recognize and protect a 
form of the pension contract under the law so as to increase the likeli 
hood that a worker who is promised a benefit will receive it, as well as 
to raise the fraction of the promised pension that is paid when the full 
commitment is not delivered. Another, more recent, goal is to encour 
age those who wish to work beyond the plan©s normal retirement age, 
so as to mitigate the funding crises in social security and medicare. 
There also is a desire to secure comparable treatment for low-wage 
workers employed by firms offering generous pensions to their high- 
wage workers. Another major aim is to extend pension coverage as 
widely as possible. Finally, Congress has been giving more weight to 
controlling the revenue loss resulting from the favorable tax treatment 
of pensions.
These goals may produce initiatives that will reinforce policies to 
limit backloading or work counter to such policies. For instance, work 
ers who want to stay beyond the normal retirement age are hurt by 
rules that mandate projected wages in pension formulas, but they may 
be helped by policies that require the crediting of age and years of ser 
vice or the actuarial adjustment of benefits for employees who con 
tinue working. When the compensation budget is constrained, efforts to 
help certain classes of workers may have negative impacts on other 
classes of workers. Those individuals who are adversely affected are 
often the target of additional policies designed to improve their status 
or the incentives they face. Consequently, different policies may have 
conflicting effects, and compatibility among goals becomes an issue.
NOTES
1. A survey of major policies to increase portability that were considered in the past is pre 
sented in Turner (1993, chapter 9).
2. With projected wages, the only difference between the pension value at age 30 and its final 
value occurs because different tenure lengths are used in the formula. The 14 percent figures 
comes from dividing the 5 years of tenure at age 30 by 37 years of tenure at age 62. The 3 percent 
figure comes from column 6 of table 2.1.
3. A number of exercises along these lines performed by Hay/Huggins are described in chap 
ter 9 of Turner (1993).
4. Explanations for defined benefit pensions typically focus either on the advantages of benefit 
backloading for the design of efficient compensation schemes or on the importance of the retire 
ment incentives that these plans create, thereby increasing firm profitability. In the former group,
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one explanation is that the backloading of defined benefit plans discourages shirking by workers 
and thereby increases productivity. However, given the accrual patterns of pension plans, the 
potential pension loss from separation is greatest in the middle years of tenure at the firm. As we 
discussed in chapter 3, it is unclear why incentives against shirking need to be so much stronger in 
the middle years than in the early or later years. Another explanation proposed by Oi (1983), that 
pensions help to screen out early quitters and hence to reduce hiring and training costs, faces sim 
ilar objections. Again, if the goal is to recover training costs incurred early in the employment 
relationship, it is unclear why the firms should make the cost of leaving less in the early years than 
in the middle years. Further doubts about shirking and training cost explanations for pensions 
come from evidence that indicates a poor understanding of plan incentives, not only by the work 
ers (Gustman and Steinmeier 1989a; Mitchell 1988), but by their employers (Kotlikoff and Wise 
1987b). Firms that use pensions to create incentives against mobility and shirking have good rea 
son to insure that these incentives are well understood.
The other category of explanations for pensions influencing productivity focuses on retire 
ment incentives. In a model discussed by Parsons (1983), older workers are characterized by a 
much wider dispersion of productivity than are younger workers. Either because the firms cannot 
distinguish well which older workers are productive and which are not, or because firms are 
unable to act on this knowledge, they find it more efficient not to employ workers past a certain 
age. In this explanation, pensions provide workers with the incentives to retire at the appropriate 
age, thereby increasing overall productivity. The major drawback of this rationale is its failure to 
account for the large number of plans in which eligibility for retirement depends partly, if not 
entirely, on years of service. For example, there are plans that permit retirement with full benefits 
after 30 years of service, regardless of age. If the goal of pensions is to induce retirement at an 
appropriate age, then it would seem that eligibility for retirement should be based on age, not on 
years of service.
5. For a useful discussion of pension policies and their origins, see CBO (1987, appendix A).

9 
Conclusions
It is a widely accepted view that pensions reduce labor mobility. 
Observing that mobility is lower on pension covered jobs and that 
defined benefit pension plans backload benefits, many students of the 
pension-mobility relationship have concluded that it is the disincentive 
created by backloading that decreases mobility. Others have reached 
this conclusion on the basis of more careful empirical analysis, as indi 
cated in our survey of the literature.
In the preceding chapters, we have examined the basis for this view. 
Our research provides evidence that is strongly inconsistent with the 
thesis that lower mobility on pension-covered jobs is due to backload 
ing of defined benefit plans.
A direct examination of defined benefit pension formulas indicates 
that backloading accounts for only a small portion of the value of the 
future pension. We have shown that, on average, a worker in his thirties 
or forties requires a raise of only a few percentage points to overcome 
the loss from pension backloading. While pension backloading may 
amount to half a year©s earnings in a sample of prime-aged male work 
ers, those in the sample have a remaining worklife of decades, so that 
even a modest wage increase will generate earnings that can overcome 
the one-time loss from leaving a job with a backloaded pension.
An analysis of worker mobility in three separate data sets also raises 
questions about the idea that backloading accounts for lower mobility 
from pension-covered jobs. In particular, reduced form multivariate 
mobility equations indicate that the reduction in mobility from pen 
sion-covered jobs is the same whether the worker is covered by a 
defined benefit plan, which is backloaded, or by a defined contribution 
plan, which is not.
If pension backloading does not explain the lower mobility from 
pension-covered jobs, then what is causing the reduced mobility in 
these cases? Much of the analysis in this book has focused on the 
hypothesis that pension-covered jobs offer higher wages than do non- 
pensioned jobs and that this is done for unobserved reasons, including 
the payment of efficiency wages or rents. Thus, the compensation pre-
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mium received by workers on jobs that offer pensions accounts for the 
associated lower mobility.
This explanation has been supported in analyses using data from 
three surveys: the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP), and the Panel Study on 
Income Dynamics (PSID). The descriptive information from these sur 
veys suggests that higher wages are paid on pension-covered jobs than 
on other jobs. The value of the pension widens the compensation dif 
ference. The descriptive data also indicate that wage losses are greater 
for movers from pension-covered jobs; these losses are augmented 
because the new jobs frequently do not offer pensions.
Estimates of a model in which the three outcomes (mobility, com 
pensation on the current job, and compensation on the next best job) 
are jointly determined support the idea that it is the higher compensa 
tion on pension-covered jobs that accounts for lower mobility from 
those jobs. The analysis suggests that because the value of backloading 
is just a small fraction of the compensation differential for those who 
hold pension-covered jobs, backloading plays only a very slight role in 
explaining the mobility differences between those with and without 
pensions. For pension-covered workers, most of the difference in 
mobility is associated with the higher compensation on their current as 
opposed to next best job.
To test the idea that pension backloading and compensation differ 
entials between the current and next best job fully account for the 
mobility differences between workers with and without pensions, a 
model was specified in which mobility was a function of separate coef 
ficients for pension backloading and the compensation premium. We 
then tested the constraint that a dollar©s worth of pension backloading 
has the same effect on turnover as a dollar©s difference in compensation 
from other sources. In one data set, the SIPP, coefficients measuring 
the effect of backloading and of other compensation differences were 
found to be approximately equal, with no significant differences. This 
test suggests that there is no important omitted factor in the model. 
However, in a second data set, the PSID, the estimated coefficients 
were significantly different, with a much higher coefficient for a vari 
able measuring backloading, suggesting that there may be a factor not 
captured in the estimated models. Although the results from these tests
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are mixed, the small size of the pension incentives compared to the 
other elements of compensation leads us to favor the SIPP results.
In the end, we have very strong evidence that lower mobility on pen 
sion-covered jobs is not a result of the backloading of defined benefit 
pension plans. Much of the available evidence also points to the con 
clusion that turnover is lower from pension-covered jobs because they 
offer incumbents higher compensation than is available in alternative 
employment. There also is some suggestion that an unmeasured factor 
associated with employment on jobs offering backloaded pensions may 
account for part of the reduction in turnover observed for pension-cov 
ered workers, although it is unclear why the effect of the unobservable 
element is much stronger in the PSID than in the SIPP data. It will be 
the task of future researchers to determine exactly how much there is to 
that story.
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